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This thesis centres on the intersection between four French nineteenth-century novels
and the writings of the Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing, work which appeared in the
1960's and early 1970's and which has been given the label 'anti-psychiatric'
because of its hostility to established psychiatric practices. The aims of this thesis
are, firstly, to demonstrate that a congruence of concerns exists between the two
domains in spite of the wide distance which may seem to separate them, and,
secondly, to examine the extent to which Laingian anti-psychiatry may be used as an
analytical framework within which to examine the de-motivated turning point of
each novel - for example, why Julien Sorel attempts to kill Madame de Renal in Le
Rouge et le Noir or why Claude Lantier commits suicide in Zola's L 'CEuvre.
In part one, 1 lay out the founding principles of the anti-psychiatry movement as well
as its many shortcomings, focussing both on Laing's writings and his involvement
with the ultimately ill-fated anti-psychiatric therapeutic community at Kingsley Hall
in London. I argue that although anti-psychiatric practice has today fallen into
disrepute among mainstream psychiatric clinicians - in part because of the failings of
Kingsley Hall - it nonetheless offers the critic a fruitful if vastly under-utilised
interpretative framework within which to analyse literary texts.
In the first chapter of part II, I demonstrate the relevance of anti-psychiatric theory to
the four novels under consideration through analysing each novel's de-motivated
turning point. I argue that the congruence of concerns shared by anti-psychiatry and
the four novels centres on foregrounding notions of authenticity and on questioning
received views of madness. I also outline in the conclusion to part II chapter one a
series of questions which ask why the main protagonist of each novel, much like the
schizophrenic as described by Laing, acts in a manner which is seemingly
inexplicable and contrary to their self-interest, particularly at the moment in the text
when it is least expected or least 'vraisemblable'. In the second chapter of part II, I
review the approaches other critics have taken to these questions, enabling me to
situate my proposed Laingian anti-psychiatric approach within the critical field.
In the three chapters which make up part III, I borrow concepts proposed by Laing in
his 1960 best-selling ontology of schizophrenia The Divided Self in order to analyse
the existential positions of the four protagonists. I adopt a diachronic approach,
analysing in chapters one and two the period leading up to their unexplained and
unexpected actions. I demonstrate that the mental processes undergone by a
schizophrenic - such as 'depersonalisation' and 'disembodiment' - each have their
counterparts in the protagonists' lives, on both a literal and a figurative level. In the
third chapter of part III, I extend this Laingian analysis to include the portion of the
novels subsequent to their apparently irrational actions. I show that these actions end
up enabling the protagonists to gain access to a privileged, quasi-messianic mode of
existence similar to that which anti-psychiatrists believed their patients were able to
reach as a result of their schizophrenic condition. I argue, in conclusion therefore,
that the four protagonists can be seen as anticipating and realising within a fictional
context the goals of Laingian anti-psychiatric therapy which its practitioners failed to
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Farewell to a warrior,
the world is a better place for your being here.1
Les hommes sont si necessairement fous, que ce serait etre fou
par un autre tour de folie, de n'etre pas fou.2
'
Spoken by Paul Laing at his father's memorial service in 1990. Quoted in John Clay, R. D.
Laing: A DividedSelf(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997), p. 265.
2 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, in CEnvres completes, edited by Jacques Chevalier (Paris:
Gallimard, 'Pleiade', 1954), p. 1134.
6
This thesis centres on the intersection between four nineteenth-century French novels
and the writings of the Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing, work which has been given
the label 'anti-psychiatry' because of its hostility to established psychiatric practices.
The fields of nineteenth-century French literature and 'anti-psychiatry' may at first
seem to have little in common with one another. Flowever, I wish to demonstrate
through this thesis that there exists between the two spheres what could be termed a
'congruence of concerns'. Furthermore, I wish to examine the extent to which 'anti-
psychiatry' may be used as an analytical framework within which to examine
controversial events in four novels: Stendhal's Le Rouge et le Noir (1830), Flonore
de Balzac's Louis Lambert (1832), Edrnond and Jules de Goncourt's Renee
Mauperin (1864), and Emile Zola's L'CEuvre (1886). These novels may at first
appear to have little in common with one another - as well as with 'anti-psychiatry' -
beyond belonging to the tradition of the nineteenth-century Realist / Naturalist novel.
They do, however, share two features which are central to this thesis. Firstly, the
event on which each novel turns and which brings about each novel's closure - Louis
Lambert's attempted self-castration and subsequent collapse into catatonia; Julien
Sorel's attempted murder of Mme de Renal; Renee Mauperin's incrimination of her
brother and her overtly beatified death; and Claude Lantier's suicide - is left either
entirely unexplained or else explained in multiple, contradictory or inadequate ways
by the narrator and / or character concerned. Secondly, each of these de-motivated or
confusingly motivated incidents seems irrational, out-of-place or 'invraisemblable' in
the light of preceding events in the novel. On a first reading at least, the reader could
well be forgiven for concluding that the actions of the four chief protagonists run
directly contrary to what might reasonably and rationally be expected of them at that
point of the narrative. In L 'CEuvre, for example, Claude Lantier commits suicide at
the very point when he appears to have the possibility for personal happiness and
security within his grasp for the first time, having abjured his previously all-
compassing passion for art which has caused both him and his family only misery
and poverty. The central goal of this thesis is thus to respond within an 'anti-
psychiatric' framework to the following series of questions: why does Julien Sorel
try to kill Mme de Renal when he appears to have no need to do so? Why does Louis
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Lambert attempt to castrate himself just a few days before his much-anticipated
wedding, and why, by extension, does he collapse into what appears to be incurable
madness and die at the age of 28? Why does Renee Mauperin incriminate her
brother? Furthermore, why does she die at such a young age and why does she take
on such god-like qualities in death? Why does Claude Lantier commit suicide?
In order to shed new critical light on these questions, I examine them from the stand¬
point of 'anti-psychiatry', a body of psychiatric theories on mental illness developed
by disparate groups of dissident psychiatrists, cultural theorists and political activists
in the 1960's and 1970's. I concentrate specifically on the work of the Scottish
psychotherapist Ronald Laing (better known as R. D. Laing) not only because he was
'anti-psychiatry's hero',3 'the arch-seer and prophet-in-chief of anti-psychiatry'4 and
'the most widely read psychiatrist in the world in the 1970's'.5 More important in the
present context, however, are the facts, firstly, that there is a demonstrable
'congruence of concerns' between Laing's work and the four novels, and, secondly,
that his writings, in particular The Divided Self with its ontology of schizophrenia,
provide us with easily comprehensible descriptions of the specific processes a mad
person undergoes in going mad. These descriptions can then be used as an
interpretative matrix for examining the questions outlined above in relation to the
four novels. This fact distinguishes his work from that of Foucault or Deleuze and
Guattari, for example, whose writings, despite being immensely productive and
provocative in their own right when read in conjunction with literary texts, do not
broach the psychological processes undergone by a mentally ill individual.6
3
Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, 'Introduction', in Cultures ofPsychiatry and Mental Health Care
in Post-War Britain and the Netherlands, edited by Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra and Roy Porter
(Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 1-7 (p. 5).
4
Peter Sedgwick, Psycho Politics: Laing, Foucault, Goffman, Szasz and the Future ofMass
Psychiatry (London: Pluto Press, 1982), p. 67.
3
M. Guy Thompson, 'The Fidelity to Experience in R. D. Laing's Treatment Philosophy',
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 33 (1997), 595-614 (p. 595).
6 Deleuze and Guattari's work has given rise to a small, but growing field of study known as
schizoanalysis. See for example Charles Stivale, 'Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari:
Schizoanalysis and Literary Discourse', Sub Stance, 29 (1981), 46-57; Andre Colombat,
Deleuze et la litterature (New York: Peter Lang, 1990); Eugene W. Holland, Baudelaire and
Schizoanalysis: The Sociopoetics of Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993); John Marks, 'Deleuze and Literature: Metaphor and Indirect Discourse', Social
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Moreover, as shall emerge from the review of Laing-inspired literary criticism which
I carry out towards the end of part I, the 'grille de lecture' which Laing's work offers
has been vastly under-utilised by critics, particularly within the field of French
studies. One exception is the parallel drawn by Ann Duncan between Laing's
theories and the Goncourts' Germinie Lacerteux. Duncan concludes her study of the
novel, which otherwise makes no reference to Laing's work, by commenting on the
'astonishing accuracy with which the Goncourts, through insight rather than wide-
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scale observation, analysed the dynamics of [...] interpersonal situations', and by
suggesting that their analysis 'is borne out by the work of several modern
psychiatrists, in particular R. D. Laing'. She concludes:
there are close similarities between the Goncourts' account of
Germinie's development of behavioural disturbances under stress,
and the conclusion drawn by Laing from his observations of the
relationship between neurosis and family conflicts. [...] The
parallels between the Goncourts' insights into the psychology of
their heroine and the conclusions drawn by Laing and others from
their extensive observation of schizophrenics and their families
suggest that, through sheer intuition, the Goncourts hit on some
very astute perceptions, almost a century before these were
formulated by psychologists.9
Duncan's comments aside, no further work has been devoted to the confluence of
French literature with the works of R. D. Laing. It is this gap which I aim, at least in
part, to fill through demonstrating that 'anti-psychiatry', and Laing's work in
particular, is of relevance to the concerns raised in several French nineteenth-century
Realist novels.
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to an exposition of the
founding principles of the 'anti-psychiatry' movement and the objections it raises to
the psychiatric orthodoxy. Such an exposition is required because, despite its
immense popularity in the 1960's and early 1970's, 'anti-psychiatry' is an almost
Semiotics, 7 (1997), 233-46; Eugene W. Holland, Deleuze and Guattari's 'Anti-Oedipe
Introduction to Schizoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1999).
'
J. Ann Duncan, 'Self and Others: The Pattern of Neurosis and Conflict in Germinie






entirely forgotten phenomenon today, even among members of the psychiatric
profession. I also focus on its therapeutic objectives and techniques, as exemplified
by the Kingsley Hall therapeutic community which was established by Laing and his
colleagues in London in 1965. I demonstrate that the Bakhtinian conception of the
carnival provides an instructive analogy for the history and practice of 'anti-
psychiatry'. I argue that although it is regarded by the few members of the
mainstream clinical psychiatric profession who have any knowledge of the field as
little more than a slightly embarrassing and best forgotten 'fete des fous', 'anti-
psychiatry' nonetheless provides us with a set of metaphors and an interpretative
framework which lends itself particularly well to the analysis of literary texts.
Having outlined in part one the methodological approach adopted in this thesis, I
devote part two, divided into two chapters, to a 'rapprochement' between 'anti-
psychiatry' and the four novels under consideration. In part II chapter one, I
demonstrate through a detailed analysis of the textual inscription of the de-motivated
or ambiguously motivated status of each novel's central event that 'anti-psychiatry'
and the four novels arguably share a similar vision of madness: that is, that madness
is but a series of actions which run contrary to received codes of behaviour. In
parallel to this congruence of concerns, I produce a detailed series of questions
relating to the 'invraisemblance' of each novel's key event. Part II chapter two then
reviews the responses other critics have proposed to these questions, a review which
enables me to situate my 'anti-psychiatric' approach within the wider critical field.
Part III centres on an analysis of the four novels through the lens of Laingian 'anti-
psychiatry' and, in particular, Laing's 1960 work The Divided Self: An Existential
Study in Sanity and Madness. Part III therefore brings together the 'problematique'
outlined in part II and the methodology described in part I. I adopt a diachronic
approach, examining in chapters one and two of part III only the events which
precede the protagonist's seemingly illogical acts. From The Divided Self I borrow
the concepts of 'ontological insecurity', the resultant fears of engulfment and
implosion, and the defence mechanisms of isolation, depersonalisation and
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disembodiment in order to undertake a psychological re-construction of the four
protagonists in the period which precedes their allegedly illogical and irrational
actions. In the third chapter of part III, I extend this diachronic analysis to include the
period subsequent to these acts and draw on Laing's notorious but vastly successful
1967 work The Politics of Experience, in addition to The Divided Self, to help
formulate 'anti-psychiatric' responses to the questions outlined in part II. I
demonstrate that the four protagonists' irrational actions end up enabling them to
gain access to a privileged, quasi-messianic mode of existence similar to that which
anti-psychiatrists believed their patients were able to reach as a result of their
schizophrenic condition. I argue, in conclusion, that the four protagonists can be seen
as anticipating and realising within a fictional context the goals of Laingian anti-
psychiatric therapy which its practitioners failed to translate into clinical reality at,
for example, Kingsley Hall.
Limits must necessarily be placed on the scope of any thesis. Although the point of
departure of this thesis is madness, if viewed from an 'anti-psychiatric' perspective, I
do not provide a study of the inscription of madness in nineteenth-century French
literature, of which Shoshana Felman's work on the manipulation of the signifier
'folie' and its cognates in the works of Stendhal remains a classic.10 I also do not aim
to examine allegedly 'mad' French nineteenth-century authors such as Nerval or
Lautreamont" nor the rise of 'hysteria', that stock trope of nineteenth-century
literature, because it plays no part in three of these four novels and only a tangential
one in Renee Mauperin.12 Similarly, because none of the four writers examined here
fell victim to sustained periods of what could be termed 'clinical madness' during
10 Shoshana Felman, La «folie » dans I 'antvre romanesque de Stendhal (Paris: Corti, 1971).
See also Gwenhael Ponnau, La Folie dans la litterature fantastique (Paris: Editions du
CNRS, 1987); and Tony James, Dream, Creativity and Madness in Nineteenth-Century
France (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
" See for example Jean-Pierre Soulier, Lautreamont - genie ou maladie mentale? (Paris:
Minard, 1978); Peter Dayan, Nerval et sesperes: Portrait en trois volets avec deux gonds et
un cadenas (Geneva: Droz, 1992); Laure Murat, La Maison du docteur Blanche: Histoire
d'un asile et de sespensionnaires de Nerval a Maupassant (Paris: Lattes, 2001).
12
For a solid analysis of views on hysteria in nineteenth-century France, see Janet Beizer,
Ventriloquized Bodies: Narratives ofHysteria in Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
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their own lives, I do not discuss the relationship between madness and the creative
processes.13 In a wider sense, I approach these authors' works not from the
biographical level, a 'piste de recherches' already well trodden by critics of the
nineteenth century,14 but almost exclusively from the level of close textual analysis.
The second mainstay of this thesis is the body of psychiatric theory known as 'anti-
psychiatry' and, in particular, the work of R. D. Laing. Although I discuss in part I
the roots of 'anti-psychiatric' thought, I do not examine in detail the heavy
existentialist,15 psychoanalytic16 or other philosophical influences17 weighing down
on Laing and other like-minded thinkers. The fraught relationship between Laing's
work and the New Left of the 1960's and 70's has already been the subject of several
13 See here Jean Oury, Creation et schizophrenic (Paris: Galilee, 1989); and Frederic Gros,
Creation et folie: Une histoire dn jugement psychiatrique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1997).
14 To give just one example of biographically oriented criticism on each author, see Andre
Maurois, Promethee ou la vie de Balzac (Paris: Hachette, 1965); Jean Prevost, La Creation
chez Stendhal: Essai sur le metier d'ecrire et la psychologic de I'ecrivain (Paris: Mercure de
France, 1951); Robert Ricatte, La Creation romanesque chez les Goncourt 1851-1870 (Paris:
Armand Colin, 1953); F. W. J. Hemmings, Emile Zola (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953).
15
Douglas Kirsner, The Schizoid World of Jean-Paul Sartre and R. D. Laing (St. Lucia,
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976); Douglas Kirsner, 'An Abyss of
Difference: Laing, Sartre and Jaspers', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 21
(1990), 209-15; Christian Delacampagne, 'De l'existentialisme a l'antipsychiatrie', Temps
modernes, 46 (1990), 658-64; Alfons Griedler, 'On the Existential-Phenomenological
Background of R. D. Laing's The Divided Self, Journal of the Society for Existential
Analysis, 2 (1991), 8-15.
16 Daniel Burston, 'Conflict and Sociability in Hegel, Freud and Their Followers: Tzvetan
Todorov's "Living Here Together'", New Literary History, 27 (1996), 73-82; M. Guy
Thompson, 'Deception, Mystification and Trauma: Laing and Freud', Psychoanalytic
Review, 83 (1996), 827-47; Thompson, 'The Fidelity to Experience in R. D. Laing's
Treatment Philosophy'; M. Guy Thompson, 'The Heart of the Matter: R. D. Laing's
Enigmatic Relationship With Psychoanalysis', Psychoanalytic Review, 87 (2000), 483-510.
17 Martin Howarth-Williams, The Work of R. D. Laing and its Relevance for Sociology
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); John M. Heaton, 'The Divided Self: Kierkegaard
or Winnicott?', Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis, 2 (1991), 30-7; Daniel
Burston, The Wing ofMadness: The Life and Work ofR. D. Laing (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1996) pp. 151-251; Gavin Miller, 'Transcendental Kinship in the Works of
George Friel and Alasdair Gray' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1999);
John M. Heaton, 'On R. D. Laing: Style, Sorcery and Alienation', Psychoanalytic Review,
87 (2000), 511-26; Daniel Burston, The Crucible ofExperience: R. D. Laing and the Crisis
ofPsychotherapy (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000); Daniel Burston, 'R. D. Laing
and the Politics of Diagnosis', Janus Head, 4 (2001), 12-28; Gavin Miller, 'Cognition and
Community: The Scottish Philosophical Context of "The Divided Self", Janus Head, 4,
(2001), 104-29.
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studies18 and are consequently not examined here. Similarly, I largely ignore the
biographical side of Laing studies, a field which has seen much scholarly activity in
the last decade.19 I also do not touch on the relationship between Laing's work and
20that of the best-known American anti-psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, and, more widely,
1 do not examine ' anti-psychiatry"s extensive implantation into the cultures of most
Western nations in the 1960's and 1970's, particularly the UK,21 the USA,22
Germany,23 Holland,24 and, most successfully of all, Italy.2"
18 See Robert J. Antonio, 'The Work of R. D. Laing: A Neo-Marxist, Phenomenological
Interpretation', Human Context, 7 (1975), 15-26; Andrew Collier, R. D. Laing: The
Philosophy and Politics ofPsychotherapy (Hassocks: Harvester, 1977); Scott Bortle, 'R. D.
Laing as Negative Thinker', Janus Head, 4 (2001), 130-58.
19 See Adrian C. Laing, 'R. D. Laing - The First Five Years', Journal of the Society for
Existential Analysis, 2 (1991), 24-9; Adrian C. Laing, R. D. Laing: A Life (London: Peter
Owen, 1994); Burston, The Wing ofMadness, pp. 1-150; Bob Mullan, Mad to be Normal:
Conversations with R. D. Laing (London: Free Association Books, 1995); John Clay, R. D.
Laing: A Divided Self, Bob Mullan, R. D. Laing: A Personal View (London: Duckworth,
1999); Joseph H. Berke, 'Trick or Treat: The Divided Self of R. D. Laing', Janus Head, 4
(2001), 49-53; Theodor Itten, 'Laing in Austria', Janus Head, 4 (2001), 69-89.
20
For a comprehensive survey of Szasz's work, see Richard E. Vatz and Lee S. Weinberg,
'The Rhetorical Paradigm in Psychiatric History: Thomas Szasz and the Myth of Mental
Illness', in Discovering the History ofPsychiatry, edited by Roy Porter and Mark S. Micale
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 311-30. A less enthusiastic view
can be found in Rael Jean Isaac and Virginia C. Armat, Madness in the Streets: How
Psychiatry and the Law Abandoned the Mentally III (New York: Free Press, 1990).
21
For cogent surveys, see Digby Tantam, 'The Anti-Psychiatry Movement', in 150 Years of
British Psychiatry 1841-1991, edited by German E. Berrios and Hugh Freeman (London:
Gaskell, 1991), pp. 333-47; Roy Porter, 'Two Cheers for Psychiatry! The Social History of
Mental Disorder in Twentieth-Century Britain', in 150 Years of British Psychiatry, Volume
II: The Aftermath, edited by Hugh Freeman and German E. Berrios (London: Athlone,
1996), pp. 383-406; Nick Crossley, 'R. D. Laing and the British Anti-Psychiatry Movement:
A Socio-Historical Analysis', Social Science and Medicine, 47 (1998), 877-89.
2 For studies which take in the wider anti-psychiatric scene in the USA beyond Szasz, see
Norman Dain, 'Critics and Dissenters: Reflections on "Anti-Psychiatry" in the United
States', Journal of the History of Behavioural Studies, 25 (1989), 3-25; Norman Dain,
'Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry in the United States', in Discovering the History of
Psychiatry, edited by Porter and Micale, pp. 415-44; David A. Powlinson, 'Competent to
Counsel? The History of a Conservative Protestant Anti-Psychiatry Movement'
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1997).
23 H. Spandler, 'To Make an Army out of an Illness: The History of the Socialist Patients'
Collective', Asylum, 6 (1992), 4-16; Iris Holling, 'Three Years of Anti-Psychiatric Practice
at the Berlin Runaway-House', Changes, 17 (1999), 278-88.
24 Gemma Blok, "'Messiah of the Schizophrenics": Jan Foudraine and Anti-Psychiatry in
Holland', in Cultures ofPsychiatry and Mental Health Care, edited by Gijswijt-Hofstra and
Porter, pp. 151-67.
23
For more on the anti-institutionalisation campaigns led by Franco Basaglia, see T. Becker,
'Psychiatric Reform in Italy - How Does It Work in Piedmont?', British Journal of
Psychiatry, 147 (1985), 254-60; R. Mollica, 'From Antonio Gramsci to Franco Basaglia: The
13
A further sphere which I do not treat in this thesis, even though it represents exciting
and as yet largely unexplored critical terrain, is the relationship between, on the one
hand, 'anti-psychiatry' and Laing's theories and, on the other, late twentieth-century
French culture. One might think that there is in fact very little to explore in this area
given that Elisabeth Roudinesco claims that 'il n'y eut aucun veritable courant
antipsychiatrique'26 in France. Roudinesco attributes this to her belief that 'la gauche
lacanienne occupait en partie le terrain de la revolte contre l'ordre psychiatrique, a
27
travers le courant de la psychotherapie institutionnelle', while, at the same time, the
work of Foucault and Deleuze 'cristallisaient la contestation « antipsychiatrique »
face a la double orthodoxie freudienne et lacanienne'.28 On the other hand, Arthur
Marwick takes a rather different view when he describes Laing as 'the one [British]
29individual to achieve guru status and fame on the Left Bank'. This divergence
between Roudinesco's and Marwick's positions, when taken along with the relative
TO
dearth of French criticism pertaining to Laing's life and work, points to the fact that
a detailed assessment of Laing's impact on French cultural life remains there for the
writing. This thesis does not, and indeed could not, aim to plug this gap. I also leave
to one side the intersection between Laing's work and, firstly, that of Jacques Lacan,
31the French intellectual most closely associated with 'anti-psychiatry'; secondly,
that of Jean-Paul Sartre, an extremely heavy influence on Laing's intellectual
Theory and Practice of the Italian Psychiatric Reform', International Journal of Mental
Health, 14 (1985), 22-41; and Martin Donnelly, The Politics of Mental Health in Italy
(London: Routledge, 1992).






29 Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain. France, Italy and the US c.
1958-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 313.
30
Only two short studies, now both over a quarter of a century old, examine Laing's theories
from a French perspective. See Gilbert C. Rapaille, Laing (Paris: Editions Universitaires,
1972); Christian Delacampagne, Antipsychiatrie ou les voies du sacre (Paris: Grasset, 1974).
31
Only one study has touched on the links between the work of Laing and Lacan. Judy Tame
Wall and Del Loewenthal focus on the differing ways in which Laing, Lacan and Freud
approach the question: 'when our clients speak to us [therapists], can their discourse be said
to be true or false?' See their study 'The Saviour in the Gap: A Comparison of Lacan with
Freud and Laing', British Journal ofPsychotherapy, 13 (1997), 451-60 (p. 451).
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career;32 thirdly, that of Michel Foucault whose Histoire de la folic can be seen as a
classic founding text of 'anti-psychiatric' thought;33 and, finally, that of Deleuze and
Guattari with their anti-capitalist, anti-Freudian project as laid out in L'Anti-CEdipe
and Mille Plateaux, even if the latter philosophers, similarly to Lacan, have been
described as 'the rough equivalent in France of R. D. Laing or David Cooper in
England'."'4 Nor will I examine Guattari's involvement with the innovative La Borde
psychiatric clinic despite it making for another 'rough equivalent' of 'anti-
psychiatry"s Kingsley Hall therapeutic community which I examine in some detail
in part one.
My goal in this thesis is to examine the extent to which Laing's writings may be used
as an interpretative framework within which to re-conceptualise the existential
position of the chief protagonist of each of the four novels. Through this thesis I wish
to demonstrate my belief that 'anti-psychiatry' presents a highly fruitful conceptual
framework for the analysis of literary texts. As Elaine Showalter has said:
if Laing's work lasts, it will not be in the realm of psychiatric
practice or social style, but in art or literature, where it may provide
instructive images and tropes for other imaginations. Laing created
himself out of images and books and to images and books he has
returned; literature gave him not only some of his models and
incentives, but, in view of what the 60's failed to do, his destiny as
well."
32 For more on this important reciprocal Laing-Sartre influence, see D. Mackey, 'Sartre and
the Problem of Madness', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 1 (1970), 80-2;
Max Charlesworth, 'Sartre, Laing and Freud', Review of Existential Psychology and
Psychiatry, 17 (1980-1), 23-39; David Jopling, 'Anti-Psychiatry in Sartre's The Family
Idiot', Review ofExistential Psychology and Psychiatry, 19 (1984-5), 161-87; David Jopling,
'Sartre's Anti-Psychiatry and Philosophical Anthropology', Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology, 18 (1987), 6-13; Shlomit Schuster, 'Sartre's Freud and the Future of
Sartrean Psychoanalysis', Israeli Journal ofPsychiatry and Related Sciences, 35 (1998), 20-
30.
Relatively little is known about the personal relationship between Laing and Foucault.
They certainly entered into considerable correspondence, much of which is held in Glasgow
University Library's R. D. Laing Collection. Moreover, they took part in several public
debates as Didier Eribon reports in Michel Foucault (1926-1984) (Paris: Flammarion, 1989),
pp. 67; 148; 332-3. Yet little is known about their reading of each other's works.
'4
Holland, Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-CEdipus, p. vii.
35 Elaine Showalter, 'Laing and the Sixties', Raritan, 1 (1981), pp. 107-27 (p. 127).
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PART I:
'Line fete des fous?'
The Rise and Fall and Rise Again
of 'Anti-Psychiatry'
Carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing
truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of
all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions. Carnival
was [... ] the feast of becoming, change and renewal.36
Et qu'est-ce qu'un aliene authentique? C'est un homme qui a
prefere devenir fou [... ] que de forfaire a une certaine idee de
I'honneur humain. [...] Car un aliene est aussi un homme que la
societe n'a pas voulu entendre et qu'elle a voulu empecher
d'emettre d'insupportables verites.37
36 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, translated by Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 10.
,7 Antonin Artaud, CEuvres Completes, 25 volumes (Paris: Gallimard, 1956-90), XIII (1974):
'Van Gogh: Le suicide de la societe', pp. 13-64 (p. 17).
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Introduction to Part I
In his recent discussion of the historical significance of what has become known as
'anti-psychiatry', the Warwick historian Colin Jones suggests that the 'anti-
psychiatry' movement can only be satisfactorily defined as 'the carnivalesque
celebration of the symbolic inversion of medical authority and legitimacy'. Jones's
introduction of the carnival metaphor is significant on two levels. Firstly, it points to
the difficulties inherent to defining 'anti-psychiatry' in anything other than negative
terms: it is, after all, much more straightforward to describe what both the carnival
and 'anti-psychiatry' are not or what they react against rather than what they do
actively represent in a more positive sense. Secondly, the carnival is often mistakenly
assumed to be the period during which all restrictions on normally forbidden
licentious and debauched behaviour are temporarily lifted. In reality, however,
individuals do not have licence to behave as they choose during the carnival and
must instead abide by a series of strict codes and traditions handed down from one
generation to the next. In a parallel sense, 'anti-psychiatry' is often mistakenly
viewed as the 'sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll' era of psychiatric history in which it was
forbidden to forbid. In reality, however, as I outline here in part I, the carnivalesque
symbolic inversion of medical authority which was wrought by 'anti-psychiatrists' in
the 1960's and early 1970's was founded on a set of codes and beliefs which were
just as rigid, as revered and as strictly adhered to as any set of practices and traditions
which characterise pre-Lenten carnivals. The aim of part one, then, is to outline the
cultural and intellectual codes and foundations of the so-called 'anti-psychiatry'
movement. I analyse the principal criticisms which the movement directed at
mainstream psychiatric practices and the allegations which the latter in return threw
back at their passionate disparagers; I also discuss the three models of Laingian 'anti-
psychiatric' thought and the principal goals of its therapeutic practice. In the second
half of part I in particular, I argue that the Bakhtinian metaphor of the carnivalesque
can provide a useful analogy for our understanding of this important counter-cultural
movement. Part I thus revolves around the question: did 'anti-psychiatry' merely
represent a 'fete des fous'?
38
Gijswijt-Hofstra, 'Introduction', p. 6.
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If 'anti-psychiatry' can be seen in terms of the carnivalesque, R. D. Laing is its
unrivalled 'carnival king'. Born in Glasgow in 1927, Laing studied medicine at the
local university between 1945 and 1951, eventually choosing to specialise in
TQ
psychiatry. His brilliantly insightful analyses of the schizoid condition; his
magnetic personality and outstanding empathy for schizophrenic patients; his
penchant for fame and celebrity; and his extremely colourful private life which took
in several wives and mistresses, ten children and an unquenchable thirst for single
malt all contributed to him winning as many passionate acolytes as furious
detractors. Since his untimely death on a St. Tropez tennis-court in 1989, he has
variously been described as 'the most influential psychiatrist of his time'40 and 'a
pyrotechnically gifted analyst and writer',41 or, less charitably, as 'a poor man's
Jung'42 and 'a semi-charlatan with only a genius for self-publicity'.43 Despite the fact
that Laing's work today is often subjected to scorn and derision from certain quarters
of the psychiatric profession, one commentator nonetheless has sufficient confidence
in Laing's worth and ability to be able to claim that 'more than anyone else in our
time, Ronald Laing challenged the mental health professions and society at large to
question prevailing models of madness and the nature and limits of psychiatric
authority'.44 Anthony Clare, the doyen of Radio 4 establishment psychiatry and
certainly not someone who might be expected to be a friend of the Laingian
enterprise, even goes as far as to declare that 'Laing influenced a whole generation of
young men and women in their choice of psychiatry as a career. [...] Everyone in
contemporary psychiatry owes Laing something'.45 A further aim of part I is to
examine some of the misunderstandings surrounding Laingian 'anti-psychiatry'
which have given rise to such opposing views.
39 For full details of Laing's family background and education in Glasgow, see WMF, 33-94;
Adrian Laing, R. D. Laing, pp. 16-43; Burston, The Wing ofMadness, pp. 1-42; and Clay, R.
D. Laing, pp. 1-38.
40
Anthony Clare, 'Ronald David Laing 1927-1989: An Appreciation', Psychiatric Bulletin,
14 (1990), 87-8 (p. 87).
41 Carole Augier, 'R. D. Laing: A Divided Self, New Statesman, 26 July 1996, p. 46.




Burston, The Crucible ofExperience, p. 1.
45
Quoted in Clay, R. D. Laing, p. 268.
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Let the carnival begin
So far in part I, I have placed the term 'anti-psychiatry' inside inverted commas. I
have done so for the simple reason that the term was much disputed and indeed often
resented by many of those most closely associated with it. R. D. Laing, for example,
objected to the term, which was first coined by Laing's one-time close colleague
David Cooper in his 1967 work Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry,46 on the grounds
that he found the neologism as fundamentally illogical and meaningless as the terms
'anti-science' or 'anti-medicine'.47 Instead, Laing preferred to be described as 'a true
psychiatrist'.48 Yet for all its inelegance and shortcomings, the term 'anti-psychiatry'
retains the important merit of flagging up one of its practitioners' chief concerns. As
a recent biographer of R. D. Laing writes: 'in one respect the term is accurate: it
highlights the 'anti-' aspect of these thinkers. They were all against establishment
psychiatry or against establishment tout court ',49 Indeed, it is only this carnivalesque
'anti-' aspect of anti-psychiatry which gives any form of identity and purpose to an
otherwise highly fractious and uncoordinated movement.
What do anti-psychiatrists reject or react against? The widest of their criticisms
relates to the methodological principles on which establishment psychiatrists
predicate their clinical diagnoses. In particular, it is the profession's aspiration
towards a value-free, pseudo-positivistic objectivity which most angers anti-
psychiatrists. This debate revolves around what can be termed as the 'biomedical' or
'positivistic' model of madness versus the 'social' or 'interpretative' model. In the
words of one influential psychiatry text-book, a central tenet of the 'medical model'
reads: 'the foundations of psychiatry have to be laid on the ground of natural
sciences. [...] It is only from an organic connection between the natural sciences,
46 David Cooper, Psychiatry andAnti-Psychiatry (London: Tavistock, 1967).
47
Kotowicz, R. D. Laing and the Paths ofAnti-Psychiatry, p. 5. In his autobiography, Laing
states: '1 have never called myself an anti-psychiatrist, and have disclaimed the term from
when first my friend and colleague, David Cooper, introduced it', WMF, 9. Laing told
Cooper in the 1960's that he judged the introduction of the term to be a 'fucking disaster'.
Quoted in Mullan, Mad to be Normal, p. 356.
48
Clay, R. D. Laing, p. 266.
49
Kotowicz, R. D. Laing and the Paths ofAnti-Psychiatry, p. 5.
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biology, medicine and psychiatry [...] that lasting advances can be made'.50 It is this
model which has historically held sway in the psychiatric profession and which
arguably still does so today. One of the core works recommended to current
psychiatry students at the University of Edinburgh, for example, opens with the
heavily Cartesian statement:
students new to psychiatry often have concerns that the clinical
skills required will be different from those of surgery and
medicine. The skills required are in fact similar - careful history
taking, systematic clinical examination and sound clinical
reasoning. The only major difference is that the clinical
examination includes the mental as well as the physical state of the
patient.51
A patient's behaviour and symptoms must therefore be observed in a rigorous,
detached fashion, or in the words of David Morgan: 'the diagnosis of mental illness
is not seen as dependent upon the social character of behaviour, or upon others'
evaluations and reactions to that behaviour, but upon the assessment of the structure
and functioning of the individual organism'. Anti-psychiatrists condemn such a
diagnostic process, and Laing, ever ready with the snappy sound-bite, would riposte:
'consciousness won't be found at the end of a microscope'. Elsewhere Laing argues
that what he terms
the psychiatric, 'diagnostic' look is itself a depersonalised and
depersonalising cut-off look. It is an application of a highly
sophisticated scientific look that is culturally deeply conditioned. It
is a way of seeing things, and the relation between things, by
subtracting all personal experience. [...] It is a look which is
cultivated with the express intention of not seeing intentions out
there. Things have no intentions.54
For Laing, this psychiatric 'look' strives towards an impossible degree of objectivity,
preferring instead to deduct from a patient's case history all relevant social and
50
Willy Mayer-Gross, Martin Roth and Eliot Slater, Clinical Psychiatry (London: Bailliere
& Cassell, 1969), p. 3.
51 Michael Gelder, Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3.
'2 David Morgan, 'Explaining Mental Illness', Archives europeennes de sociologie, 16
(1975), 262-80 (p. 265).
53
Quoted in Mullan, R. D. Laing: A Personal View, p. 139.
54
R. D. Laing, 'Laing's Understanding of Interpersonal Experience', in The Oxford
Companion to the Mind, edited by Richard L. Gregory and O. L. Zangwill (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp. 417-8 (p. 417). Laing contributed his own entry to this volume.
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cultural variables. His criticism is simple: 'psychiatry tries to be as scientific and
objective as possible towards what is most personal and subjective' (WMF, 158).
Exploiting to the full this unfeasible objective gaze, the inherently comprehensible
and sane clinician is accorded the right to act as the arbiter of absolute authority over
the inherently incomprehensible and insane patient, the two of them separated
forever by an 'abyss of difference'.55
If anti-psychiatrists criticise the methods by which establishment psychiatrists arrive
at their diagnoses, they also express grave concerns about the diagnoses which are
eventually passed. Put simply, anti-psychiatrists castigate the psychiatric profession
for attributing much too willingly to mental health problems a biological rather than
a social aetiology. They criticise their establishment colleagues for seeing mental
illness as dependent more on the organic functioning of the brain and the body than
on the family and social environment. As evidence for the social determinants of
mental illness which anti-psychiatrists feel their more traditional brothers prefer to
overlook in the name of an impossible aspiration towards objectivity, they point to
the close correlation between mental illness and poverty / social class,56 gender,57 or
belonging to a minority ethnic or national group/ Anti-psychiatrists also cite the
infamous 1973 Rosenhan experiment in which it was demonstrated that their more
mainstream colleagues had immense difficulty in telling schizophrenic patients apart
from non-schizophrenic patients.59 Among other significant evidence, they stress the
55 The phrase was first coined by the Swiss psychiatrist Karl Jaspers and is quoted in Kirsner,
'An Abyss of Difference', p. 209.
56 See Richard Warner, Recovering from Schizophrenia: Psychiatry and Political Economy
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1994); Jennie Williams, 'Social Inequalities and
Mental Health', in This is Madness: A Critical Look at Psychiatry and the Future ofMental
Health Services, edited by Craig Newnes, Guy Holmes and Cailizie Dunn (Ross-on-Wye:
PCCS Books, 1999), pp. 29-50; G. Harrison etal, 'Recovering From Psychotic Illness: A 15-
and 25-Year International Follow-Up', British Journal ofPsychiatry, 178 (2001), 506-17.
37 For full surveys of this area, see Joan Busfield, 'Mental Illness as Social Product or Social
Construct: A Contradiction in Feminists' Arguments?', Sociology of Health and Illness, 10
(1988), 521-42; Pauline M. Prior, Gender and Mental Health (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1999); George Stewart, 'Machismo and Misery', Openmind, 104 (2000), 18-20.
38 See Kobena Mercer, 'Racism and Transcultural Psychiatry', in The Power ofPsychiatry,
edited by Peter Miller and Nicholas Rose (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), pp. 112-42; Roland
Littlewood and Maurice Lipsedge, Aliens and Alienists: Ethnic Minorities and Psychiatry
(London: Routledge, 1997).
59 David L. Rosenhan, 'On Being Sane in Insane Places', Science, 179 (1973), 250-8.
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lack of a clearly defined 'norm' of health, the parameters for which are shifting
constantly according to era, culture, and political and social priorities with the result
that anti-psychiatrists berate practitioners working within the parameters of the
'medical model' for conceiving of mental illness only as a deviation from a norm,
even though that norm is itself ultimately indefinable.60 The discourse of psychiatry
can speak only of mal-adaptations, failures to adjust, or a lack of insight, they claim:
it is, in the words of Laing, 'a veritable vocabulary ofdenigration'' (TDS, 27). Based
on such evidence, anti-psychiatrists pose the question: if establishment psychiatry is
to be accorded the legitimacy it claims for itself, why is it unable to predicate its
judgements on independent and reliable criteria of health and illness, rather than on
intuitive, moral and thus necessarily value-laden evaluations of a patient's
behaviour?
Anti-psychiatrists further argue that putting forward a principally biological
aetiology to mental illness robs the patient of his/her sense of intentionality and,
consequently attributes to his/her behaviour motives beyond his/her individual
control. Thomas Szasz, the most controversial American writer working in this field,
declares: 'modern psychiatry dehumanise[s] man by denying - on the basis of
spurious scientific reasoning - the existence, or even the possibility, of personal
responsibility'.61 In one of his most influential essays which poses the question 'what
is schizophrenia?', Laing also argues that 'the 'committed' person labelled as patient,
and specifically as 'schizophrenic', is degraded from full existential status as human
agent and responsible person, no longer in possession of his own definition of
himself.62 It is for this reason that anti-psychiatrists attack bitterly the terminology
used by the psychiatric profession. They claim that the latter's mutation of 'madness'
into 'mental illness' allows the profession, firstly, to reduce madness to a series of
unmotivated acts which are devoid of any intrinsic, interpretable signification, and,
60
See in this connection Lucy Johnstone, Users and Abusers ofPsychiatry: A Critical Look
at Traditional Psychiatric Practice (London: Routledge, 2000).
61 Thomas Szasz, Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanisation ofMan
(London: Calders and Boyers, 1973), p. 11.
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R. D. Laing, 'What is Schizophrenia?', New Left Review, 28 (1964), 63-8 (p. 64).
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secondly, to reduce the patient to an 'invalid-ated',63 intention-less and inexplicable
vegetable. Such a reflex fortuitously allows the profession to subject the
incapacitated individual to whatever degrading and dehumanising forms of treatment
it sees fit. In the view of an anti-psychiatrist, this entire process serves only to
aggravate rather than alleviate the condition they describe as 'mental illness'. It
should be made clear, however, that Laing and most (if not all) anti-psychiatrists do
not deny the existence of madness, or at least that they do not deny that there are
often significant differences between two individuals' states of mind and that an
individual may be 'dangerous to himself and others, and require care and attention in
a mental hospital' (TDS, 27). What anti-psychiatrists do, however, raise fundamental
objections to relates to the procedure by which the label 'mentally ill' is attributed
and the way in which psychiatrists are accorded total control over their now socially
ostracised patients.
This brief survey of anti-psychiatry's principal criticisms of the psychiatric
profession has provided an insight into what anti-psychiatry rejects or does not stand
for. To understand what Laingian anti-psychiatry represents in a more positive,
constructive sense, it is useful to turn, firstly, to what represents a founding tenet of
Laing's thought. In his 1966 work Interpersonal Perception, co-authored with H.
Phillipson and A. R. Lee, Laing argues for the philosophical 'meaninglessness of the
category "I" without its complementary category of "you'" (IP, 3). Expanding on this
statement, he writes:
over a hundred years ago Feuerbach effected a pivotal step in
philosophy. He discovered that philosophy had been exclusively
orientated around "I". No one had realised that the "you" is as
primary as the I. It is curious how we continue to theorise from an
egoistic standpoint. In Freud's theory, for instance, one has the "I"
(ego), the "over-me" (super-ego) and "it" (id), but no you. Some
philosophers, some psychologists, and more sociologists have
recognised the significance of the fact that social life is not made
up of a myriad I's and me's only, but of you, he, she, we, and
them, also, and that the experience of you or he or them or us may
indeed be as primary and compelling (or more so) as the
experience of "me". (IP, 3)
63 R. D. Laing, 'The Invention of Madness', New Statesman, 16 June 1967, p. 843.
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Keeping this statement in mind, it is illuminating to refer a study by Miriam Siegler
which reconfigures within three distinct models Laing's thought as it evolved over
the course of the 1960's. The point of linkage between these three models of
madness - the 'psychoanalytic', 'conspiratorial' and 'psychedelic' models64 - is the
stress which Laing and his anti-psychiatrist colleagues lay on the social intelligibility
of the symptoms of mental illness. As Thomas Szasz writes: 'what people now call
mental illnesses are, for the most part, communications expressing unacceptable
ideas, often framed in an unusual idiom'.67 A further essential point of linkage
between the three Laingian models is the firmly held belief that mental illness
represents some form of 'existential crisis'. David Ingleby describes such a crisis as
'an intelligible response to the conflict between people's needs and the demands (or
constraints) placed on them by their particular social roles.'66 Laing, moreover, states
categorically:
In over 100 cases where we have studied the actual circumstances
around the social event when one person comes to be regarded as
schizophrenic, it seems to us that without exception the experience
and behaviour that gets labelled schizophrenic is a special sort of
strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unliveable
situation. (PE, 95)67
It is this last sentence which acts as the crux to much of Laing's work, and one
which, as we will find out in part III of this thesis, is of crucial importance to the
lives of the four protagonists under examination. Laing goes on:
in his life situation, the person has come to feel he is in an
untenable position. He cannot make a move, or make no move,
without being beset by contradictory and paradoxical pressures and
demands, pushes and pulls, both internally, from himself, and
externally, from those around him. He is, as it were, in a position
of checkmate. (PE, 95)
64 Miriam Siegler, Humphry Osmond and Harriet Mann, 'Laing's Models of Madness',
British Journal ofPsychiatry, 115 (1969), 947-58.
65
Szasz, Ideology and Insanity, p. 19.
66 David Ingleby, 'Understanding 'Mental Illness", in Critical Psychiatry: The Politics of
Mental Health, edited by David Ingleby (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), pp. 23-61 (p. 52).
67
In an influential reformulation of this view, Sartre wrote in a 1964 preface to a work co-
authored by Laing: 'je tiens - comme vous, je crois - la maladie mentale comme Tissue que
le libre organisme, dans son unite totale, invente pour vivre une situation invivable'. Jean-
Paul Sartre, 'Foreword', in David Cooper and R. D. Laing, Reason and Violence: A Decade
ofSartre's Philosophy 1950-1960 (London: Tavistock, 1964), p. 7.
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Turning to the first model outlined by Siegler - the 'psychoanalytic' model68 we
find that the unliveable situation which causes disturbed but still intelligible and
'context-sensible' behaviour is the social role of family member. Laing writes:
to the best of my knowledge, no schizophrenic has been studied
whose disturbed pattern of communication has not been shown to
be a reflection of, and reaction to, the disturbed and disturbing
pattern characterising his or her family of origin. (PE, 94-5)
Put simply, if'patients [are] disturbed, their families [are] often disturbing' (PE, 93).
As a means of understanding the development and modalities of such disturbed
communication patterns, it is helpful to turn to Laing's 1961 work Selfand Others in
which he situates the development of schizophrenia within 'disconfirmatory' family
interaction. To begin his explanation of this phenomenon, Laing argues that:
any human interaction implies some measure of confirmation, at
any rate of the physical bodies of the participants, even when one
person is shooting another. The slightest sign of recognition from
another at least confirms one's presence in his world. 'No more
fiendish punishment could be devised', William James once wrote,
'even were such a thing physically possible, than that one should
be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all
the members thereof. (SO, 98-9)
What Laing thus describes as 'schizogenic' forms of disconfirmatory behaviour are
those which are 'destructive of self development' (SO, 99):
the characteristic family pattern that has emerged from the studies
of the families of schizophrenics does not so much involve a child
who is subject to outright neglect or even to obvious trauma, but a
child who has been subjected to subtle but persistent
discontinuation, usually unwittingly. (SO, 100-1)
flow does such 'discontinuation' work on a day-to-day level? In a 1956 study which
exerted a heavy influence on Laing's thinking, Gregory Bateson proposed that the
'double bind' underlies the development of schizophrenia,69 a simple summary of
which is provided by Eve Johnstone:
68
Siegler, 'Laing's Models of Madness', pp. 952-3.
69
Gregory Bateson and others, 'Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia', Behavioural Science, 1
(1956), 251-64.
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schizophrenia [can be] produced by the constant reception of
incongruent messages from a key relative - to take a trite example,
the verbal message "You know that Mummy loves you"
accompanied by non-verbal behaviour implying something quite
different.70
Thus, in a reformulation of Bateson's work, Laing contends:
for many years a lack of genuine confirmation takes the form of
actively confirming a false self, so that the person whose false self
is confirmed and real self discontinued is placed in a false position.
Someone in a false position feels guilt, shame, or anxiety at not
beingfalse. (SO, 101)
Psychosis thus arises out of a patient's guilt and anxiety over this enforced
abandonment of their real self or of their authenticity, as Laing also calls it with a
nod in the direction of Heidegger. As Daniel Burston makes clear, Laing is arguing
that 'the pathological signs of schizophrenia may be the result of prolonged anxiety
and confusion, not the other way round, and that standard psychiatric procedure can
only intensify them'.71 Laing is at pains to point out, however, that the family does
not set out deliberately to 'cause' schizophrenia.
Confirmation of a false self goes on without anyone in the family
being aware that this is the state of affairs. The schizogenic
potential of the situation resides in the fact that it is not recognised
by another; or if the mother or father or some other member or
friend of the family is aware of this state of affairs, it is not brought
into the open and no effort is made to intervene. (SO, 101)
What happens is that the individual is unable to be 'true to himself (SO, 129). Laing
borrows Heidegger's concept of 'aletheia', as expressed in Existence and Being, to
describe what the individual is unable to do or be: 'in this concept, truth is literally
that which is without secrecy, what discloses itself without a veil' (SO, 129). It is this
state of 'aletheia' or of 'being true to him/herself that the individual schizophrenic
70
Eve C. Johnstone and others, Companion to Psychiatric Studies (Edinburgh: Churchill
Livingstone, 1998), p. 383.
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Burston, The Wing ofMadness, p. 71.
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has been prevented from accessing as a result of the double binds and mystifications
72his/her family inflicts, albeit mostly unwittingly.
This view which attributes to the family much of the blame for the onset of
schizophrenia may not initially seem enormously far removed from the classical
psychoanalytic position which situates neuroses within the conflicts and tensions
inherent to social and family life. However, whereas Freudian psychoanalysis viewed
such tensions as intrinsic to civilisation, and therefore as inevitable and immutable,
anti-psychiatrists, on the other hand, look on such conflicts as potentially alterable
threads of the social fabric, but only if the consciousness of the public, the political
classes and the psychiatric profession can be raised and influenced sufficiently. It is
in this regard that anti-psychiatry's pronounced reforming and even revolutionary
ethos becomes apparent, a zeal which psychoanalysis, its intellectual bed-fellow,
lacks. The revolutionary fervour which characterises the rhetoric and practice of anti-
psychiatry became much more virulent over the course of the 1960s, and by the end
of the decade Laing was proposing that the schizophrenic had been propelled into an
unliveable situation of inauthenticity not merely by disconfirmatory family
interaction but also by the entire capitalist system. Siegler et al categorise such views
70
under the heading of the 'conspiratorial model of madness'. In his most
controversial work, The Politics ofExperience (1967), Laing writes:
there is no such 'condition' as 'schizophrenia', but the label is a
social fact and the social fact a political event. This political event,
occurring in the civic order of society, imposes definitions and
consequences on the labelled person. [...] The person labelled is
inaugurated not only into a role, but into a career of patient, by the
concerted action of a coalition (a 'conspiracy') of family, G.P.,
mental health officer, psychiatrists, nurses, psychiatric social
workers, and often fellow patients. (PE, 100)
Out of this extract arise two significant points. Firstly, it demonstrates Laing's
repugnance at the failings of drug therapy and 'institutionalisation' within mental
72
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health primary care delivery. Such views had first been expressed in an anti-
psychiatric context by Russell Barton in his ground-breaking 1959 study of
'institutional neurosis',74 a condition in which the patient develops certain symptoms
such as social withdrawal and passivity as a direct result of being trapped in an
oppressive, inhumane and thereby 'symptom-inducing' asylum. Erving Goffman
built on such work in his 1961 work Asylums, a study of the characteristics common
to 'total institutions' - that is, any closed and highly regimented environment such as
an asylum, a convent or a boarding school. After spending several months working in
a Washington DC mental institution, Goffman observed that such institutions forced
inmates to undergo a severe programme of 'disculturation'75 or 'training in unfitness
for the world outside',76 an "untraining' which renders him [the patient] temporarily
incapable of managing certain features of daily life on the outside, if and when he
gets back to it'.77 He concluded that inmates were dispossessed of their sense of self
70
through a series of 'status degradation ceremonies' which left them condemned to
70
play out the 'moral career of the mental patient'.
The second point to emerge from Laing's statement concerns the inherently political
nature of the attribution of the label 'mad' or 'schizophrenic'. Much work has been
carried out in this domain by 'labelling theorists' such as Kai Erikson who argues
that:
deviance can be defined as a conduct which is generally thought to
require the attention of social control agencies - that is, conduct
about which "something should be done". Deviance is not a
property inherent in certain forms of behaviour, it is a property
conferred upon these forms by the audiences which directly or
indirectly witness them. [...] The difference between those who
earn a deviant label and those who go their own way in peace
depends almost entirely on the way in which the community sifts
74 Russell Barton, Institutional Neurosis (Bristol: [n. pub.], 1959).
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out and codes the many details of behaviour to which it is
■■ 80
witness.
The causes of deviance, crime and illness are thus not necessarily situated within the
individual but instead within the way in which the individual is viewed and evaluated
by the criminal justice system or the medical and psychiatric professions. Mental
81*
illness, it has been argued by Thomas Scheff in particular, is little more than an
unhelpful label applied to those who are socially bothersome and who contravene
social norms and conventions. Attributing such a label is an inherently political act,
in the view of Scheff, and, as such, is open to political manipulation. This fact found
good illustration in 1973 when several million mentally ill Americans effected a
miraculous overnight recovery as homosexuality was dropped, despite opposition
from many in the psychiatric profession, as a category of mental illness from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III, the bible of American
89 • Pclinical psychiatric diagnoses. The political nature of psychiatric diagnoses has
been researched most fully by historians and sociologists keen to write 'the Great
Revision'83 of the history of the psychiatric profession.84 According to this
revisionist view, the psychiatric profession assumed its powers of segregation and
incarceration as a means of dealing with and morally re-educating 'deviant'
individuals: be it the economically unproductive, as Andrew Scull argues
persuasively with the parallel he establishes between the rise of the psychiatric
80 Kai T. Erikson, 'Notes on the Sociology of Deviance', in The Other Side: Perspectives on
Deviance, edited by Howard Becker (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 9-21 (pp.
10-2).
81 See his studies Being Mentally III: A Sociological Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1966); 'The
Labelling Theory of Mental Illness', American Sociological Review, 39 (1974), 444-52. A
rebuttal of such 'labelling theories' can be found in H. M. van Praag, 'The Scientific
Foundation of Anti-Psychiatry\ Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 58 (1978), 113-41.
82 For a survey of the struggle to have homosexuality removed from the category of 'mental
disorders', see Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of
Diagnosis (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
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profession with the rise of industrial capitalism, ' or all 'asociaux' who offend
bourgeois values, as Michel Foucault has claimed in his now canonical Folie et
deraison.86 Anti-psychiatry's importance in this domain (and arguably its most
enduring legacy) has been to throw into serious doubt the benevolence and ideology-
free status of psychiatric intervention.
In a significant development of the 'conspiratorial' model of madness, anti-
psychiatrists came to argue that the schizophrenic's behaviour should be read as a
sign of protest against a world which, perhaps more than the patients themselves,
deserves the label 'mad'. David Cooper writes polemically: 'all delusion is political
07
statement and all madmen are political dissidents'. Cooper's credo is simple: his
88mission as an anti-psychiatrist is to work towards a 'genuine socialist revolution'.
Quaintly outlandish though such views might sound to Thatcher's and Blair's jaded
children, they should not, however, be seen as isolated outbursts of political quackery
given that they were shared by a wide range of intellectuals on the Left in the 1970's
including many unconnected with the mental health professions such as Sartre and
Marcuse. Anti-psychiatrists and left-wing intellectuals more widely argued that the
principal objective of the psychiatric profession was to maintain the existing,
repressive social order rather than to relieve suffering. Psychiatry was thus construed
as modern capitalism's ultimate weapon of social control against dissidence: 'just as
we fill our jails with those who transgress the legal order, so we partly fill our
89
asylums with those who act unsuitably'; or, as Laing put it memorably, 'we put
people into mental hospitals not because they are suffering but because they are
83 See for example his Museums of Madness: The Social Organisation of Insanity in
Nineteenth-Century England (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982); Social Order / Social
Disorder: Anglo-American Psychiatry in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1989); Psychiatry and Social Control in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries', History ofPsychiatry, 2 (1991), 149-69.
86 Michel Foucault, Folie et deraison: Histoire de la folie a I'age classique (Paris: Plon:
1961).
87 David Cooper, The Language ofMadness: Explorations in the Hinterland of Revolution
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insufferable'.90 With such statements, anti-psychiatry's close affinities with the
counter-cultural movements of the 1960's and 1970's become apparent: both are
characterised by a rebellion against authority; a disdain for establishment institutions
of any kind; and a passion for expressive behaviour. Accordingly, the zenith of anti-
psychiatry's popularity was reached in an era when civil rights movements and
student 'revolutions' were sweeping across the Western world and when a
carnivalesque inversion of authority seemed to be reaching every sphere of life, the
field of psychiatry included. F. M. Martin has argued that anti-psychiatry's
importance and attraction lay not in 'its manifest absurdity when approached in
rational-scientific terms', but instead in 'its place in the history of attitudes and
beliefs'.91
Anti-psychiatry [...] harmonised with quite widely prevalent
values and aspirations of the time. Models of mental illness which
identified the patient (especially the sensitive young schizophrenic)
with the radical critic of a dehumanising society, his family with
the oppressive forces of the established order, and defined the
collusive psychiatrist as an agent of control and coercion, were
dramatically congruent with the sharp questioning of established
institutions and the quest for solutions.92
In the same way that civil rights movements were one of the first global movements
of protest, stretching from San Francisco to Sydney, anti-psychiatry's impact was
also felt right across the (Western) world. The movement's rise to prominence is well
summed up by Peter Sedgwick who has argued that by the late 1960's
virtually the entire Left and an enormous proportion of the liberal-
arts and social-studies reading public was convinced that R. D.
Laing and his band of colleagues had produced novel and
essentially accurate renderings of what psychotic experience truly
signified.93
The carnival had undoubtedly reached its peak.
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Thus far in part I we have seen which elements of more traditional psychiatric
practice anti-psychiatrists reacted against as well as the two of the three models of
Laingian anti-psychiatric thought. I wish now to turn to how such principles were
translated into clinical reality, and, as a result, to the third model of madness which
Siegler attribute to Laing.
If anti-psychiatrists attack the 'psychic violence' which a family or capitalist society
inflicts on a child, what do they believe can be done to repair it? 'The task in
therapy', Laing argues, 'comes to be to make contact with the original 'self of the
individual which, or who, we must believe is still apossibility, if not an actuality, and
can still be nursed back to a feasible life' (TDS, 158-9). In sum, the patient must be
freed from the disconfirmatory double binds in which s/he has become entangled
thanks to the competing and contradictory demands of his/her family and the
capitalist hegemony surrounding them. How can this happen in psychiatric practice?
Proponents of anti-psychiatry argue that a meeting of clinician and psychotic patient
across 'the abyss of difference' is manifestly possible but only if a radically different
Took' is adopted from the psychiatric, 'diagnostic look' examined earlier in part I.
The psychiatrist must eschew a Took [which] is adapted to the elimination of the
conditions of the possibility of understanding',94 and adopt instead a look which
attempts to understand what is going on inside and between people through 'placing
the interpersonal happenings within their social context [...] and recognising and
sympathetically understanding the intentions of others, and their interconnections'.95
Unlike those working within the confines of the medical model who act as the
arbiters of absolute justice and authority over their dehumanised patient, anti-
psychiatrists aim to treat their patients, very simply, as human beings, restoring to
their behaviour its inherent explicability and making an effort to listen to and
empathise with them and understand their 'being-in-the-world'. As Laing points out,
'one may see [a patient's] behaviour as 'signs' of a 'disease'; or one may see his
behaviour as expressive of his existence' (TDS, 31). At the risk of over-simplifying
somewhat, anti-psychiatry chooses the latter approach, more orthodox psychiatry the
94




former. In the same way that the Bakhtinian carnival stipulates 'the suspension of all
hierarchical rank [and] privileges',96 the relationship between psychiatrist and patient
must be a personal, human-to-human one, unencumbered by the professional persona
of the doctor or the patient's 'role' as patient. Echoing Martin Buber's theology,
Laing writes that it is a relationship which should be characterised by authenticity
and genuine mutual relatedness and which must centre on 'the original bond of I and
You'' (TDS, 19). In essence, this bond should put the human back into the human
science of psychiatry. The individual in psychiatric care can be brought back to a
position ofmental health not through the rectification of neurological imbalances but
through the restoration of his/her sense of authenticity and genuine mutual
relatedness with others.
The significance of the role within the therapeutic process to be played by genuine
relatedness and kinship, or an I-You relationship predicated on mutual recognition,
was first impressed upon Laing during his formative years at Gartnavel Hospital in
Glasgow. In his 1985 autobiography, he describes a project he co-established at
Gartnavel which became known as the 'Rumpus Room'. This was a bright, spacious
and well furnished room where twelve of the most intractable chronic patients were
allowed to stay from nine to five, Monday to Friday; were provided with materials
for crafts and other pastimes; and were allowed to wear their own clothes and make¬
up. Laing reports on one specific incident in the Rumpus Room which was to have a
profound effect on his later thought:
after several months, after a lot of heart-searching, matron and
superintendent overruled misgivings and allowed the nurses and
patients [in the Rumpus Room] to have a gas stove and oven. They
could now make tea for themselves. This was unthinkable in the
ward (danger of pouring scalding water over themselves or
drinking it, etc.). They made tea and they made some buns. Ian
Cameron, one of the psychiatrists, took some of the buns over to
the doctors' sitting room and offered them around. There were
seven or eight of us psychiatrists sitting around. Only two or three
were brave, or reckless, enough to eat a bun baked by a chronic
schizophrenic. This incident convinced me of something. Who was
crazier? Staff or patients? Excommunication runs deep. A
companion means, literally, one with whom one shares bread.
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Companionship between staff and patients had broken down. The
psychiatrists were afraid of catching schizophrenia. Who knows? It
might be contagious, like herpes, through mucous membranes.
(WMF, 126)97
Genuine relatedness has broken down entirely in this example. For it to be restored
again, authentic encounters need to take place. Laing describes witnessing one
instance of an authentic encounter when he was on duty at Gartnavel one Hogmanay.
The New Year is the biggest celebration in Scotland. It is marked
by prolonged carousing on the part of the alcoholic fraternity, but
many teetotallers celebrate the spirit of the New Year contentedly
sober. There is no 'religion' about it. There is a special spirit
abroad - 'Auld Lang Syne'. 'A man's a man for a' that.' In
Gartnavel, in the so-called 'back wards', I have seen catatonic
patients who hardly make a move, or utter a word, or seem to
notice or care about anyone or anything around them year in and
year out, smile, laugh, shake hands, wish someone 'A Guid New
Year' and even dance [...] and then by the afternoon or evening or
next morning revert to their listless apathy. The change, however
fleeting, in some of the most chronically withdrawn, 'backward'
patients is amazing. If any drug had this effect, for a few hours,
even minutes, it would be world famous, and would deserve to be
celebrated as much as the Scottish New Year. The intoxication
here however is not a drug, not even alcoholic spirits, but the
celebration of a spirit of fellowship. (WMF, 31-2)
In the third model of madness which Siegler et al attribute to the evolution of Laing's
no
thought - the 'psychedelic' model - Laing takes much further the goals of authentic
disclosure and the restoration of genuine mutual relatedness which he claims to have
witnessed at Gartnavel. This model is founded on the principle that madness can act
as a gateway to potentially Promethean discoveries and thus not merely represent a
politically revolutionary act. The Promethean qualities of the schizophrenic's journey
are evidenced by David Cooper's explicit linking of psychosis to the messianic:
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'madness [...] is a matter of voicing the realisation that I am (or you are) Christ'.99
Undoubtedly, this psychedelic model can claim a long and illustrious cultural
pedigree as the view which sees madness as a source of prophetic or divine
inspiration extends from Antiquity to Shakespeare to Surrealism and beyond. In an
anti-psychiatric context, it first re-surfaced in Gregory Bateson's 1961 re-edition of
Perceval's Narrative. Bateson, an American psychiatrist who exercised a heavy
influence on Laing, wrote in his introduction to this work:
it would appear that once precipitated into psychosis the patient has
a course to run. He is, as it were, embarked upon a voyage of
discovery which is only completed by his return to the normal
world, to which he comes back with insights different from those
of the inhabitants who never embarked on such a voyage. Once
begun, a schizophrenic episode would appear to have as definite a
course as an initiation ceremony - a death and re-birth - into which
the novice may have been precipitated by his family life or by
adventitious circumstances, but which in its course is largely
steered by endogenous process.100
As Bateson hints in this quotation, the traditional hierarchical relationship between
sanity and insanity ought to be inverted. Laing exemplifies this position when he
claims that 'what we call 'normal' (sane) is a product of repression, denial, splitting,
projection, introjection and other forms of destructive action on our experience' (PE,
23-4). In other words, 'our collusive madness is what we call sanity' (PE, 62).
Furthermore, he formulates in his preface to the 1964 edition of The Divided Selfone
of his most famous sound-bites: 'our 'normal', 'adjusted' state is too often the
abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our true potentialities. [... ] Many of us are only
too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt to false realities' (TDS, 12). In other
words, we, the sane, are radically estranged from our 'inner world', fooled into
accepting as sanity a consensually validated world view which is, in Laing's view,
but a 'pseudo-sanity'. The flip-side to this controversial argument is that what others
call 'madness' is in fact the only true form of sanity. David Cooper writes: 'psychotic
99 David Cooper, 'Introduction', in Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of
Insanity in the Age ofReason, translated by Richard Howard (London: Tavistock, 1967), pp.
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experience may, with correct guidance, lead to a more advanced human state but
only too often is converted by psychiatric interference into a state of arrest and
stultification of the person'.101 As this statement suggests, disturbed behaviour
should be seen not only as a 'context-sensible' form of protest against the
schizophrenic's family or the dehumanising capitalist system but also as a healing
voyage on which s/he will discover new insights which are blocked off to the rest of
humanity and from which s/he should not be diverted by institutionalisation,
psychosurgery or medical intervention of any form. 'Madness need not be all
breakdown', writes Laing in one of his most oft-quoted remarks, 'it may also be
breakthrough. It is potentially liberatory and renewal as well as enslavement and
existential death' (PE, 110). The role of the anti-psychiatric therapist should
therefore be to guide the patient through this voyage, accompanying them on their
journey back into their inner selves and to existential rebirth. 'Psychotherapy must
remain an obstinate attempt of two people to recover the wholeness of being human
through the relationship between them' (PE, 45), Laing writes. The therapist must
aid the patient to 'un-learn' the false selves which s/he has been forced to project by
a 'disconfirmatory' family and social environment. In the next section, I examine the
Kingsley Hall therapeutic community in London - 'one of the most famous but least
102
analysed social experiments of our time' - which was co-established by Laing
specifically as a means of expediting just such controversial goals.
R. D. Laing, the carnival king
One of Laing's most significant contributions to the anti-psychiatric enterprise came
through his involvement with the 'therapeutic communities' which anti-psychiatrists
established as a means of developing alternative proposals for treating the mentally
ill. Along with David Cooper and other like-minded colleagues, Laing founded in
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April 1965 the Philadelphia Association with the idea of establishing 'anti-
1 f)"? . ....
hospitals' or 'therapeutic communities' in which some of the 'violence' which had
been perpetrated on the mentally ill in traditional mental institutions and in their
family environment could be un-done. Given that anti-psychiatrists viewed
traditional psychiatric treatment methods such as ECT and drug therapy as barriers to
a patient's recovery and impediments to their 'healing voyage', they argued that what
was required was a special place where, very simply, people could go to have a
breakdown. Such places were to act as 'asylums' in the truest sense of the word: a
sanctuary which would provide refuge and protection, precisely that which anti-
psychiatrists felt mainstream forms of mental health therapy failed to guarantee those
in their care. One of the most (in)famous such communities was founded in 1965 by
Laing and his colleagues at Kingsley Hall in East London. The Kingsley Hall venture
provides us with a helpful insight into the wider objectives of anti-psychiatric
therapeutic practice, goals which Laing had formulated in part as a result of his
experience of witnessing authentic encounters in the Rumpus Room at Gartnavel. In
the previous section, we gained some insight into the objectives of anti-psychiatric
therapy in our discussion of the psychedelic model of madness. Here, however, I
want to extend this examination to the later, most popular, but by far most
controversial aspects of Laingian thought because, as will become apparent in part III
of this thesis, it is these elements of Laing's work which resonate most loudly with
the existential positions of the chief protagonists of the four novels under analysis,
despite their being the most discredited.
The founding principle of institutions such as Kingsley Hall was not to 'cure' but to
'heal' a disturbed individual. This could be done by guiding them towards a position
of genuine brotherly and authentic mutual relatedness with others and by attempting
to un-do the knots, double binds and disconfirmations inflicted on the schizophrenic
by his/her family and/or a capitalist society. In essence, Kingsley Hall would restore
individuals to the position of 'aletheia' discussed earlier, one in which the individual
could be 'true to him/herself, and relate to others 'without secrecy [...], without a
103 A phrase first coined by David Cooper in 'The Anti-Hospital: An Experiment in Social
Psychiatry', New Society, 1 1 March 1965, pp. 11-8.
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veil' (SO, 129). 'Curing' could never be on the anti-psychiatric agenda as 'to cure'
implies rendering the individual acceptable to others and restoring them to what anti-
psychiatrists viewed as the inherently flawed state of sanity and normality. After all,
they would argue, anyone who tries to match their behaviour to what is expected of
them by society or their family is the one who is really mentally ill. Instead, anti-
psychiatry can be seen as taking its inspiration from the Bakhtinian description of the
Medieval carnival, a period during which 'people were, so to speak, reborn, for a
new, purely human relations. These truly human relations were not only a fruit of
imagination or abstract thought; they were experienced'.104 By extension, as if out of
a desire to recreate the kind of 'voyage of discovery' which characterised Bateson's
view of Perceval's Narrative, Kingsley Hall would provide 'a sort of re-servicing
factory for human breakdowns, [...] a place where people who have travelled further,
and, consequently, may be more lost than psychiatrists and other sane people, can
find their way further into inner space and time, and back again' (PE, 105-6). Laing
continues:
instead of the degradation ceremonial of psychiatric examination,
diagnosis and prognostication, we need, for those who are ready
for it (in psychiatric terminology those who are about to go into a
schizophrenic breakdown) an initiation ceremonial, through which
the person will be guided with full social encouragement and
sanction into inner space and time by people who have been there
and back again. (PE, 106)
Based on the premise that psychotic break-down should be seen not as a symptom of
a genetic abnormality or neurological disorder, but instead as evidence of a
existential crisis, the aim of anti-psychiatric therapy was to facilitate an existential re¬
birth 'in an attempt to reconstitute the self in a more authentic and integrated way'.105
'Psychosis', wrote Joseph Berke, a long-standing colleague of Laing's, 'is potentially
growth-promoting and ego integrative'.106 As such, the process of self-healing or
'positive disintegration'107 would lead to the destruction of one's false selves and
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inauthentic identities and to the repairing of the damage wrought by socialisation
within a 'corrupt' capitalist society. As Morton Schatzman writes: 'lost souls may be
cured by going mad among people who see madness as a chance to die and be
reborn'.108
One of the key characteristics of the therapy available at Kingsley Hall centred on
what Laing was later to term 'autorhythmia'. This was seen as the principle 'of
enabling individuals to find their own authentic rhythm, rather than fitting them into
a communal pattern,'109 and rather than initiating them into the role ofmental patient
from which they may never re-emerge. Leon Redler describes how this principle was
put into practice on a daily basis:
in terms of respecting your own way and your own time, you
should not have to be bound by unnecessary restrictions as to what
time you must get up in the morning, what time you must have
your meals, when you can bathe, when you must go to sleep, when
it is "lights out" time, all the sort of stuff that most of us take for
granted. We might take it for granted, but most of us aren't really
free to do that because we live by the clock and by the
requirements of our work and other responsibilities. But 1 think at a
time when that structure breaks down, it really is very helpful to be
able to be free of any constraints of those sorts and to be able to
"play it by ear" - helpful to let something be in play, rather than
have the play killed off.110
Redler goes on to say that this was to be a place 'where people were more into a
mode of being with than one of doing to'.111 Similarly, one Kingsley Hall resident
told Morton Schatzman:
here you find various people and you can open up and talk to them,
and relate, and build up understanding. Not where one person tells
another what he should want, how he should dress, and eat. [...]
Here [unlike in a mental hospital] a person can do something and
108 Morton Schatzman, 'Madness and Morals', in Laing and Anti-Psychiatry, edited by
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isn't made to conform his behaviour in relation to a model of what
others think is right or wrong."2
The only restriction placed on a resident was that their behaviour should not
deliberately harm another resident. As a result, the fact that one member of the
community spent most of her time covering the walls of her room with her own
faeces or that another sat in his room for twelve months communicating with no-one
was not, in itself, a problem. Anti-psychiatric philosophy dictated that no treatment -
at least no treatment in the conventional sense of the term - should be on offer at
Kingsley Hall. Available instead was a kind of 'benign neglect', a concept based on
'a fundamental respect for personal freedoms [...] which the residents of Kingsley
Hall had all too often experienced as under threat from a medical establishment
which served only to invalidate their sense of self."3 Zbigniew Kotowicz's recent
study of anti-psychiatry provides us with a useful description of this principle in
operation.
[The therapists] would attempt to create an environment in which
the traditional roles of staff and patient would not be played out.
Although medically trained people were the driving force behind
the project no such qualification would be required of anyone who
wanted to join the community as a helper."4
Such a description is once again reminiscent of Bakhtin's conception of the carnival,
a feast which aimed above all to overcome the 'consecration of inequality'115
characteristic of official Medieval feasts. In the same way that 'the suspension of all
hierarchical precedence during carnival time was of particular significance',116 'all
the members of the [Kingsley Hall] community would live together in the same place
without any distinction of role'.117 In sum, Kingsley Hall was to provide a living
proof of the key anti-psychiatric belief that the 'abyss of difference' between
112
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psychotic and doctor could be bridged in the same way that the carnival allowed the
abyss between serf and 'seigneur' to be bridged.
A second key principle of Laingian anti-psychiatric therapy is 'metanoia'. This term
provides a useful insight into Laing's thought as, derived from the Greek for
penitence or repentance, it is normally used within a religious context to imply a
Christian conversion or evangelical re-birth which will lead to 'a new quality of
118
thought that is beyond everyday thought'. Such religious overtones to the word
dovetail neatly with the aims of anti-psychiatry: that is, the bringing about of a re¬
birth or a 'return to sanity, to wholeness'.119 The Laingian interpretation of
'metanoia' therefore represents a spiritual journey which enables the individual to
divest him/herself of collective identity and thus join the elect who have reached a
position of authenticity and who have escaped from the double binds an unliveable
environment has imposed. The metanoic conversion will lead to a 'true sanity' (PE,
119), saner than the pseudo-sanity which we take to be the only possible sanity and
which is a reflection of the divine. The madman can act, in Laing's evocative phrase,
as 'the hierophant of the sacred' (PE, 109-10):
true sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the
normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated
social reality: the emergence of the 'inner' archetypal mediator of
divine power, and through this death a rebirth and the eventual re-
establishment of a new kind of ego-functioning, the ego now being
the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer. (PE, 119, my
italics)
Laing also stresses the divine characteristics of this 'transformation of a potentially
1 90
liberatory kind' which metanoia entails. He argues that all the therapists at work in
Kingsley Hall were in fact 'attendants upon the divine [who] saw the divine as
manifesting itself in the relationships that they had among themselves'.121
118 John Pettavel, Metanoia: Essays in the Interpretation ofCertain Passages in the Gospels
(Haslemere: Phene, 1983), p. 8.
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A crucial element in Kingsley Hall of facilitating a metanoic voyage was LSD. Laing
describes thus the beneficial effects hallucinogenic drugs could have on residents:
an LSD or mescaline session in one person, with one set in one
setting may occasion a psychotic experience. Another person, with
a different set and different setting, may experience a period of
super-sanity. [...] The aim of therapy will be to enhance
consciousness rather than to diminish it. Drugs of choice, if any are
to be used, will be predominantly consciousness expanding drugs,
rather than consciousness constrictors — the psychic energisers, not
the tranquillisers.122
If necessary, the therapist and patient would trip together, the former acting as the
latter's guide on this transformatory journey. Laing argues that:
the relevance of drugs is that they release the personal from being
as it were imprisoned inside the ego [...]. What it seems to open
out is a sort of relatively undifferentiated matrix of experience
which is perhaps comparable to the way a child experiences itself
in the first few months of life, and beyond that again. [...] Coming
back from void into the matrix is what I would call reincarnation
and from the matrix experience into the ego again is what I would
call re-birth.123
It is this 'reincarnation' which would enable the schizophrenic to finally experience
authentic mutual relatedness with others.
Laing's 1967 works The Politics ofExperience and The Bird of Paradise represented
the high water-mark of Laing's public enthusiasm for LSD. Furthermore, The
Politics ofExperience also quickly became a Bible of radical chic, selling over six
million copies in the USA alone.124 Laing himself soon reached demi-god status,
being regarded by many as 'the shaman to the underground'.12:1 He was revered in
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quasi-messianic terms by his acolytes who saw him as the thinker who held out 'the
promise of helping us build new Paradises out of old Infernos'.126 His followers
127 • • 128would go on 'pilgrimages' to meet him in London, speak of their 'faith' in him,
129
or of the 'revelations' revealed to them upon reading his work. It would be
misleading, however, to assume that Laing's fame was restricted to the purely
counter-cultural: by 1970 he was being hailed as one of the leading figure-heads of
1 70 • • r*
the British Left, and in 1972 he received the honour of becoming the youngest
ever thinker, with the exception of Chomsky, to have a volume dedicated to his work
in the Fontana Modern Masters series.131
'Une fete des fous'?
In his study of the carnivalesque, Bahlctin points out that the 'enthronement' of the
carnival king necessarily implies a simultaneous but reverse move towards the king's
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eventual 'dethronement'. This 'en-de-thronement' metaphor can also be applied to
anti-psychiatry and the work of R. D. Laing. While works such as The Politics of
Experience and the accompanying accolades he received represented the apogee of
the anti-psychiatric carnival, they also marked the first stage of Laing's ultimate
dethronement as carnival king given that the increasing idolisation he enjoyed within
counter-cultural circles was paralleled by a corresponding decline in his standing
among his fellow professionals. As Bob Mullan writes in relation to the Kingsley
Hall experiment: 'medical opinion was decisive and undivided in its condemnation
of the project, and one well-known psychiatrist believed that Laing had, at last,
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committed professional suicide'.13j John Bowlby, the British psychoanalyst and a
one-time colleague of Laing at the Tavistock Clinic, felt that 'although Laing could
have been someone', he had quite simply 'blown it'134 with The Politics of
Experience. Others thought he had in fact merely gone mad: Nick Crossley reports
that 'one [American researcher] even got a Federal grant to study the language of
The Politics of Experience as a way of researching that very possibility'.135 Laing
was accused of offering his patients no more than a 'homage to catatonia'136 and, as
Anthony Clare surely justifiably argues, 'it is one of the most profound ironies of the
1960's that so many of the bitterest critics of drug therapy should have been so
zealous in pushing acid as the cure of everything from schizophrenia to social
137isolation'. The Kingsley Hall community had also not proved to be the runaway
clinical success Laing had hoped for given that putting into practice its aims,
however laudable they may have been on paper, proved immensely problematic. At
times, the community descended into something resembling chaos, a hardly
surprising fact given the relatively free availability of LSD. Local residents reacted
particularly badly to having what they saw as a 'loony bin' next door and, on
occasions, hurled verbal and physical abuse at the residents and premises.138 If there
was friction between the community and its neighbours, things were far from perfect
inside the community either. Effecting a carnivalesque rupture of barriers of caste,
property, profession and age between doctors and patients proved rather more
difficult in clinical practice than in theory. Some patients insisted on being treated
only by qualified physicians: Mary Barnes, for example, Kingsley Hall's most
famous resident, would only desist from her refusal to eat on the advice of one of the
physicians; secondly, the community still required some form of high command or
medical director to actually run the place on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, despite
133
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their non-interventionist rhetoric associated, some Kingsley Hall therapists would
occasionally fall back on more traditional treatment methods: the use of tranquillisers
was not unknown for example,139 or, as in the following case cited by Sedgwick, 'a
refractory member of the community was put inside a sack which was carefully tied
up and left at the bottom of the stairs'.140 Finally, relapse rates for Kingsley Hall
residents were shown to be remarkably similar to those for more traditional therapy
techniques.141 These examples of clinical shortcomings at Kingsley Hall are taken
from the work of some of Laing's noisy detractors, and one is left with the suspicion
that their negative views stem more from their prejudices against the anti-psychiatric
enterprise and Laing himself than from any direct contact with the workings of the
community. Be that as it may, even Laing himself would eventually admit that the
community had not been 'a roaring success',142 and it closed its doors in 1970 when
the lease on its premises expired.
If the Kingsley Hall experience is symptomatic of anti-psychiatry's relative failure to
translate its philosophical principles into clinical reality, it also points to another of
its failings: that its excesses and more outrageous statements came to undermine the
solidity of its intellectual and philosophical principles. For example, while Laing's
first major work, The Divided Self.\ had met with a relatively unconcerned response
from fellow psychiatrists,14, his involvement with the Kingsley Hall experiment, on
the other hand, brought him only scorn and derision. Over the next few years, Laing
continued to provide his more staid enemies with plenty of ammunition with which
to attack him: his links with the LSD guru Timothy Leary;144 his research into re-
birthing and adulthood grief over the loss of one's placenta; his obsession with
139 See Laing, R. D. Laing: A Life, pp. 123-4.
140
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Buddhism; his heavy drinking and arrest for cannabis possession which eventually
led to him being struck off the General Medical Council's medical register; even the
fact that he had abandoned his first wife and their five young children were taken as
evidence for his unworthiness to be taken seriously as a thinker and practitioner.
Laing also suffered through his association with other, more out-spoken anti-
psychiatrists than himself. His once close colleague David Cooper, for example,
claimed in his work The Death of the Family that
it is fatuous to speak of the death of God or the death of Man [...]
until we can fully envisage the death of the family - that system
which, as its social obligation, obscurely filters out most of our
experience and then deprives our acts of any genuine and generous
145
spontaneity.
Even though Laing detested this work - it led to a definitive rupture between Cooper
and Laing146 - Laing nonetheless became branded as an anti-Christ in the moral panic
over the break-up of the nuclear family because of his earlier close association with
Cooper (and not least because of his description of the family unit as a 'mutual
protection racket' (PE, 55)). Similarly, the widespread use of LSD within anti-
psychiatric treatment methods or their belief in the liberatory powers of madness
handed their establishment critics a large and painful stick with which to beat them.
After having been the darling of the media and the New Left for much of the 1960s
and early 1970s, Laing suddenly disappeared from view, spending several months of
1972, for example, in a Buddhist retreat in modern-day Sri Lanka. No longer in the
public eye, Laing's meteoric rise to fame and fortune was followed by an equally
swift fall from grace. If in anti-psychiatry's 1960's heyday he had been the carnival
king, by the Lenten 1980's he had been dethroned with the same brutal predictability
which characterises the closure of every carnival. As early as 1981, a mere nine years
145 David Cooper, The Death of the Family (London: Allen Lane, 1971), pp. 7-8.
146 On this point, see Burston, The Wing ofMadness, p. 58.
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after Laing had been hailed as the 'new god of medicine',147 Elaine Showalter could
I 48
write: 'nobody, not even the mad, seems to take Ronald Laing seriously anymore'.
It would be wrong to suggest, however, that anti-psychiatry's disappearance from the
cultural radar can be attributed solely to its inability to translate its principles into
clinical practice. The psychiatric profession did not take kindly to its fractious
offspring with the result that it displayed a high level of 'passive aggression'149
towards Laing and anti-psychiatry in their glory-days of the 1960's and 1970's,
largely ignoring its challenge and huge popularity in the hope that the movement
would implode in a haze of hallucinogenic smoke. One of the few instances in which
the establishment psychiatric profession did emerge from its self-imposed silence
and attack its virulent critics head-on can be found in a speech by Sir Martin Roth on
the occasion of his 1973 Presidential Address to the Royal College of Psychiatrists.
While Roth describes as 'manifestly absurd'150 the view held typically by anti-
psychiatrists that the mainstream psychiatrist is party to a sordid conspiracy against
human freedom, he reserves his greatest wrath for the methods by which anti-
psychiatrists arrive at their subversive opinions. Denouncing the way in which anti-
psychiatry casts aside in a facile manner 'evidence patiently gathered over the
centuries about the disorders with which he [the psychiatrist] is daily confronted',151
Roth berates the lack of clinical evidence presented to back up anti-psychiatric
theories. Instead of basing diagnoses on scrupulously gathered data, anti-
psychiatrists, he argues, provide little more than 'isolated anecdotes and illustrative
examples of a kind which can readily be found to buttress any view, no matter how
i rj
false and irrational'. Most significantly, he sees anti-psychiatry as an attack on 'the
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place of science, and ultimately upon the place of reason, in the investigation of the
phenomena with which psychiatry deals'.153 No doubt piqued by the popularity of the
anti-psychiatric position among the chattering classes of the day, Roth declares that
'diatribe and assertions unsupported by evidence are no longer acceptable as the
foundation for policy-making in efforts to help those with mental disease'.154 Yet it
seems clear that whatever the validity of his contentions, the paradigm of psychiatric
orthodoxy within which Roth operates is so antithetical to anti-psychiatry's overtly
politicised philosophising that his engagement with Laing's work can only ever
represent a 'dialogue de sourds'.
The force of the criticisms put forward by the psychiatric orthodoxy, when taken
along with anti-psychiatry's ability to self-destruct, have resulted in a situation today
in which anti-psychiatry would appear to exert little influence over contemporary
psychiatric practice. Its failure to penetrate the psychiatric mainstream is evidenced
by the textbooks currently recommended to students of psychiatry at the University
of Edinburgh of which several make no reference whatsoever to anti-psychiatry or
Laing.155 The authors of the text-books in which Laing's name does appear accord
him either only foot-note status, the occasional disparaging reference to the clinical
unworkability of their theories, or the most damning of faint praise: one, for
example, states that 'while anti-psychiatry was important in drawing attention to the
limitations of psychiatric knowledge and the dangers of stigmatisation and
institutionalisation, there is little evidence to support it and it is not helpful to
patients'.136 Another describes anti-psychiatry as a 'disconnected group of
psychiatrists and others, influential beyond its size [which has] little influence on the
1 S7
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appear to reign supreme today, a view exemplified by one recent contribution to the
158
debate entitled 'biological psychiatry - is there any other kind?', and by the
excitement generated in clinical psychiatric circles by the imminent cracking of the
human genetic code, an advance which some believe will lead to the pin-pointing of
a 'schizophrenic gene'.159
Anti-psychiatry's role in bringing about the most notable shift in policy towards the
care of the mentally ill over the last forty years - deinstitutionalisation - has
similarly been called into question: two recent comprehensive studies of the history
of deinstitutionalisation in the UK damningly make no mention whatsoever of anti-
psychiatry.160 It has also been argued that institutions were only able to throw open
their doors because of the advances made in drug therapy over the past fifty years
rather than because of any philosophical shift of emphasis in psychiatric practice
which anti-psychiatry may have inspired.161 Similarly, the move towards
desinstitutionalisation and 'care in the community' is often attributed to the need
experienced by fiscally pressurised governments to curb increasingly stretched social
security budgets.162 It could be argued, then, that anti-psychiatry has made only a
very limited impact on contemporary psychiatric practice and that its call for a
radical change in direction in psychiatric practice has either gone unnoticed or else
was drowned out in the cacophony of scandal emanating from its proponents.
Consequently, the analogy between anti-psychiatry and the carnival can surely be
extended further. One oft-made criticism of the Bakhtinian vision of the carnival is
158 Samuel B. Guze, 'Biological Psychiatry - Is There Any Other Kind?', Psychological
Medicine, 19 (1989), 314-22; see also Samuel B. Guze, Why Psychiatry is a Branch of
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exemplified by Caryl Emerson's statement that 'in its functioning as society's safety
valve, as a scheduled event that worked to domesticate conflict by temporarily
sanctioning victimisation, medieval carnival in practice could be more repressive
i /:o
than liberating.' Anti-psychiatry's attempt to invert medical legitimacy and
authority could be said to have fulfilled a similar function: that is, to have functioned
as a safety valve for establishment psychiatry's concerns about its objectives and
treatment methods, and also, arguably, to have led to a parallel re-imposition of that
same legitimacy and authority once the anti-psychiatric carnival interlude had
passed. After all, if in 2001 one were to ask anyone under the age of 35-40 (and not
merely non-medical professionals) whether they have heard of anti-psychiatry or the
work of Laing, the answer would probably be 'no'. It is arguable, then, that anti-
psychiatry ultimately failed in its bid to reform psychiatric practice. Indeed, many
within the modern-day psychiatric establishment would plump for the view that anti-
psychiatry represented little more than an embarrassing, inconsequential and best
forgotten 'fete des fous'.
Rise now and be the notion again
In light of the apparent failure of anti-psychiatry to achieve its ideological and
practical therapeutic goals, and in light of the derision with which it is viewed today
by many in the psychiatric main-stream, the question therefore arises: are the works
of R. D. Laing not better off left gathering dust in the library stacks of psychiatric
history? One aim of this thesis is to argue that this should not necessarily be the case
and to propose instead that the field of literary textual analysis could provide a more
welcoming home for Laing's work than current establishment psychiatric practice.
To lay the foundation for a justification of this view, it is worth bearing in mind that
despite the apparently damningly conclusive nature of the remarks quoted earlier,
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critical opinion over Laing's legacy nonetheless remains divided. While several
Laing obituaries, for example, were certainly hostile to his work and suggested with
ill-disguised glee that the ghost of anti-psychiatry could finally be exorcised,164
others painted a more positive picture of his achievements. Anthony Clare wrote:
1 feel confident that, for some time to come, when people reach for
a book which will help them understand what being in the throes of
a severe mental illness might be like, they will not reach for one of
the many weighty, researched and solid texts currently available,
but for one of Laing's personal, passionately written and polemical
books.165
John Clay has also recently suggested that: 'few psychiatrists, psychoanalysts and
psychotherapists since the 1960's have not been affected by his pronouncements and
modified their thinking and practice as a result'.166 Furthermore, even if Laing today
remains a persona non grata in the lecture theatres of undergraduate psychiatry, his
discredited theories still echo in the on-going professional debate over the nature and
causes of schizophrenia,167 particularly among the many professionals 'who find that
the diagnosis [of schizophrenia] lacks logical, moral, or clinical integrity'.168 On a
practical level, interest has recently snow-balled in the therapeutic applications of
Laing's writings,169 an interest in no small measure stimulated by the work of the
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165
Clare, 'Ronald David Laing 1927-1989', p. 88.
166
Clay, R. D. Laing, p. 268.
167 Two indispensable summaries of this re-assessment of Laing's and anti-psychiatry's role
in the debate on the causes and nature of schizophrenia are: T. M. Keen, 'Schizophrenia:
Orthodoxy and Heresies. A Review of Alternative Possibilities', Journal ofPsychiatric and
Mental Health Nursing, 6 (1999), 415-24; and Newnes, Holmes and Dunn, editors, This is
Madness: A Critical Look at Psychiatry and the Future of Mental Health Services. Other
studies to take a positive view on Laing's achievements and contribution to contemporary
psychiatric practice include: Mary Boyle, Schizophrenia: A Scientific Delusion? (London:
Routledge, 1990); F. A. Jenner et al, Schizophrenia: A Disease or Some Ways of Being
Human? (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993); Peter K. Chadwick, Schizophrenia:
The Positive Perspective. In Search of Dignity for Schizophrenic People (London:
Routledge, 1997); Liam Clarke, 'Ten Years On: The Abiding Presence of R. D. Laing',
Journal ofPsychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 6 (1999), 313-20.
168
Keen, 'Schizophrenia: Orthodoxy and Heresies', p. 415.
169 See for example Anthony Lunt, Apollo versus the Echomaker: Psychotherapy, Dreams
and Shamanism - A Laingian Approach (Longmead: Element Books, 1990); Justin A.
Franck, 'Listening with the Big Ear: A Laingian Approach to Psychotic Families', Journal of
the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 18 (1990), 131-44; Redler, 'R. D. Laing's
Contribution to the "Treatment" of "Schizophrenia"'; Kirk J. Schneider, 'R. D. Laing's
Existential-Humanistic Practice: What Was He Actually DoingT, Psychoanalytic Review, 87
51
American psychoanalyst Guy Thompson.170 Furthermore, while the move over the
last forty years towards deinstitutionalisation within mental health primary care
cannot be attributed to the influence of anti-psychiatry alone, it was still given a
strong boost by the campaigns and polemics which Laing's work provoked.171
Why then has anti-psychiatry largely remained anathema to the mainstream
psychiatric orthodoxy? Was it really all a mere 'fete des fous'? I would argue not.
What seems to have happened is that practice over the last forty years mainstream
psychiatric has come to meet many of the objections which anti-psychiatrists initially
raised: community care, anti-institutionalism, patients' rights and advocacy groups
all form an essential part of psychiatric policy today. Yet these were also moves for
which Laing and his anti-psychiatric colleagues argued for vociferously and which at
the time were met with hostility from some quarters of the psychiatric profession.
However, in taking ownership ofmany of the principles which anti-psychiatry stood
for (or at least a watered-down version of them) mainstream psychiatry has
airbrushed out of its history the significant - if not decisive - contribution made by
Laing and anti-psychiatry in the move to more patient-centred methods of mental
health primary care delivery. As one observer has remarked cogently: 'Laing has
1 79
suffered the indignity of becoming a climate of opinion - and survived'. Anti-
psychiatry thus acted as a wake-up call to the psychiatric profession, reminding it of
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the unfeasibility of the value-free objectivity to which it aspires. Peter Sedgwick
writes:
whatever exaggerations the more radical anti-psychiatrists and
labelling theory sociologists have engaged in, they have shown
convincingly that both diagnoses and treatment measures in
psychiatry are founded on ethical judgements and social demands
whose content is sometimes reactionary, often controversial and
nearly always left unstated.173
Undoubtedly, the preference of most anti-psychiatrists for headline-grabbing sound¬
bites and their impassioned evangelising irritated their mainstream colleagues. Digby
Tantam remarks: 'anti-psychiatrists were moralists first, and scientists second [...].
Critics of their position were enemies, not discussants'.174 Moreover, the overt
philosophising and moralising of Laing and his cohorts was intensely difficult to
swallow for a profession whose dominant thought paradigm is predicated on the
scrupulous accuracy and objectivity of a positivistic science. Interestingly, one of the
175
founding theories of anti-psychiatric practice - Bateson's double bind theory - has
been criticised more for being an unresearchable construct, and therefore one which
is impossible to test and verify, rather than for any alleged lack of foundation in
clinical reality.176 In a wider sense, John Clay makes the surely apposite remark that:
Laing was often right about the big things - the need to listen extra
carefully to patients, to respect their multi-layered communications
and the inner world of a divided self - but he made errors for
which his critics rarely forgave him, among which were [sic] his
tendency to produce apergus at the expense of accuracy.177
Despite the evidence cited from current psychiatry text-books, it would be wrong to
suggest that interest in Laing's work has dried up: the publication of several Laing
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biographies in the 1990's exemplifies an important resurgence of interest in Laing's
life and work. While many of these concentrate on the gory details of Laing's
colourful personal life,178 others examine his role in the wider anti-psychiatry
179 •• ' ' ' ' 180
movement, or the philosophical, political and religious roots of his thought.
Significantly, Laing's autobiography, first published in the mid-1980's, was re¬
issued by Canongate in 1998 while hard-back editions of seven of his key works
were published by Routledge in 1998 and 1999. Laing has also been the object of
attention from researchers in the field of Scottish studies with the argument that
Laing warrants swift re-habilitation into the canon of twentieth-century Scottish
thinkers having recently been put forward by Cairns Craig in his study of the modern
Scottish novel.
The model of the person that is provided by [John] Macmurray and
used by Laing lies behind much of modern Scottish writing - in
part because it derives from the same traditions of thought that are
shared by those writers and in part because many of the writers of
the past half century have been influenced by one or other of these
thinkers, or by other writers who have been so influenced.181
A fine example of such an influence can be found in Gavin Miller's recent
examination of Alasdair Gray's re-working of Laing's conceptual models within, for
182
example, 1982 Janine and The Fall ofKelvin Walker. One aim of this thesis is to
tap into this recent resurgence of interest in Laing's work in areas beyond the field of
clinical psychiatry and to argue for its relevance not only to Scottish studies but also
the field of French studies and textual analysis more widely.
One reason why Laing's work, more than that of other anti-psychiatrists, is pertinent
to the literary lies in its heavy reliance on literary examples as a means of supporting
his theories of schizophrenia. His work - in particular his early writing - is littered
178 Such is the case for: Adrian Laing: R. D. Laing: A Life; Burston, The Wing ofMadness,
pp. 1-150; Mullan, editor, Conversations with R. D. Laing; Clay, R. D. Laing; Mullan, R. D.
Laing, A Personal View; Mullan, editor, R. D. Laing: Creative Destroyer.
179
Kotowicz, R. D. Laing and the Paths ofAnti-Psychiatry.
180
Burston, The Wing of Madness, pp. 151-251; Burston, The Crucible ofExperience. See
also footnotes 15 and 18 in the thesis introduction.
181 Cairns Craig, The Modern Scottish Novel: Narrative and the National Imagination
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 114.
182
Miller, 'Transcendental Kinship', pp. 112-83.
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with quotations from writers such as Shakespeare, Kafka, Dostoevsky or Beckett
with the result that the distance between Laingian anti-psychiatry and the literary is
less than might be initially assumed. In fact, one of Laing's most powerful and
insightful analyses centres not on a case-study drawn from his clinical experience but
on an examination of Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, and, specifically, on the
collusive, mystifying 'psychic violence' Raskolnikov's mother inflicts on her son
(SO, 164-73). Furthermore, Robert Coles has argued that the literary qualities of
Laing's writing are all too often overlooked:
what we ought to keep in mind is that Laing is a writer and a poet,
an aphorist, a symbolist. And in that sense what he does to patients
is what Flannery O'Connor or Faulkner does to the Southener in
the courthouse. As a writer Laing etches out things, draws out
things, emphasises, points up as artists always do, and makes larger
than life so that we will be somehow responsive to qualities in
people and situation that we might ordinarily miss.1 3
A further reason why Laing's work is instructive in the domain of literary analysis
emerges from an examination of the impact on literary criticism of the work of Freud
and Lacan. Freud-bashing has a long and illustrious pedigree (much longer than the
history of Laing-bashing), Freud having been accused of being everything from 'a
therapeutic danger and fraud' to 'an incestuous, murdering, masturbating and
184
abortionizing cocaine addict". Lacan is also hardly short of detractors as evidenced
by the recent polemic stirred up by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's Impostures
185intellectuelles. Yet despite such slating, the work of Freud and Lacan still remains
intensely productive within literary criticism. Moreover, psychoanalysis has made for
such a powerful literary tool because of its insistence that an analysand's words,
however confused and unintelligible they may initially appear, should in fact be seen
as fully intelligible, albeit after a lengthy interpretative process. Laing and anti-
psychiatry adopt a similar therapeutic approach towards the potential significance of
183 Robert Coles et al, 'R. D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry: A Symposium', in Laing and Anti-
Psychiatry, edited by Boyers and Orrill, pp. 157-87 (p. 176).
184
Porter and Micale provide a handy summary of the enormous range of accusations Freud
has been charged with over the years: 'Reflections on Psychiatry and Its Histories', pp. 18-9.
183 Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Impostures intellectuelles (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1997), pp.
25-39.
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a patient's utterances. In the next section, I will examine some of the uses to which
Laing's theories have already been put within the sphere of literary analysis. We
have already seen that a small number of studies have been carried out in the field of
Scottish studies in relation to the Laingian analyses of literary texts and only one in
the field of French studies.186 Before progressing to my own extended Laingian
analysis of four French nineteenth-century novels, I wish to examine the other
studies devoted to the intersection between literary texts and the work of R. D. Laing.
As far as I am aware, this is the first such survey to have been attempted to date.
Laingian interpretations of literary texts: a survey of criticism
Of the dozen or so Laingian analyses, most demonstrate how the work of a particular
writer - Poe and Shakespeare figure highly among the authors examined - provides a
case study for a specific notion within Laing's theories on psychiatric practice or
schizophrenia. Andria Beacock, for example, discusses Hamlet's existential position
within the Laingian context of 'ontological insecurity' and the consequent
development of false self systems. This approach is perhaps not as novel as it might
187
appear given Laing's insistence on his indebtedness to the work of Shakespeare.
Several other critics examine texts which, in their view, also offer literary exemplars
of the Laingian condition of 'ontological insecurity' and its corollaries
188 • • t*'dehumanisation' and 'disembodiment', while A. R. Atkins takes the concept of
186 See p. 9.
187 Andria Beacock, 'Notes on Melancholia / Schizophrenia as a Social Disease: Robert
Burton, R. D. Laing, and Hamlet', Massachusetts Studies in English, 6 (1979-80), 1-14.
188 See David J. Kleinbard, 'Laing, Lawrence and the Maternal Cannibal', Psychoanalytic
Review, 58 (1971), 5-13; David J. Kleinbard, 'D. H. Lawrence and Ontological Insecurity',
PMLA, 89 (1974), 154-63; Charles B. Harris, 'Todd Andrews, Ontological Insecurity, and
The Floating Opera', Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction, 18 (1976), 34-50; Michael
Coulson Berthold, 'Ontological Insecurity in Martin Chuzzlewif, Dickens Studies
Newsletter, 14 (1983), 135-42; Manfred Draudt, 'Reality or Delusion? Narrative Technique
and Meaning in Kipling's The Man Who Would be King', English Studies, 65 (1984), 316-
26; Michael Patterson, 'A "Laingian" Reading of Pirandello's Henry IV, Modern Drama, 27
(1984), 637-45; Fritz Oehlschlaeger, 'Willa Cather's Consequences and Alexander's Bridge:
An Approach Through R. D. Laing and Ernest Becker', Modern Fiction Studies, 32 (1986),
191-202; Henry Kozicki, 'The "Unholy Battle" with the Other in George Meredith's Modern
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'ontological insecurity' as the basis for a biographical study of D. H. Lawrence and,
specifically, his often troubled personal relations with women.189 Yet this clutch of
articles appears oddly unsatisfactory because in each of them Laingian theory
provides little more than background decoration to the text under examination.
Indeed, it is arguable that the author of each study would have arrived at much the
same conclusions without ever bringing Laing's work into play.
Works which engage more critically and fruitfully with Laingian theory take as their
starting point the belief which is often - albeit in a somewhat misleading form -
attributed to Laing that disturbed family behaviour induces the onset of
schizophrenia. That madness is but a logical reaction to an unliveable family
environment is taken as the starting point for Alan Sinfeld's illuminating study of
King Lear190 as well as of Wade Harrell's study of the plays of the English
playwright David Mercer who, according to Harrell, portrays characters who
undergo 'a process of psychological disintegration brought on by [their] inability to
deal with the insanity of the world and people around them'. Harrell argues that
'Mercer's ideas of sanity parallel those of R. D. Laing'191 because 'what both men
seemed to be concerned with ultimately was offering an explanation in psychological
Love', Papers on Language and Literature, 23 (1987), 142-60; Lawrence R. Broer, Sanity
Pleas: Schizophrenia in the Novels of Kurt Vonnengut (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press,
1989), pp. 20-2; Jean-Luc Vandaele, 'La question du corps en poesie en hommage a R.
Laing', Psychologie medicale, 22 (1990), 1062-6; John Guzlowski, 'Connectedness and
Separateness in Anne Tyler's The Accidental Tourist\ A Laingian Analysis', Journal of
Evolutionary Psychology, 15 (1994), 63-74; Jane Unsworth, 'Why Does An Author Who
Apparently Draws So Much On Autobiography Seem Committed to 'Alienating' the
Reader? A Reflection on Theories of Autobiography With Reference to the Work of Janet
Frame', in The Uses of Autobiography, edited by Julia Swindells (London: Taylor and
Francis, 1995), pp. 24-30; Michelle Warner, 'The Development of the Psycho-Social
Cannibal in the Fiction of Bret Easton Ellis ', Journal ofEvolutionary Psychology, 17 (1996),
140-6; Ed Moffatt, 'Grenouille: A Modern Schizophrenic in the Enlightening World of Das
ParfunT, Forum for Modern Language Studies, 37 (2001), 298-313.
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A. R. Atkins, 'Recognising the "Stranger" in D. H. Lawrence's The Trespasser', The
Cambridge Quarterly, 20 (1991), 1-20.
190 Alan Sinfeld, 'Lear and Laing', Essays in Criticism, 24 (1976), 1-16.
191 Wade Harrell, 'A Laingian Schizophrenic in Mercer's Ride a Cock Horse', in Within the
Dramatic Spectrum, edited by Karelisa Hartigan (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1986), pp. 88-96 (p. 88-9).
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terms of the growing generation conflicts in Britain in the 1960's'. Mercer's 1967
play In Two Minds, later filmed by Ken Loach under the apposite title Family Life,
provides strong evidence of his wider indebtedness to Laing's writings, and in the
apparently sole French-language Laingian analysis, Brigitte Gauthier writes: 'Mercer
crea son heroine Kate Winter (Janice dans le film) en rassemblant les faits a partir de
1
differentes histoires de Sanity, Madness and the Family de R. D. Laing'. Laing's
broader belief that the psychiatric profession is complicit in conspiring to condemn
to asylums these same individuals who find intolerable their family and social
environment is explored by Pasquale Accardo in his comparative study of Karl Kraus
and G. K. Chesterton.194
Of all the Laingian concepts to have caught the eye of critics, it is that of divided
selfhood which has been taken up with the greatest success. Rodger Beehler, for
example, suggests that Oliver Sacks' 1985 work The Man Who Mistook His Wife for
a Hat can be read fruitfully in conjunction with Laing's work as an exploration of
what we awkwardly refer to as "selfhood" [and of] how far a
person's own agency contributes to those various states (ranging
from mute immobility to violent predatory frenzy) that we collect
under the vague and shifting expressions 'psychosis', 'insanity',
'madness', and 'mental illness.195
Sam B. Girgus takes up this preoccupation with selfhood in his studies of the work of
Edgar Allan Poe and argues that in Poe's story 'William Wilson', 'Wilson is
presented [...] in a manner that makes him almost a casebook study of the false-self
system as described by Laing'.196 In a further Laing-inspired analysis of Poe's work,
Girgus again proposes that 'Laing's approach can provide some insight into the
192 ibid., p. 95. Showalter also draws attention to the heavy Laingian influence on Mercer's
work in her study 'R. D. Laing and the Sixties', pp. 123-5.
193
Brigitte Gauthier, 'Espaces asilaires: Techniques cinematographiques de l'alienation dans
Family Life de Ken Loach", La Licorne, 28 (1994), 101-11 (p. 101).
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Pasquale Accardo, 'Parallel Lives: The Anti-Psychiatry of G. K. Chesterton and Karl
Kraus', Chesterton Review, 13 (1987), 333-9.
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Rodger Beehler, 'Madness and Method', Philosophy, 68 (1993), 369-88 (p. 369).
196 Sam B. Girgus, 'R. D. Laing and Literature: Readings of Poe, Hawthorne and Kate
Chopin', in Psychological Perspectives on Literature: Freudian Dissidents and Non-
Freudians. A Casebook, edited by Joseph Natoli (Archon: Shoe String Press, 1964), pp. 181-
97 (p. 189).
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existential condition of many of Poe's characters in terms of their "schizoid way of
being-in-the-world" as divided, disembodied and false selves'.197 More significant,
however, is his use of Laing's famous view - 'madness need not be all breakdown. It
may also be breakthrough. It is potentially liberation and renewal as well as
enslavement and existential death' (PE, 110) - as a basis for the argument that:
Poe to some extent, of course, shares Laing's view of madness as
breakthrough. But he seems far less certain about the nature of the
reality beyond that breakthrough. [...] Poe also might have agreed
with Laing when Laing says that we all have become in one way or
another mad. But unlike Laing, Poe seems uncertain that there is
anything else. He seems to feel that if, like the narrator of "Usher",
we break through our prison, on the outside we will find only
another prison.198
The notion that madness can lead to a metanoic re-birth - formulated in The Bird of
Paradise and The Politics ofExperience - is as fundamental to Laing's later thought
as it was controversial in its day. Claude J. Rawson describes The Bird ofParadise,
as 'a journey into the self, and an exploration of the radical madness of the human
condition, of the kind (it might be said) which Swift's Tale [of the Tub] both mocks,
and ft1';1 9 while Denis McCort argues that with The Politics ofExperience, 'Laing
becomes heir to the tradition of the [German] Romantic quest for transcendence',200
as explored by Schlegel, Hoffman or Novalis. The novelist perhaps most frequently
associated with The Politics ofExperience is Laing's contemporary Doris Lessing, a
linkage made no doubt as a result of the close parallels between, on the one hand, the
hope for re-birth which Laing laid out in The Politics ofExperience and, on the other,
Lessing's view of madness as revelation and cure first introduced in The Golden
Notebook and explored more fully in The Four-Gated City and Briefing for a
197 Sam B. Girgus, 'Poe and R. D. Laing: The Transcendent Self, Studies in Short Fiction,
13 (1976), 299-309 (p. 299). See also a further Poe study by Girgus entitled 'Poe and the
Transcendent Self, in The Law ofthe Heart: Individualism and the Modern Self in American
Literature (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 24-36.
198
Girgus, 'Poe and R. D. Laing: The Transcendental Self, p. 309.
199 Claude J. Rawson, "Tis Only Infinite Below': Speculations on Swift, Wallace Stevens, R.
D. Laing and Others', Essays in Criticism, 22 (1972), 161-81 (p. 166).
200 Denis McCort, 'R. D. Laing and the German Romantic Quest for Transcendence', West
Virginia University Philological Papers, 28 (1982-3), 23-7 (p. 23).
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Descent into Hell. Vlastos feels able to contend that Laing and Lessing should not
only be read in conjunction with one another but, more importantly, that both should
201
be seen as 'social visionaries [and] prophets of contemporary culture'. This point
has been reiterated by Elaine Showalter:
the evolution of Lessing's fiction in the 1960s parallels Laing's
movement from an interpretation of schizophrenia as an intelligible
and potentially healing response to conflicting social demands, to a
view of madness as a form of rebellion, and the schizophrenic as
the sanest person in a mad society.202
Showalter also believes that 'virtually all of Doris Lessing's fiction in the 1960's
dramatizes Laing's theories; indeed Lessing and Laing seem often like collaborators
* 903
writing the words and the music to some vast opera of inner space'.*"
Such approaches to Lessing's fiction can also be situated within the significant camp
of Laing-inspired feminist approaches to literary texts, feminism having initially
found important ammunition in Laing's analyses of women's oppression, even
though it was eventually to be left thoroughly disappointed.204 Vlastos, for example,
has put forward the argument that:
for Lessing, as well as for Laing, fragmentation,
compartmentalisation, splitting is seen as the essential problem of
the makeup of our individual lives and of our society. Thus Anna
in The Golden Notebook is consciously and perpetually tormented
by the conflicts between her different roles as a woman - mistress,
mother, friend - and by the painful discrepancies between her
aspirations and her accomplishments as artist and as political
activist. And, like the failures of all Lessing protagonists, Anna's
failures are only partially personal. The division within herself as a
woman are also socially determined - condoned or encouraged -
by convention.20'
201 Marion Vlastos, 'Doris Lessing and R. D. Laing: Psychopolitics and Prophecy', PMLA,
91 (1976), 245-58 (p. 246).
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Cynthia Griffin Wolffs impressive Laingian / feminist study takes a similar line with
regard to Edna Pontellier, the chief protagonist of Kate Chopin's The Awakening, to
that of Vlastos. Wolff argues that 'by using R. D. Laing's description of the
"schizoid" personality, it might be possible to better assess the configuration of
Edna's personality',206 within the oppressive patriarchal environment from which she
is only able to find ultimate release and escape in suicide.
If such views are of the highest interest in a literary study, they do, however, stir up a
hornet's nest of controversy when applied to real patients in a clinical context. It is
all very well to celebrate the triumph of an insane universe within a literary context
but when one is faced with the nightmarish realities of caring for a mentally ill
patient on a day-to-day basis, the lustre of insanity and the possibility of metanoic re¬
birth quickly fades. A critical view of Laing's belief in madness as re-birth is
forwarded within a literary context by David Holbrook in his study of Sylvia Plath
and Dylan Thomas whose work, Holbrook argues, echoes resonantly with Laing's
analyses of the schizoid position. He draws close parallels between Laing's call in
The Politics ofExperience for 'the dissolution of the old normal ego' (PE, 119) and
Plath's view of herself as 'Lady Lazarus, who commits suicide, regularly with joy, in
order to be raised from the dead'.207 Yet Holbrook goes on to castigate Laing for
selling a schizoid fraud. His return ticket for many must prove,
devastatingly, a single. Those who follow his social and
psychedelic advocacy (rather than his poignant insights into
schizoid experience) are likely to find that they have never left the
platform.208
It seems clear from the preceding analysis that the studies which have been devoted
to the confluence of literary texts with the psychiatric theories of R. D. Laing are not
only relatively few in number when compared with, for example, psychoanalytic-
206
Cynthia Griffin Wolff, 'Thanatos and Eros: Kate Chopin's The Awakening', in Contexts
for Criticism, edited by Donald Keesley (London: Mayfield, 1994), pp. 241-55 (p. 244).





inspired approaches, but are also relatively short on detail and often take a largely
biographical approach to textual analysis. No extended analysis, such as that which I
carry out in this thesis, has been undertaken of the possible interaction between
French literary texts and Laingian theory. On this topic, there surely remains much to
be said.
Conclusion to Part I
In part I, I have put forward the view that the Bakhtinian concept of the
carnivalesque provides a useful analogy for our understanding of the rise and fall of
the important counter-cultural movement of anti-psychiatry. I would suggest in
conclusion that this analogy can be extended further. Earlier I described Caryl
Emerson's view of the dethronement of the carnival king as a thoroughly reactionary
event because of its re-confirmation and re-consecration of the existing social order
and its provision of a social safety valve through which the discontented are
presented with a controlled and short-lived opportunity to let off steam. Yet Emerson
appears to overlook the fact that, in Bakhtin's estimation, carnival remains a
fundamentally ambivalent event: the dethronement of the carnival king not only
exemplifies the casting down and defeat of the carnivalesque insurgents, it also
symbolises a fertilisation of the new. Carnival is 'the feast of becoming, change and
renewal',209 and, as such, the degradation of the king has as its principal function 'to
bury, to sow and to kill simultaneously, in order to bring forth something more and
better. [...] Degradation digs a bodily grave for a new birth; it has not only a
destructive, negative aspect, but also a regenerating one'.210 With regard to Laingian
anti-psychiatry, if this 'something more and better' is perhaps unlikely to be found in
the sphere of psychiatric practice, it is in the domain of literary analysis, I would
argue, that the carnivalesque interlude arguably represented by Laingian anti-
psychiatry will bring forth future regeneration and renewal.
209
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Introduction to Part II
In part I, I put forward the argument that the field of literary criticism could provide a
more welcoming home than contemporary psychiatric practice to the much-maligned
body of thought developed by the anti-psychiatry movement and by R. D. Laing in
particular. In part II, I lay the foundations for using Laing's work as an interpretative
framework within which to analyse literary texts. The first stage in this procedure is
to demonstrate that despite the intellectual and temporal distance which separates the
two spheres there nonetheless exists a substantial congruence of concerns between
Laingian anti-psychiatry and the four nineteenth-century novels under examination:
Stendhal's Le Rouge et le Noir, Balzac's Louis Lambert, the Goncourts' Renee
Mauperin, and Zola's L 'CEuvre. In the first of two chapters in part II, I therefore
focus on each novel's de-motivated and seemingly 'invraisemblable' turning-point,
examining the evidence presented in each work relating to why the four main
protagonists commit their apparently illogical actions, all the time exploring the
numerous contradictions and ambiguities surrounding these acts. In the conclusion to
the individual section devoted to each novel, I draw up a series of questions which
emerge from these ambiguities and contradictions and which form the basis of a
'problematique' I then attempt to resolve in part III by using as a conceptual
framework the work of R. D. Laing.
The first text used in chapter one to demonstrate this 'congruence of concerns' is
Balzac's novella Louis Lambert, 'the Ark of the Temple of the Comedie Humaine
• 911
and its ostensible philosophical apex', and the tale of a childhood genius who dies
at the age of 28 after descending into a debilitating catatonic state and attempting to
castrate himself a few days before his much anticipated wedding. I examine this
novel before the three others under consideration - even though this means
disregarding the chronological order in which the four novels were published - for
the simple reason that anti-psychiatric issues impinge in a more obvious and direct
manner on Louis Lambert than they do upon the other three novels. Indeed, many of
the principal concerns of anti-psychiatry reviewed in part I - unreliable diagnoses of
211 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama and the
Mode ofExcess (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 116.
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madness; the view of madness as breakthrough as much as breakdown - arguably
form the novel's principal focus. Having established the existence of a congruence of
concerns between Laingian anti-psychiatry and Louis Lambert, I then move on to
examine the other novels which do not seem to concern themselves at all with
notions of madness.
The second stage in the procedure to lay the foundation for using Laing's work as an
interpretative framework involves reviewing in part II the explanations which literary
critics have put forward with regard to the questions raised in the first chapter of part
II. Such a review does not, however, claim to be exhaustive given that producing a
fully comprehensive survey of the critical literature relating to each of these four
novels and novelists could account for an entire thesis in itself. I therefore focus on
approaches which engage directly with the questions outlined in part II chapter one.
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PART II Chapter One
A Congruence of Concerns:
Anti-Psychiatry and Four French
Nineteenth-Century Novels
En quelques minutes, la maladie, les signes et I'anxiete de la
souffrance s'etaient effaces sur la figure amaigrie de Renee. Une
beaute d'extase et de supreme delivrance, devant laquelle son
pere, sa mere, son ami etaient tombes a genoux. La douceur, la
paix d'un ravissement etait descendue sur elle. Un reve semblait
mollement renverser sa tete sur les oreillers. Ses yeux grands
ouverts, tournes en haut, paraissaient s'emplir d'infini, son regard,
peu a peu, prenait la fixite des choses eternelles. (RM, 259)
Dieu seul sait qui du fou, qui du savant a ete le plus pres du vrai.212
212
Balzac, Theorie de la demarche, in La Comedie Humaine, XII, pp. 259-302 (p. 265).
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Anti-psychiatry and Louis Lambert
At first glance, it seems clear that Louis goes, quite simply, spectacularly mad
towards the end of his life. After all, Louis's uncle tells the narrator that following
Louis's first 'acces de catalepsie', he remained 'pendant cinquante-neuf heures
immobile, les yeux fixes, sans manger ni parler' (LL, 677), after which he fell into
'une melancolie que rien ne put dissiper' (LL, 679). In the throes of such torment, 'il
frottait habituellement une de ses jambes sur l'autre par un mouvement machinal que
rien n'avait pu reprimer' (LL, 682), and would limit his speech to elliptical,
seemingly incomprehensible utterances such as 'les anges sont blancs!' (LL, 682).
To cap it all, Esquirol, the high priest of nineteenth-century French psychiatry,
declares him incurable and advises he be kept in a quiet, darkened room (LL, 679).
This diagnosis has since been corroborated by several modern-day psychiatrists:
Jacques Borel insists on Louis's inherent incomprehensibility when he writes that Te
schizophrene s'y decouvre [in Louis] tout entier, avec sa figure propre, sa singularity,
T | 1
son etrangete et son mystere'; while Henri Claude and J. Levy-Valensi suggest
that Louis's condition is 'typique de la schizophrenic pure avec son developpement
progressif vers l'etat dementiel'.214 So impressed are these clinicians by Balzac's
anticipation of the schizophrenic condition that they feel confident enough to claim
that the protagonist Louis Lambert could not have been an invention of Balzac's
imagination: 'tout nous permet de conclure que le condisciple de Balzac au college
de Vendome a existe, qu'il fut un dement precoce dont l'observation a ete
minutieusement relevee'.2'2 Other psychiatrists congratulate Balzac on having
'discovered' and provided an early literary representation of the schizophrenic
213
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condition some eighty years ahead of Bleuler.216 Such textual evidence, when taken
along with the corroboration provided by several clinical psychiatrists and literary
critics, would appear to suggest that Louis does indeed go clinically mad. More
significantly, it also suggests that he is beyond all comprehension, and, as such, that
he is deserving of the kind of de-humanising, invalidating 'diagnostic look' which
denies him any sense of intentionality and responsibility and which, as we saw in
part I, Laing argues forms the characteristic approach adopted by mainstream
917
psychiatry towards the mentally ill.
Despite occupying such a prominent position in the novel and receiving solid
endorsement from several sources, Louis's 'madness' nonetheless remains cloaked in
ambiguity and 'invraisemblance'. This is particularly true when it comes to the
reasons why Louis goes mad. If the raft of psychiatrists whose work has just been
cited attribute Louis's strange behaviour or alleged schizophrenia to some form of
biological impairment, the tale's narrator and one-time close friend of Louis posits a
psychological cause.
L'exaltation a laquelle dut le faire arriver l'attente du plus grand
plaisir physique, encore agrandie chez lui par la chastete du corps
et par la puissance de fame, avait bien pu determiner cette crise
dont les resultats ne sont pas plus connus que la cause. (LL, 677)
The imprecision implied by the 'avait bien pu' verbal construction suggests that
much uncertainty surrounds Louis's thought processes at this point. This ambiguity
is exacerbated by the fact that the view centring on Te plus grand plaisir physique'
has been severely undermined by preceding events. Immediately before imparting
the news of Louis's attempted castration218 and descent into apparent insanity, the
narrator quotes at length from several letters Louis sent Pauline de Villenoix in
716 Devic and Morin, 'A propos de la demence precoce', p. 307. Borel makes a similar point
in Medecine etpsychiatrie balzaciennes, pp. 102-5.
217 See p. 20.
218 Critics have questioned whether Louis castrates himself or instead commits some other
form of self-mutiliation: see, for example, Michel Lichtle, 'Notes et variantes', in LL, 1588
on this point. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that physical castration remains one surely
highly plausible interpretation of the phrase Toperation a laquelle Origene crut devoir son
talent' (LL, 679).
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which he expresses his boundless joy at the prospect of their imminent marriage. We
read for example: 'vous serez toute ma famille, comme vous etes deja ma seule
richesse, et le monde entier pour rnoi' (LL, 664); 'je vis par vous, et, pensee
delicieuse, pour vous. Maintenant tout a un sens, pour moi, dans cette vie' (LL, 665);
or finally: 'nous pourrons rester, pendant toutes les journees de notre vie, heureux
comme nous le sommes furtivement en de rares instants! Quoi! nos sentiments si
purs, si profonds, prendront les formes delicieuses des milles caresses que j'ai
revees' (LL, 673). These are hardly the words, one might think, of a man on the
verge of self-castration and the self-denial of the 'mille caresses' of which he speaks
so expectantly. These letters testify to the fact that the prospect of marriage fills
Louis only with intense pleasure: why then should he castrate himself so close to his
wedding day and crumble into a state of incurable madness? Figuring highly among
the novel's most 'invraisemblable' elements, therefore, is the curious timing of
Louis's attempted self-castration.
Further ambiguity and 'invraisemblance' arise out of the fact that the three key
events which bring about the novel's closure - madness, castration, death - are each
associated with what could be termed textual silencing. Firstly, the majority of the
period covering Louis's madness is narrated only retrospectively. Secondly, the word
castration is not actually used in the text as Louis's uncle refers instead to
T'operation a laquelle Origene crut devoir son talent' (LL, 679). This somewhat
obscure reference to Origen - the third century AD Greek preacher who, according to
legend, castrated himself to forestall any possible rumours regarding his teaching
female catechumens - suggests that Louis's uncle prefers to keep Louis's act hidden
under a shroud of silence and secrecy, and, at the very least, that naming the action of
castration must remain taboo. While castration is the object of some form of overt
authorial censorship in several nineteenth-century literary texts (such as Balzac's
Sarrasine), it nonetheless remains true that for an unidentified reason it is the one act
in Louis Lambert which dare not have its name spoken. Thirdly, after his death,
Louis is buried on an island on the de Villenoix estate, his tomb being 'sans nom,
sans date' (LL, 692). As a result of this series of 'textual silencings', the text seems
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to be proposing some form of undefined and unexplained unwillingness to associate
Louis with language. The questions therefore arise: why should Louis and language
be incompatible? Why are his actions surrounded by such ambiguity and
'silencings'?
A further area of ambiguity centres on the way in which the text simultaneously
asserts and undermines a diagnosis of 'madness'. One clear example of this
phenomenon can be found in the clash between Louis's uncle's opinion that his
nephew went mad a few days before his wedding to Pauline de Villenoix (LL, 676)
and the narrator's subsequent argument that:
en province, oil les idees se rarefient, un homme plein de pensees
neuves et domine par un systeme, comme l'etait Louis, pouvait
passer au moins pour un original. [...] En province, un original
passe pour un homme a moitie fou. Les premieres paroles de M.
Lefebvre [Louis's uncle] me firent done douter de la folie de mon
camarade. (LL, 677)
This under-cutting of the uncle's words also serves to weaken his argument that
Louis had tried to castrate himself because he believed himself to be impotent (LL,
679). Indeed, on a practical level, one wonders how exactly he could have
communicated his fears of impotency to his uncle given that he was at the time
apparently in the depths of 'un acces de catalepsie'.
The one individual who know bests and empathises most with Louis - Pauline de
Villenoix - casts the longest shadow of doubt over an un-nuanced or unqualified
diagnosis of madness. She declares to the tale's narrator: 'sans doute [...] Louis doit
paraitre fou; mais il ne I'est pas, si le nom de fou doit appartenir seulement a ceux
dont, par des causes inconnues, le cerveau se vicie, et qui n'offrent aucune raison de
leurs actes' (LL, 683). In her opinion, there is an inherent logic and
comprehensibility to Louis's actions and behaviour. 'Tout est parfaitement
coordonne chez mon mari. [...] Aux autres hommes, il paraitrait aliene; pour moi,
qui vis dans sa pensee, toutes ses idees sont lucides' (LL, 683, my italics). In making
such statements, Pauline establishes a strong link between Louis Lambert and the key
anti-psychiatric principle which states that what is often written off as madness, and
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therefore as fully incomprehensible, is in fact context-sensible, comprehensible
behaviour which is expressive of the individual's existential position. Through her
adoption of an anti-psychiatric approach avant la lettre, Pauline proposes that
understanding Louis requires above all the assumption of a viewpoint which permits
and seeks out comprehension from the outset as opposed to one which excludes it
automatically. This view that Louis is not as mad as he may at first appear and not
incomprehensible or beyond the bounds of reason is backed up at least in part by the
fact that Louis is clearly of sufficently firm mind to compose the series of complex
but still comprehensible aphorisms included in the novel's final pages (LL, 684-91).
Furthermore, the narrator suggests in his description of Louis's condition: 'peut-etre
calomnions-nous en la qualifiant sans la connaitre' (LL, 680), once again echoing the
anti-psychiatric principle that the label 'mad' is most often applied only to behaviour
we are unable or, as is more likely, unwilling to understand.
A further tenet of anti-psychiatry which finds illustration in Louis Lambert reads that
madness should not be seen as a form of disintegration and break-down but instead
as a healing voyage of discovery and break-through which contains the potential to
lead to prophetic insights and a more advanced mental state. This fact is best
illustrated by way of a return to the diagnoses passed on Louis Lambert by the
several clinical psychiatrists whose work was examined earlier. The most significant
characteristic linking their diagnoses is that each of them employs what Laing terms
a 'vocabulary of denigration' (TDS, 27) with respect to Louis's condition, the same
type of vocabulary which Laing berated the psychiatric profession for adopting in
relation to 'real-life' schizophrenics. Louis's fate is seen, variously, as 'un
219 220 221effondrement mental', 'une catastrophe', 'une chute', or 'une desagregation
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mentale complete': it is a curse which must be exorcised, a state which can only
shut off gateways rather than open them up. Each psychiatrist remains content to
chart the ways in which Louis's condition converges with or diverges from pre-
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existing ontologies of schizophrenia rather than examine the extent to which Louis's
madness may be seen as a breakthrough and not a breakdown. Jacques Borel, for
example, feels that Louis's attempted self-castration 'se comprend mal': it is, he
believes, 'si inutile. Dans 1'esprit schizophrenique, toujours indifferent au desir
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sexuel, ce geste n'a pas de signification aussi materielle'. Borel argues, then, that
if Louis's castration makes little sense, it is because Balzac made an error in
including it. Moi'se Le Yaouanc's similar complaint runs that Esquirol would never
have advised that Louis be kept in silent isolation as such a prognosis would have
been reserved for 'les individus saisis d'un acces de rnanie aigue et non pour les
malades paisibles, chez qui la folie s'installe de faqon durable, chronique'.224 As a
result of such inaccuracies, Le Yaouanc can only attribute Balzac's apparently
blatant disregard for 'les lemons de la medecine' to 'la rapidite avec laquelle il a pris
des notes avant de partir pour Sache'. Both psychiatrists thereby commit the error
which anti-psychiatrists find objectionable in their establishment colleagues: namely,
permitting a pre-existent description of an illness to dictate their diagnosis rather than
allowing their diagnosis to be led by the facts of the case. Indeed, most psychiatrists,
with the exception of Borel, make no effort to explain why Louis attempts to castrate
himself - the turning-point of the novel after all - and none shed light on the timing
of Louis's self-castration and subsequent demise so close to his much-anticipated
wedding.
To what extent, then, does the text confirm or reject these views that Louis's
madness is a catastrophe? The narrator, certainly, appears to side with Pauline in
underlining the inappropriate nature of any approach which sees Louis's condition as
a debilitating affliction from which he must be cured. Far from casting him outwith
the bounds of intelligibility and sanity, Louis's state imbues him instead with 'un
bonheur divin' (LL, 683) based on which he is able to access 'une incomplete
revelation d'un monde inconnu' (LL, 683). Laing's (in)famous sound-bite which
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states that 'madness need not be all breakdown, it may be also breakthrough' (PE,
110) could almost have been formulated with Lambert in mind.
Further evidence for a rejection of the view that Louis's demise is a catastrophe is
provided by Balzac in a series of statements he made in relation to Louis Lambert. In
an 1835 letter to Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, for example, he explains that with
'le Livre mystique' (the collective name for his works Les Proscrits, Louis Lambert
and Seraphita) he had aimed to portray 'les grandes conceptions de l'extase humaine
echauffee par le souffle divin';226 moreover, he saw Louis Lambert specifically as the
tale of 'le Voyant marchant a sa vision, conduit au Ciel par les faits, par ses idees,
par son temperament'.227 Balzac thus emphasises that Louis's destiny is no 'descent'
into an incapacitated oblivion - instead it should be seen as an ascension to an
exalted, divine sphere of existence which remains inaccessible to all but the happy
few. As a result, we should read as a salutary warning Balzac's statement that Louis
Lambert is to be recommended 'aux esprits germaniques curieux d'examiner
logiquement jusqu'a quel point le genie peut ressembler a la folie et vice versa la
22 cfolie au genie:' genius does not lead to madness per se, he warns, but one can
easily be mistaken for the other if we fail to analyse them with sufficient care. The
close resemblance between madness and divine prophecy which Balzac points to
here finds echo in the novel itself where, even long before his ultimate descent /
ascension into madness, Louis is described as being gifted with 'une ame sublime'
(LL, 606), a 'mens divinor' (LL, 594), and a 'gout pour les choses du ciel' (LL, 594),
all of which 'eleverent son coeur, le purifierent, l'ennoblirent, lui donnerent appetit de
226
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la nature divine' (LL, 594). He also sees his quasi-Faustian goals as being to
determine 'les rapports reels qui peuvent exister entre l'homme et Dieu' (LL, 652)
and to lead mankind, Moses-like, towards the Promised Land of a new society which
'ne doit pas etre constitute comme Test la notre' (LL, 653). Although this divine,
prophetic aspect of Louis's character will be examined in greater detail in part III, it
is already evident that the close contiguity of Louis's alleged madness and his
revelatory potential strengthens the claim that a real congruence of concerns exists
between this novel and the anti-psychiatric principles outlined in part I. This
congruence, despite it having been overlooked by Balzacian critics, revolves around
both spheres contesting received notions of madness. Both argue, firstly, that
behaviour which many write off as 'madness' may in fact be more comprehensible
than it at first appears, and, secondly, that this behaviour we call 'madness' should
not necessarily be seen as a tragedy, but instead as a release and even a god-send. A
series of questions arises out of this congruence of concerns as a result of the
numerous textual ambiguities and silencings surrouding the novel's key events,
questions on which the novel turns and which resonate loudly with the concerns of
anti-psychiatry. How should we interpret the physically debilitated state which Louis
occupies towards the end of the novel and his subsequent death? Should he be
regarded more as a divine visionary who succeeds in escaping from the limitations of
the human form and who progresses to a quasi-messianic ascension and less as an
intentionless, dehumanised failure who deserves to be locked up in a darkened room?
If this is the case, why does he accede to this position of apparent divine
contentment? What mental processes does he go through? Put more polemically,
what drives him mad? What drives him to attempt to commit the act of castration so
soon before his wedding given that at that point of the narrative it seems to represent
a fundamentally illogical action?
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Anti-psychiatry and Le Rouge et le Noir
What can anti-psychiatry bring to the work of a writer like Stendhal? One might
initially think not much: he is, after all, the writer who famously immersed himself
every day in the carefully reasoned prose of the 'Code civil'. Moreover, no
characters in Le Rouge et le Noir exhibit overt symptoms of mental illness.
Notwithstanding these facts, Shoshana Felman has demonstrated over several
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studies the astonishing frequency with which the signifier 'la folie' and its
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cognates recur within Stendhal's novels. In the course of one such examination,
Felman stresses the culturally relative status of 'la folie"s signified, suggesting that
in his novels 'la folie ne designe rien d'autre que ce que les autres traitent comme
telle, sans en avoir pour autant une existence reelle'.231 Felman's argument
establishes an immediate link between Stendhal's work and anti-psychiatry and, in
particular, Kai Erikson's views on deviance discussed in part I: 'deviance is not a
property inherent in certain forms of behaviour, it is a property conferred upon these
forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them'.232 This
conjunction between Felman's and Erikson's views provides at least an initial basis
for the view that Le Rouge et le Noir and anti-psychiatry may share similar concerns.
A firmer basis, however, can be established by examining the novel's key scene -
Julien Sorel's shooting of Mme de Renal - through the same lens as that which we
have just viewed Louis Lambert: namely, in terms of textual de-motivation,
ambiguity and 'invraisemblance'. It is to such an examination that I shall turn now.
The scene which recounts Julien Sorel's failed attempt on the life of Louise de Renal
presents the reader with a remarkable instance of textual de-motivation. Despite
making for the novel's surely most significant scene and the one which brings about
its closure, the shooting scene's most notable characteristic is its brevity as it
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occupies only seven short paragraphs in which the narrator gives a bald description
of events without further analysis or comment. The narrator also withholds access to
Julien's interior monologue which on many previous occasions has provided
invaluable clues as to his motivations. On this point, Christopher Prendergast quotes
Merleau-Ponty in order to make clear that 'much of the tension of Julien's return to
Verrieres arises from the suppression of the kinds of thoughts or interior detail that
we could expect to find in such an account; we get in one page what might have
taken up five'. The effect of this conspicuous 'silence dedaigneux', in Genette's
words, is to cocoon the shooting, on first reading at least, in mystery and
inexplicability.
If neither Julien nor the narrator propose an explicit motive during the shooting
scene, several motives are, however, put forward in the chapters of the novel
subsequent to the shooting, yet none of these explanations seem entirely adequate or
satisfactory. One example of this inadequacy arises out of the fact that the reader
remains in possession of one piece of crucial information throughout the shooting
scene which influences his/her view of Julien's behaviour: knowledge of the
existence and contents of Mme de Renal's damning letter. Through its juxtaposition
with the shooting scene, this denunciation appears to offer an immediate explanation
for Julien's actions. Yet only a few characters in the novel such as Mathilde and the
marquis de La Mole are aware of its existence. Neither Julien nor his lawyer cite the
letter's explosive contents as a possible motive for his murder attempt, and, in fact,
his lawyer and the audience at the Besanfon trial seem unaware that the letter exists
given that Mme de Renal does not refer to it in the further letter she sends to the
court begging for clemency. One could admittedly argue that neither Julien, Mme de
Renal nor Mathilde de La Mole would want the letter's existence to enter the public
domain in light of its scandalous contents. Yet it remains undeniable that Julien
makes no mention of the letter in his courtroom out-burst which, when taken together
with the strikingly de-motivated and purely descriptive narrative stance adopted in
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the shooting scene, lends a sharp air of ambiguity and mystery to what represents the
crucial event of the novel.
In other scenes subsequent to the shooting, Julien contributes to the confusion
surrounding his actions. For example, in the chapter which immediately follows the
shooting scene, Julien states unequivocally to the investigating judge - 'j'ai donne la
mort avec premeditation [...]; j'ai achete et fait charger les pistolets chez Un Tel,
Farmurier. L'article 1342 du Code penal est clair, je merite la mort, et je l'attends'
(RN, 646). Yet he maintains a conspicuous silence as to what precisely caused him to
act with premeditation in the first place. The investigating judge is understandably
surprised by Julien's reactions and persists with his line of questioning 'pour faire en
sorte que l'accuse se coupat dans ses reponses' (RN, 646): but the defendant's
resolve remains firm - 'mais ne voyez-vous pas, lui dit Julien en souriant, que je me
fais aussi coupable que vous pouvez le desirer? Allez, monsieur, vous ne manquerez
pas la proie que vous poursuivez. Vous aurez le plaisir de condamner' (RN, 646-7).
In refusing to betray his motives to the judge, Julien would prefer to be sent to his
death rather than be forced to cobble together a cogent defence or even to take up
one of the many possibilities of escape from his prison cell which are open to him.
The reader might well be justified in therefore posing the question: why should the
unspecified motivations for his premeditated act remain shrouded in silence?
Julien does eventually expand on his motives, albeit only to a limited extent.
However, his words once again hardly dispel the sense of mystery surrouding his
actions. Firstly, he claims to have not acted out of a desire for money (RN, 665);
secondly, he reacts furiously to his lawyer's suggestion that he should cite jealousy
as his motive: 'sur votre vie, monsieur, s'ecria Julien, hors de lui, souvenez-vous de
ne plus proferer cet abominable mensonge' (RN, 667). These two explanations serve
only to eliminate possible motives rather than propose lines of enquiry in a more
positive sense. Elsewhere Julien does provide some 'positive' reasons: in a letter to
Mathilde de La Mole, he writes: 'je me suis venge [...]. La vengeance a ete atroce'
(RN, 647). He repeats this argument about vengeance during his impassioned court-
77
room speech: 'mon crime est atroce, et il fut premedite. J'ai done merite la mort,
messieurs les jures' (RN, 674-5). Based on such a defence, the reader could surely be
forgiven for concluding that Julien was driven by a sense of class warfare in light of
the juxtaposition of this statement alongside the tirade he launches at the 'bourgeois
indignes' of the jury whom he claims will convict him because he is but 'un paysan
qui s'est revolte contre la bassesse de sa fortune' (RN, 675). Yet such an
interpretation can be founded only on speculation as the text does nothing to confirm
that a sense of class hatred may have motivated his murder attempt. Indeed, this line
of argument is seriously undermined by the fact that Julien's career is ruined not by
Louise de Renal's letter, but by his specific act of attempted murder. Julien would
have no doubt been able to save his career had he mounted a robust defence against
the allegations either by putting forward the arguments which Mme de Renal
formulates in her letter to the jury or else by citing the 'certificat de bonne conduite'
which M de Renal has provided him with on his departure from Verrieres in which
his one-time employer had not been able to find 'de[s] termes assez magnifiques
pour exalter sa conduite' (RN, 367). While Julien's societal ambitions may have
suffered a set-back as a result of Mme de Renal's letter, it was by no means an
irreversible one. Julien's shooting of Mme de Renal can therefore not be seen as an
act of politically motivated vengeance of class warfare as it is only after the crime
that his career nose-dives and not before.
What emerges from this analysis of Le Rouge et le Noir so far is that the motives
behind Julien's crime appear, at the very least, to be surrounded by uncertainty and
ambiguity. One might think that such ambiguity would be resolved once Julien's
death sentence has been passed, yet this does not prove to be the case. When mulling
over what he would say to Louise de Renal were he to see her again, Julien thinks:
'apres une telle action, comment lui persuader que je l'aime uniquement? car enfin
j'ai voulu la tuer par ambition ou par amour pour Mathilde' (RN, 677). What seems
to be most interesting about this extract is Julien's use of the word 'ou' which
suggests that he is no longer able to make up his mind as to why he pulled the trigger
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or, more significantly, as in Ann Jefferson's proposal, as if he no longer really cares
why.235 A satisfactory explanation for the shooting remains elusive.
Further confusion is sown, this time deliberately it seems, by M. de Frilair who tells
Mathilde de La Mole that Julien acted out of jealousy even though he is far from
certain whether this allegation contains any truth.
Je ne serais pas surpris apres tout, lui dit-il d'un air leger, quand
nous apprendrions que c'est par jalousie que M. Sorel a tire deux
coups de pistolet a cette femme autrefois tant aimee. II s'en faut
bien qu'elle soit sans agrements, et depuis peu elle voyait fort
souvent un certain abbe Marquinot de Dijon [...]. Pourquoi [...] M.
Sorel aurait-il choisi l'eglise, si ce n'est parce que, precisement en
cet instant, son rival y celebrait la messe? (RN, 660-1)
The notion of jealousy which Frilair develops here has little further textual evidence
to cite in its favour. Moreover, Frilair proposes this idea not out of an honest desire
to put forward a cogent, definitive motive for Julien's behaviour but out of a wish to
invoke the jealousy of Mathilde over Julien's relationship with Mme de Renal.
The one line of defence which Julien does repeat several times is that which relates
to a thrist for revenge. Yet this defence also contributes to the confusion and
inadequacy surrounding the explanation of his motives. Julien declares: 'j'ai ete
offense d'une maniere atroce; j'ai tue, je merite la morf (RN, 648). Does his
behaviour therefore represent a violent reaction against the question mark which
Mme de Renal's allegations have placed over his honour? Such a view is far from
implausible given that Julien's strong personal sense of honour and duty (mainly to
himself, of course) has been a constant driver of his ascent through the various
milieux of nineteenth-century France. Yet what exactly is Julien trying to avenge?
There are two possibilities, but neither, I believe, is immediately satisfactory. Firstly,
it could be that Julien acts to exact revenge for the personal 'offense' inflicted on him
by Mme de Renal's damning letter. Such an explanation seems insufficient, however,
given that it overlooks the state of mind in which Julien finds himself upon reading
235 Ann Jefferson, Reading Realism in Stendhal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), p. 88.
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Louise de Renal's damning letter. Far from feeling his honour insulted, he appears to
accept his expulsion from the Hotel de La Mole: 'je ne puis blamer M de La Mole',
he declares, 'il est juste et prudent. Quel pere voudrait donner sa fille cherie a un tel
homme!' (RN, 644). One could admittedly argue on this point that even if Julien
realises he has no right to condemn the marquis de La Mole's outraged reaction, he
can still feel personally insulted by Mme de Renal's allegations. While this point
may be valid, it does not explain why Julien should feel the need to respond to this
swipe at his personal, private sense of honour by taking such emphatically public
revenge. After all, if Julien had merely wanted to avenge this slur on his honour,
'pourquoi [...] M. Sorel aurait-il choisi l'eglise?', in the words ofM. de Frilair, 'quoi
de plus simple que de se cacher dans les jardins de M. de Renal qu'il connait si bien?
La, avec la presque certitude d'etre ni vu, ni pris, ni soupqonne, il pourrait donner la
mort a la femme dont il etait jaloux?' (RN, 661). An alternative assumption is that in
shooting Mme de Renal Julien wants to avenge the public 'offense' his ex-mistress
has inflicted on him. Yet this response remains similarly unsatisfactory as only a
limited number of individuals are aware of the letter's existence and contents and
therefore of the potential for public 'offense' which it may contain.
Thus far in this section we have seen that the various possible motives for Julien's
attempted murder of Mme de Renal are shrouded in ambiguity and silence.
Significantly, however, the shooting also takes place at the point of the narrative
where it is arguably least expected, coming at the very stage of his life when he
appears to have realised all his societal ambitions. So successfully has he juggled the
contradictory aims of mastering the linguistic and behavioural codes of Parisian
salon society while still retaining enough 'singularite' to make him stand out from
the crowd around him that he enters the church at Verrieres resplendent in the title of
'M le chevalier Julien Sorel de La Vernaye'. As was also the case in relation to Louis
Lambert's attempted self-castration, the 'invraisemblance' of Julien's behaviour is
therefore particularly dependent on its timing. This fact is well exemplified in the
chapter immediately preceding Mme de Renal's denunciation which ends on Julien's
realisation that his Napoleon-inspired ambitions of glory, rank and fame are finally
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beginning to be satisfied: 'apres tout, pensait-il, mon roman est fini, et a moi seul
tout le merite. J'ai su me faire aimer de ce monstre d'orgueil, ajoutait-il en regardant
Mathilde; son pere ne peut vivre sans elle, et elle sans moi' (RN, 639). Julien's
'novel' has thus seen him effect a successful transformation from a gauche and much
derided country book-worm into a socially adroit and much desired golden-boy. The
curious reader might therefore pose the question: why does Julien shoot Louise de
Renal at the very moment when he seems to most 'fit in'? Why does he put his hard-
earned achievements at mortal risk? By extension, a reader might also ask: why does
Julien try to kill Mme de Renal in a crowded church where his immediate arrest is
assured? Why should the Machiavellian brilliance which had hitherto characterised
his rapid social ascent so unaccountably abandon him when it comes to his most
audacious act to date? A further, perhaps more pertinent question which arises is why
does Julien try to kill Mme de Renal at all? As Richard Bolster points out: 'a rational
and prudent policy for Julien would [have been] to play for time and to persuade the
marquis that [Mme de Renal's] allegation is untrue'. Julien could have deployed
his extensive rhetorical skills to convince the marquis of the spurious or exaggerated
nature of the charges laid against him, thereby allowing him to ride out the storm
unleashed by her damning accusations. Julien's attempt on the life of Mme de Renal
thus seems as unnecessary as it is senseless.
The questions which have just been outlined will be addressed in part III of this
thesis within the interpretative framework of Laingian anti-psychiatry. More
significant for the moment, however, is the fact that these questions point to the
congruence of concerns which exists between anti-psychiatry and Le Rouge et le
Noir. This is because these questions are united by the indisputable fact that in
shooting Mme de Renal Julien acts in a manner which is out of character, contrary to
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his personal sense of self-interest and self-preservation instinct as well as to the
codes of behaviour which he had hitherto tried so hard to ape. By extension, his
TT 7
behaviour contravenes all codes of novelistic 'vraisemblance' and 'bienseance'. In
a parallel sense, we saw in part one that anti-psychiatry rests partly on the view that
those deemed to be mentally ill are not in fact suffering from a series of neurological
imbalances, as mainstream psychiatrists would claim in Laing's view, but are instead
actings in ways which deviate from and contravene society's moral and behavioural
codes. Anti-psychiatry views the symptoms of mental illness as 'wilful situational
improprieties and [...] as evidence that the individual is not prepared to keep his
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place', or as 'an infraction of social rules and social expectations'. These
descriptions echo loudly with the position of Julien Sorel and the questions which
have just been posed. The congruence of concerns between anti-psychiatry, on the
one hand, and the evaporation of Julien's sense of self-interest and of his self-
preservation instinct along with his contravention of novelistic codes of
'vraisemblance', on the other, coalesces around precisely this similarity. The actions
of the committed psychiatric patient, when viewed from an anti-psychiatric stand¬
point, and those of Julien around the time of shooting Mme de Renal can both be
described as an attempt to 'strike at the syntax of conduct'.240
Earlier in this chapter, we saw how the congruence of concerns between Louis
Lambert and anti-psychiatry turned partly on the fact that Louis's behaviour, which
many observers write off as incomprehensible nonsense, may be more
understandable than it at first appears. The congruence of concerns between anti-
psychiatry and Le Rouge et le Noir outlined so far does not extend to the possible
comprehensibility of Julien's 'mad' act of attempted murder. What I intend to show
in the course of subsequent chapters, however, is that there does indeed exist a
congruence of concerns of this form in relation to anti-psychiatry and Le Rouge et le
Noir. At the same time, I will demonstrate that specific concepts drawn from Laing's
237 For a full investigation of this point, see Prendergast, Order ofMimesis, pp. 119-47.
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ontology of schizophrenia can be brought into play in order to formulate responses to
the questions outlined above.
Anti-psychiatry and Renee Mauperin
Paralleling what we have seen in relation to Le Rouge et le Noir, anti-psychiatry may
appear to have little relevance to the Goncourts' Renee Mauperin. Yet, in a similar
manner, firmer evidence for the existence of a 'congruence of concerns' between
anti-psychiatry and Renee Mauperin can be found if, once again, we examine the
'invraisemblance' and the textual de-motivation which, in common with Louis
Lambert and Le Rouge et le Noir, characterise the key event of the novel: the
eponymous heroine's death, and specifically, why she dies at such a young age and
in such an overtly beatified manner.
Renee's demise is triggered off by her notifying the rightful and last-remaining
holder of the de Villacourt title that her brother Henri intends to take on the de
Villacourt 'particule' as a means of securing his engagement to the daughter of a
wealthy business-man with whose wife he has been conducting a clandestine affair.
Henri Mauperin had, however, been unaware of the existence of this holder of the
title who, upon reading of Henri's intentions in the copy ofLe Moniteur which Renee
anonymously sends him, is so infuriated that he comes to Paris and challenges
Mauperin to a duel in which the latter is killed. From the narrator we learn that Renee
incriminated her brother in this way in order to 'provoquer une reclamation,
empecher son frere d'obtenir ce nom, faire rompre ce mariage' (RM, 222). A reader
might wonder, however, why Renee should feel the need to put a stop to the
impending marriage, and s/he might be justified in asking why she simply does not
keep her principled objections to herself and enjoy the benefits of the social and
financial capital her brother and family will accrue through their participation in this
lucrative, high-society wedding. In incriminating her brother in this way, Renee
breaks the rules of 'the syntax of behaviour' governing the milieu she inhabits, rules
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which are seemingly predicated upon political expediency and the satisfaction of
financial greed. Renee's behaviour could then be characterised as 'mad' if we adopt
an anti-psychiatric perspective: one which sees 'madness' as behaviour which
remains comprehensible despite it representing 'a wilful situation impropriety' which
contravenes expected codes of conduct.
As a result of Henri's untimely death, Renee and her family are plunged into a state
of advanced grief, and it is her guilt over both her brother's death and the grief she
has inadvertently caused which would appear, at least initially, to cause her death.
For example, when one of the succession of doctors who treats Renee asks her father
whether she has suffered 'aucune grande emotion, aucun grand chagrin, [...] un
amour contrarie, par exemple' (RM, 223), the clear implication is that Renee's illness
and eventual death can be explained away by her heart being broken by the death of
her brother as well as by the guilt and shame she feels over the role she played in his
untimely demise. This interpretation concerning by '1'influence physique des
passions sur le coeur' (RM, 224) is lent some support by the fact that the text offers
no medical symptoms or specific aetiologies, unlike in the cases of Emma Bovary or
Germinie Lacerteux. Indeed, her death recalls that of such Romantic heroines as
Rousseau's Julie or Mme de Stael's Corinne, both of whom die in similarly
mysterious, unexplained, but almost self-willed circumstances. The manner of
Renee's death is particularly revealing in this regard. We read, for example, that 'elle
se laissait entrainer a ce qui venait. La vie s'epanchait d'elle sans qu'elle parut la
retenir et faire effort pour Farreter. [...] Elle laissait la mort monter, comme un beau
soir, sur son ame blanche' (RM, 239). Renee makes no effort to fight off death's
encroachment; in fact, she seems to actively welcome it.
Peu a peu elle laissait s'echapper et s'ecouler d'elle la conscience
de son etre physique, le sentiment et la fatigue de vivre; et de
delicieuses faiblesses la prenaient oil il lui [M. Mauperin] paraissait
qu'elle etait a demi detachee de son etre, et toute prete a se dissiper
dans la divine douceur des choses. (RM, 243)
The manner of Renee's death would thus seem to represent another 'wilful
situational impropriety' in as much as the reader might ask: why exactly does Renee
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will herself to die? After all, she has no need to feel guilt over her brother's death
given that no other characters in the novel are aware ofwhy she has incriminated her
brother - indeed, no-one is ever likely to find out as she cannot bring herself to
confess to the role she has played (RM, 220). Her shame is thus an entirely self-
imposed feeling, one which she is not pushed into by friends or family. In short, she
has got away with it.
If the last extract cited from the novel points to the way in which Renee loses her will
to live, it also demonstrates, most significantly of all, how death provides Renee with
a release from the travails and disappointments which have previously characterised
her life, and how it also bestows upon her a form of beatification and transcendence.
The scene in which Renee's death is recounted provides more particularly revealing
detail in this regard.
En quelques minutes, la maladie, les signes et I'anxiete de la
souffrance s'etaient effaces sur la figure amaigrie de Renee. Une
beaute d'extase et de supreme delivrance, devant laquelle son pere,
sa mere, son ami etaient tombes a genoux. La douceur, la paix d'un
ravissement etait descendue sur elle. Un reve semblait mollement
renverser sa tete sur les oreillers. Ses yeux grands ouverts, tournes
en liaut, paraissaient s'emplir d'infini, son regard, peu a peu,
prenait la fixite des clioses eternelles. De tous ses traits se levait
comme une aspiration bienheureuse. Un reste de vie, un dernier
souffle tremblait au bord de sa bouche endormie, entr'ouverte et
souriante. Son teint etait devenu blanc. Une paleur argentee
donnait a sa peau, donnait a son front une mate splendeur. On eut
dit qu'elle touchait deja de la tete un autre jour que le notre: la
Mort s'approchait comme d'une lumiere. (RM, 259)
This is no squalid, agonising death in the manner of Emma Bovary or even Germinie
Lacerteux, the eponymous heroine of the Goncourts' novel published, like Renee
Mauperin, in 1864. Given that Germinie Lacerteux has been described as one of the
three founding texts of French Naturalism,241 and that Renee Mauperin and it were
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written concurrently, the messianic undertones to Renee's death, are thrown into
even sharper focus when set along aside Germinie's horrid death. Renee's death is
'une mort edifiante'242 as she undergoes a form of Christ-like transfiguration as if on
the verge of an ascension into heaven. 'C'etait la transfiguration de ces maladies de
coeur qui ensevelissent les mourantes dans la beaute de leur ame, et emportent au ciel
le visage des jeunes mortes!' (RM, 259). Her whole demeanour suggests a process of
angelification, while the several imperfect verbs in the passage above denote an
impressionistic and progressive invasion of her being by a Christ-like transcendence
rather than the swift, harsh ravages of a life-destroying disease.
What relevance can anti-psychiatry possibly have to Renee's life and death? We
have seen already that her behaviour in incriminating her brother could be viewed as
a sign of her 'madness' from an anti-psychiatric perspective given that she
contravenes received modes of behaviour. We have also seen in this section that her
apparently losing the will to live and actively welcoming death seems entirely
gratuitous and unnecessary given that she is not being blamed for her brother's death.
A third congruence of concerns arises out of the transcendent state which she
accesses as a result of her alleged 'madness' and which echoes with David Cooper's
claim cited in part I: 'madness is a matter of voicing the realisation that I am (or you
243
are) Christ'. Renee's demise exemplifies the anti-psychiatric view that those who
reach a state which some call madness have in fact embarked upon the royal road to
discoveries of messianic proportions. The questions therefore arise: why should
Renee incriminate her brother when she apparently has no need to do so? On a
further level, why does Renee seemingly will herself to die? Why does she therefore
act so 'madly', striking at the syntax of conduct? If shame and guilt over the role she
has played in her brother's death really were the central factors determining her
demise, why is she transformed into a divine, quasi-messianic conduit for the
Infinite, inspiring in her cowering family reverential astonishment and veneration?
Why or how would any feelings of guilt lead to quasi-divine transcendence?
Furthermore, throughout the novel Renee is portrayed as a singular and highly
242
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unusual individual quite distinct from her peers. However, nothing from her earlier
life presages the Christ-like images associated with her on her death-bed. Why, for
what or for whom does she come to be martyred? Such questions remain unanswered
in the text. With the aid of anti-psychiatry, however, I shall address these questions
in the course of subsequent chapters, and demonstrate that Renee's behaviour is
considerably more comprehensible than it at first appears.
Anti-psychiatry and L'CEuvre
As was the case in relation to Le Rouge et le Noir and Renee Mauperin, anti-
psychiatry would appear to have only a limited relevance to L'CEuvre, the novel
which has been seen time and time again as a 'rornan a clef describing the rise and
fall of the Impressionist movement.244 Yet, an investigation of the novel which
focuses on the psychology of the main protagonist finds some initial justification in
Zola's response to Edmond de Goncourt's allegation that in writing L'CEuvre Zola
had plagiarised the Goncourts' 1866 novel Manette Salomon. In an indirect response
to such allegations, Zola wrote in an 1885 letter to Joseph Gayda:
L'CEuvre ne sera pas du tout ce qu'on a annonce. 11 ne s'agit
nullement d'une suite de tableaux sur le monde des peintres, d'une
collection d'eaux-fortes et d'aqaurelles [sic] accrochees a la suite
les unes des autres. II s'agit simplement d'une etude de
psychologie tres fouillee et de profonde passion.245
This link between L 'CEuvre and psychology-based critical interpretations can be
strengthened by an examination of the considerable degree of textual de-motivation
which, in a similar manner to the three preceding cases, surrounds the key event of
the novel: Claude Lantier's suicide. This event comes only a few hours after he and
244 A full survey of the critical literature on this point can be found in the next chapter.
245 Emile Zola, Emile Zola - Correspondance, 10 volumes, edited by B. H. Bakker
(Montreal: Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1985), V: 1884-1886, p. 282, my italics. For
a comprehensive survey of Edmond de Goncourt's allegations and Zola's subsequent
responses, see the section entitled ' La reception des Goncourf in Michel Crouzet's recent
edition of the Goncourts' Manette Salomon (Paris: Gallimard, 'Folio', 1996), pp. 556-63.
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his long-suffering wife Christine have experienced a night of passion with one
another like none they have known in their entire relationship. At one point during
this night:
elle Ie fit blasphemer ensuite, provocante, dominatrice, avec un rire
d'orgueil sensuel. « Dis que la peinture est imbecile. - La peinture
est imbecile. - Dis que tu ne travailleras plus, que tu fen moques,
que tu briileras tes tableaux, pour me faire plaisir. - Je brfilerai mes
tableaux, je lie travaillerai plus. - Et dis qu'il n'y a que moi, que de
me tenir la, comme tu me tiens, est le bonheur unique, que tu
craches sur 1'autre, cette gueuse que tu as peinte. Crache, crache
done, que je fentende! - Tiens ! je crache, il n'y a que toi. » Et el le
le serrait a l'etouffer, c'etaitelle qui le possedait. (LO, 350-1)
Claude would appear to have renounced his art, and, in so doing, have set out on a
path which could lead him to security and happiness with Christine, the only
individual in the novel to have shown him unquestioning love and loyalty. That
Claude should commit suicide at this specific point in the narrative thus seems
particularly 'invraisemblable'. After all, one could perhaps more plausibly have
imagined him committing suicide when the first painting he exhibits in the 'Salon
des Refuses' meets only with such mockery from 'une masse enorme, grouillante,
confuse, en tas, qui s'ecrasait devant son tableau. Tous les rires s'enflaient,
s'epanouissaient, aboutissaient la' (LO, 126). One could have imagined Claude
committing suicide after his portrait of his dead infant son is met only with
indifference:
apres vingt annees de cette passion, aboutir a qa, a cette pauvre
chose sinistre, toute petite, inaperfue, d'une navrante melancolie
dans son isolement de pestiferee! Tant d'espoirs, de tortures, une
vie usee au dur labeur de l'enfantement, et 9a, et 9a, mon Dieu!
(LO, 295-6)
One would have thought that the perhaps most logical or 'vraisemblable' point of all
in the narrative for his suicide comes in the scene where he runs wildly towards the
Seine, in the petrified estimation of Christine, in order to drown himself. Claude has
just overheard his one-time friends lambast him as a wretched failure and blame their
lack of critical acclaim on their association with him: 'ils l'accusaient de les avoir
paralyses, de les avoir exploites, parfaitement! Exploites, et d'une main si maladroite
et si lourde, qu'il n'en avait lui-meme tire aucun parti' (LO, 335). Later that evening,
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with this cacophony of insults still ringing in his ears, '[Claude] se penchait sur ce
fosse si large [la Seine], d'une fraicheur d'abime [...]. Et le gros bruit triste du
courant l'attirait, il en ecoutait l'appel desespere jusqu'a la mort' (LO, 341). Yet
Claude does not commit suicide after any of these events. Each time he picks himself
up from the depths of his despair and returns to his art. Instead, he commits suicide
only after renouncing his life-long, previously all-consuming passion for art, the
passion which until then had pushed his family into a spiral of poverty and
destitution and which had been the principal source of the intense suffering depicted
in the three scenes quoted above. Readers are therefore surely within their rights to
wonder why Claude should commit suicide shortly after he appears to have taken up
his last chance to 'se guerir' (LO, 350) and to find the peace and happiness which
have so long eluded him. Why commit suicide immediately after experiencing this
re-birth, around the time he feels furthest away from 'sa misere, oubliant, renaissant
a une vie de felicite' (LO, 350)? Is the reader not justified in assuming that he should
now put behind him the interminable travails of his artist-life and profit from his
new-found happiness by building a painless, financially solvent future for Christine
and himself far away from the squalor of his 'atelier maudit' and 'l'autre' who is
'bien morte' (LO, 351)? After all, early on in this crucial scene, Claude implores
Christine:
eh bien! sauve-moi, oui! prends-moi, si tu ne veux pas que je me
tue... Et invente du bonheur, fais-m'en connaitre un qui me
retienne... Endors-moi, aneantis-moi, que je devienne ta chose,
assez esclave, assez petit, pour me loger sous tes pieds, dans tes
pantoufles... Ah! descendre la, ne vivre que de ton odeur, t'obeir
comme un chien, manger, t'avoir et dormir, si je pouvais, si je
pouvais! (LO, 350, my italics)
Christine appears to succeed in fulfilling this demand as a little later we read in the
passage which immediately precedes the suicide:
leurs ravissements recommenpaient, trois fois il leur sembla qu'ils
volaient de la terre au bout du ciel. Quel grand bonheur! comment
n'avait-il songe a se guerir dans ce bonheur certain? Et elle se
donnait encore, et il vivrait heureux, sauve, n'est-ce pas'?
maintenant qu'il avait cette ivresse. (LO, 351, my italics)
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Claude has surely been rescued from the verge of suicide. Yet despite the apparent
closeness of salvation and safety, it is not enough, and only a few sentences later we
read: 'il se decida, c'etait fini, il souffrait trop, il ne pouvait plus vivre, puisque tout
mentait et qu'il n'y avait rien de bon' (LO, 351).
What causes this swift and dramatic change of heart on Claude's part? The text
seems unequivocal: Claude is driven to suicide by the triumph wrought by his love
for art and the mystical female figure to whose perfect artistic representation he has
devoted his life so deseperately over his love for life and the real-life female figure,
Christine, the Christ figure who holds out the possibility of salvation and security.
On discovering her husband's body dangling from the ceiling of his workshop - 'il
pendait la, grandi affreusement dans sa raideur immobile, la face tournee vers le
tableau, tout pres de la Femme au sexe fleuri d'une rose mystique, comme s'il eut
souffle son ame a son dernier rale' (LO, 352) - Christine can only exclaim in
impotency and defeat: 'Oh! Claude, oh! Claude... Elle t'a repris, elle t'a tue, tue, tue,
la gueuse!' (LO, 352). 'Ecrasee sous la souverainete de l'art' (LO, 352), she cowers
miserably before her nemesis: 'au-dessus d'elle, la Femme rayonnait avec son eclat
symbolique d'idole, la peinture triomphait, seule immortelle et debout, jusque dans
sa demence' (LO, 353). Fler earlier victory over her canvas rival was short-lived,
thus reflecting Zola's desire expressed in the 'ebauche' that the novel should
represent 'le triomphe absolu de la passion d'enfanter des oeuvres d'art, contre le vrai
enfantement de l'oeuvre de chair'.246
If the text seems clear that it is the tyrannical call of his artisitic vocation which leads
Claude to his death, it is much less clear, however, as to precisely why this must be
so. We do admittedly know from key intertexts to L'CEuvre - such as Balzac's Le
Chef d'ceuvre inconnu or the Goncourts' Manette Salomon - that the artist's fate, in
an almost clicheed sense, is death. As Jean-Pierre Leduc-Adine writes: 'une sorte de
loi exige, semble-t-il, que l'artiste transforme la femme en objet d'art ou bien perisse
246
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en disparaissant entre ses bras'.247 On the other hand, Paul Cezanne rejected such a
view, at least when translated into 'real life'. He asked exasperatedly why Claude
should commit suicide at all, let alone do so at such an unexpected moment of the
narrative:
on ne peut exiger d'un homme qui ne sait pas, qu'il dise des choses
raisonnables sur fart de peindre; mais, n. de D., comment peut-il
[Zola] oser dire qu'un peintre se tue parce qu'il a fait un mauvais
tableau? Quand un tableau n'est pas realise, on le f... au feu, et on
248
en recommence un autre!
Furthermore, the psychological processes undergone by Claude in the hours leading
up to his suicide are also shrouded in silence. We learn merely that Claude finds
himself in an intense state of confusion: 'une sourde poussee d'idees confuses
remontait dans son hebetemenf; and a little later, 'ses pensees etaient revenues
toutes, debordantes, torturantes, creusant son visage' (LO, 351). We also learn
nothing of why his suicide, which appears almost pre-destined in view of his literary
avatars, comes at the very point in the narrative when Claude would appear to have
found a route to happiness and salvation, and not at any earlier and perhaps more
'vraisemblable' stage of the novel. As was the case with regard to Le Rouge et le
Noir and Louis Lambert, the timing of the key event of his novel is thus crucial.
What specifically motivates him to commit suicide? Why should his self-
preservation instinct desert him and a death drive take over? It is in relation to just
such questions that certain similarities between Claude's behaviour and the
principles of anti-psychiatry emerge. Although Claude takes on no signs of divine
transcendence as we saw was the case in relation to Renee Mauperin, his
unexplained, illogical behaviour nonetheless contravenes received codes of
behaviour in a manner which recalls the anti-psychiatric principle that madness is but
behaviour which is context-sensible and comprehensible even if it contravenes
rationality and accepted codes of behaviour. As was also the case in relation to Renee
Mauperin and Le Rouge et le Noir, the fact that Claude's behaviour is much more
comprehensible than it may at first appear does not immediately emerge from an
247 Jean-Pierre Leduc-Adine, 'Aspects de la genese d'un discours mythique dans L'GEuvre
d'Emile Zola', La Licorne, 18 (1990), 41-50 (p. 43).
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analysis of the novel's turning point itself. Yet I want to show in relation to L 'CEuvre
that there does indeed exist a further aspect to this congruence of concerns, one
which we saw initially in relation to Louis Lambert: namely, one which suggests that
Claude's behaviour only starts to appear comprehensible and 'context-sensible' if we
examine the wider existential position in which Claude finds himself in the period
leading up to his death. In the following chapter of part II, however, I wish first to
examine the responses which literary critics have proposed to the questions and
difficulties which have been outlined here in part II chapter one.
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PART II Chapter Two:
A Review of Criticism
The most fundamental dichotomy of the novel is that which exists
between true and false artists and true and false art. [...] It is the
problem of authenticity in art which forms the nucleus around
which the whole novel turns.249
Pourquoi tient-on tant a conferer a I'ceuvre d'art [...] ce statut
d'exception, sinon pour frapper d'un discredit prejudiciel les
tentatives (necessairement laborieuses et imparfaites) de ceux qui
entendent soumettre ces produits de Taction humaine au
traitement ordinaire de la science ordinaire, et pour affirmer la
transcendance (spirituelle) de ceux qui savent en reconnaltre la
transcendance?250
249 Thomas Zamparelli, 'Zola and the Quest for the Absolute in Art', Yale French Studies, 42
(1969), 143-58 (p. 144).




In part II chapter one, the question was posed: how should we interpret the physically
debilitated state which characterises Louis's final days? Should he be regarded as a
divine visionary who succeeds in escaping from the limitations of the human form
and who progresses to a quasi-messianic ascension or should he be viewed instead as
an intentionless, dehumanised failure who deserves to be locked up in a darkened
room and forgotten about? We also saw in the previous chapter that despite the
ambiguity of the evidence presented by the text regarding these questions, the reader
is nonetheless pushed further towards the first of these two options than the second
by the opinions of the narrator and Pauline de Villenoix as well as by certain
revealing statements made by the novella's author. How do literary critics interpret
Louis's demise? One school of thought takes the same line as that adopted by the
group of clinical psychiatrists whose work was cited early in the previous chapter in
as much as they too adopt a purely descriptive approach and do not investigate the
productive aspects of his final state. Such an approach is evident in the work of
critics such as Graham Robb who declares in his recent majestic biography of Balzac
251that Louis goes 'spectacularly insane'. Diana Festa-McCormick similarly points to
9 S9
Louis's collapse into 'a state of insanity'; while Christopher Prendergast says
merely that Louis 'goes off his head'. None of these renowned Balzac critics
points to the 'bonheur divin' (LL, 683) which Louis accesses as a result of his
'collapse', nor to the intense ambiguity which surrounds his actions. Similarly, they
shed no light on the reasons behind his failed castration attempt nor on its
'invraisemblable' timing.
A second school of critical thought approaches the series of questions by drawing up
parallels between Louis Lambert and other Balzac texts also produced in the early
1830's such as La Peau de Chagrin, Gobseck or Sarrasine where the theme of the
necessity to conserve one's stock of 'energie vitale' takes centre stage. If, as Balzac
proposes in Physiologie du Mariage, each of us possesses 'une somme donnee
251 Graham Robb, Balzac (London: Picador, 1994), p. 201.
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d'energie', and if 'un boxeur la depense en coups de poing, le boulanger a petrir son
pain, [...] le danseur la fait passer dans ses pieds',254 Louis expends his 'somme
donnee d'energie' on philosophical thought and contemplation. In Thomas Pavel and
Claude Bremond's view, Louis Lambert and La Peau de Chagrin share a common
n r c
theme: that 'la puissance de la pensee se revele fatale'. 'Tombe amoureux d'une
belle et vertueuse jeune fille', they write, 'Louis Lambert ne peut supporter le
surcroit d'energie interieure qui resulte du melange explosif entre le genie et la
or/-
passion, et sombre dans la folie'. This second school of thought therefore parallels
Louis's falling in love with Pauline de Villenoix and his plunge into madness. It does
so not merely because of Te surcroit d'energie' Pauline provokes but because she,
unlike any other woman, becomes Tine partenaire impossible' who is 'plus qu'une
femme, un ange'. Consequently, Te desir qui se fixe sur lui n'en est pas digne; d'ou
la tentative de Louis Lambert de s'emasculer'.257 In other words, he castrates himself
'pour mettre fin au conflit de ses deux natures, angelique et charnelle'.258 Such a
conflict arises out of Louis's recognition that to possess Pauline would be to rob her
of her angelic status and reduce it to an all too human form existing in one specific
and, by definition, non-absolute moment in time. Through drawing an apposite
parallel between La Peau de Chagrin and Louis Lambert, Pavel and Bremond put
forward the argument that:
physique pour Louis, morale pour Raphael, la solution renouvelee
d'Origene est envisagee partous deux comme un recours desespere
contre une passion qui les conduit a leur perte, encore que 1'objet
de cette passion (intentionnellement nominee « Pauline » dans les
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Adam Bresnick puts this view most succinctly of all when he claims: 'Lambert's
body gets in the way of his spiritual expansion'.260 Linking these critics' views is the
belief that Louis's life takes on tragic proportions as a result of falling in love with
Pauline: Bremond and Pavel, for example, view Louis's madness as a 'perte'261 and
an 'echec'.262 Other critics adopt a similar 'vocabulary of denigration' (TDS, 27)
towards Louis's state: Bettina L. Knapp believes that Louis merely 'withers and
dies';263 Pierre-Georges Castex regards Louis as 'une victime particulierement
pitoyable';264 Harry Levin believes that 'it is thought which undoes the precocious
Louis';265 while Adam Bresnick describes the end of the novel as 'a fragmentary
testimony to a dangerous, indeed lunatic absolute beyond the divisions of gender and
conventional philosophical thinking'. Yet we saw in part II chapter one that any
view which regards Louis's madness as a descent into catatonia or as a failure and
curse is seriously flawed and over-emphasises only one side of the story given that
the text provides considerable evidence - principally from the mouth of Pauline de
Villenoix — to suggest that Louis is anything but an incapacitated failure.
Accordingly, a third school of criticism argues, in the words of Arthur Holmberg,
that 'to read the end of the novel as a tragedy is to overlook the deepest implications
of Balzac's story. Louis's life is a tragedy only when measured against a mediocre
norm'.267 If Louis's state is far from a happy one, it is because
he could never be happy as men know happiness. The final
destruction of his body frees his spirit to soar above the shackles of
earthly existence. [...] By overcoming the flesh he liberates his
soul to rejoin the infinite, his true home and only happiness. The
end of Louis Lambert is not a tragedy but a victory - the triumph
of man's spirit to transcend the confines of physical reality.268
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Holmberg's view of Louis's end as a triumph therefore stands in contrast to the
critics cited above who, like Henri Evans, believe that Pauline is Tinstrument de sa
[Louis's] ruine finale'. Robert Smadja concords with Holmberg in this more
positive assessment of Louis's lot but factors Pauline de Villenoix out of the equation
entirely, focussing instead on Louis's 'madness' as the logical and successful
culmination of his life-long desire to bring about 'la separation de 1'esprit et du
970
corps'. The end of the novel therefore represents T'aboutissement naturel et
971
logique de l'intense negativisme corporel du heros', a 'negativisme' which springs
from '1'aspect prometheen, rimbaldien, pourquoi pas nietzscheen, de la demarche de
979
Louis'. Such a 'demarche' is summed up neatly in Smadja's phrase T'homme est
quelque chose qui doit etre depasse'.273 Louis's success in this domain, Smadja
argues, should be seen as a cause for celebration rather than despair.
Within this third school of critical thought a division becomes apparent between, on
the one hand, those like Smadja and Holmberg who place Louis's Promethean
ambitions to 'depasser l'homme' on a philosophical plane and, on the other hand,
Pierre Barberis who sites Louis's desire to reach a pre-lapsarian absolute mode of
existence within a socio-historical context. Barberis argues that Louis Lambert 'ne se
comprend que dans la perspective dialectique individu-societe'274 given that it tells
the tale of 'l'inadaptation au monde des etres d'elite'.273 Barberis places the novel,
first published in 1832 after all, firmly within the context of Balzac's disappointed
personal reaction to 'la consolidation de la monarchic de Juillet, l'echec des
reves'.276 He claims that all Balzac's writing in the period 1832-3 can be summed up
within the following schema: 'poesie, souvenirs, utopies, vont recueillir toute une
269
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energie qui se voit condamnee, si elle veut agir dans le monde, aux compromissions
et aux reniements'.277 Accordingly, Louis Lambert revolves around the desire to
create 'un [sic] intense, une totalite, qui sont d'un autre ordre que celui du vulgaire
bourgeois. Balzac, comme tous les hommes d'elite, alors, se sent seul dans le monde
des hommes'.278 While emphasising the autobiographical aspects of the novel - a
97Q
common theme within Louis Lambert criticism - Barberis nonetheless sites
980
Lambert's defining quality in his 'profond besoin de verite, d'authenticite', a need
9 81
unsated in a world characterised by Tutilitarisme et le prosai'sme petit-bourgeois'.
In order to retreat from this world, Louis withdraws into a deep contemplation of the
989
Infinite 'pour juger un monde dont il ne se sent pas totalement etre'. Such a
withdrawal proves to be untenable, and he is plunged into madness as a result of his
inability to juggle his need to participate in society with his desire to escape from it,
thereby demonstrating the impossibility that the 'homme d'elite' can survive in this
earthly world.
If the schools of critical thought which have been reviewed so far in this section see
Louis's relationship with Pauline either as an obstacle to the realisation of his
absolutist desires or as irrelevant to such desires, as in the case of Barberis, a further
critical node coalesces around the view that Pauline represents the indispensable
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the love of Pauline has let him glimpse divine love and has become
the means of his elevation. [...] The crisis, the catalepsy, the
attempt at self-mutilation, becomes, then, a voluntary renunciation
of this earth in favour of the life angelic. Pauline's love was a
necessary preparation for his celestial phase. But human love,
having fulfilled its role, now gives way to love divine.283
Establishing a marked contrast with other critics, Buck sees Louis as 'the hero [who]
transcends the limitations of the human comedy'.284 Similarly, Arlette Michel writes:
'Lambert comprend [...] qu'il ne pouvait se marier; il doit aimer, mais pour depasser
l'amour'.285
From this short review of the criticism on Louis Lambert, it appears that critics
remain divided over many of the key questions posed in part II chapter one such as
the role played by Pauline de Villenoix and by love in Louis's ascent / descent into
madness. Moreover, most do not address the timing of his action nor the specific
mental processes Louis undergoes in allegedly going mad and in attempting to
castrate himself. Other issues over which no critical consensus has emerged include
the role of 'the body' - why must it be sacrificed? What role do his attempted
castration and the enforced submission of his body play in Louis's thinking and the
realisation of his philosophical aims? In part III and in the thesis conclusion, I wish
to propose responses to these questions from within an anti-psychiatric framework.
Le Rouge et le Noir
In the previous chapter, two principal questions arose out of our analysis of the
shooting scene in Le Rouge et le Noir: why does Julien Sorel attempt to kill Louise
de Renal so soon after he appears to have realised all his societal ambitions? Why
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does he try to kill her at all given that the murder attempt seems both unnecessary
and senseless? We saw also in part II chapter one that a high degree of textual
ambiguity and confusion surrounds these questions. Do critics attempt to illuminate
these blind-spots? The answer is an emphatic yes given that the shooting scene
constitutes surely one of the most analysed seven paragraphs in literary history:
several critics have already attempted summaries of critical opinion on the subject,
including Roger Pearson and Horst Lederer with this assessment of Ta
98A
psychocritique stendhalienne'. How does this plethora of critics approach the
ambiguities and 'invraisemblance' surrounding the shooting scene? In the most
comprehensive of the synopses of critical opinion, Roger Pearson outlines the 'four
principal reactions to Julien's murderous act: it is implausible; mad; an act of
987
vengeance; inexplicable and therefore true to life'. Within our stated context of an
anti-psychiatric analysis, the second and fourth of these reactions seem most
significant, and it is these reactions which I examine first.
The disregard which Julien shows for Ta bienseance' and his self-interest in shooting
Madame de Renal has led many critics to answer the questions above by suggesting
that he simply goes mad, albeit temporarily. One psychiatrist, for example, diagnoses
Julien as a 'paranoid psychopath';2 8 while Jean-Pierre Richard describes him as 'un
900
aliene provisoire'; and Henri Martineau writes that on reading Louise de Renal's
letter, Julien is 'en proie a une sorte d'hypnose'.290 Yet, if we return briefly to the
part I review of the principles of anti-psychiatry, it becomes clear that such views of
Julien's condition suffer from serious deficiencies. There we saw that diagnosing an
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individual as 'mad' has a dehumanising effect, robbing them of their sense of
intentionality. Thus to suggest that Julien is clinically 'mad' is to argue that he shoots
Mme de Renal involuntarily, as if under the malign influence of a medico-
physiological deficiency beyond his control. Yet there is little evidence in the novel
to back up such a claim: Julien may well be far from forthcoming with details about
his motives, but his insistence on the premeditated status of his act surely undermines
the view that he had lost control of his mental faculties, no matter how temporarily.
If the second of the four critical approaches which Pearson outlines shows signs of
weaknesses, what of the other principal line of argument adopted by Stendhal critics
which seems to be most pertinent to an anti-psychiatric interpretation? This reaction
- that Julien's shooting is inexplicable and therefore true to life - is of considerable
relevance to the questions outlined above given that it goes hand in hand with the
opinion that the de-motivated status of the shooting in fact represents the novel's
greatest virtue. This view therefore sits rather uncomfortably alongside my stated
aim of motivating Julien's actions even though they are presented in the novel as
explicitly de-motivated. A useful example of this stance can be found in Peter
Brooks's claim that critics have 'failed to find convincing reasons for Julien's
9Q1
excessive and self-destructive acts'. More significant, however, is his assertion
that any such act 'can never be and should never be covered up by recourse to
• t 9Q9
ingenious psychological explanations'. This view is taken up by Gerard Genette
who writes:
ces actions brutales ne sont pas, en elles-memes, plus
'incomprehensibles' que bien d'autres [...]; mais on dirait que
Stendhal a choisi deliberement de leur conserver, ou peut-etre de
leur conferer, par son refus de toute explication, cette individuality
sauvage qui fait l'imprevisible des grandes actions - et des grandes
293
ceuvres.
The weakness in Genette's argument, however, lies in the phrase 'par son refus de
toute explication'. Rather than being under-determined, 'if anything Julien's crime is
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over-determined', 94 as D. A. Miller has convincingly demonstrated. Moreover, the
various surveys of critical opinion described earlier in this chapter testify to the fact
that a seemingly infinite array of motives can be and has been attributed to Julien's
behaviour.
Two further well-known critics take a similar line to that adopted by Brooks and
Genette. Christopher Prendergast sees Julien's crime as 'the most spectacular
295
instance of Stendhalian silence [...], the triumph of spontaneity over calculation'.
Yet Julien's journey from Paris to Verrieres would have taken several days to
complete in pre-railway nineteenth-century France with the result that one wonders
just how spontaneous and un-calculating such an act can really be. Prendergast goes
on to praise the lack of motivation and intelligibility attributed to the crime: 'the
garrulous narrator simply shuts up shop, abandons the doxa at the very moment it is
most needed, for he knows that to make sense of it in these terms would be to betray
its meaning'.296 This meaning, in Prendergast's view, centres on 'the disdainful
refusal of given codes of 'vraisemblance' [....] [and the desire to] pose questions
297about the foundations and constraints of representation, verisimilitude'.
Prendergast also takes a decidedly sniffy attitude towards the substantial numbers of
Stendhal critics who have tried to motivate Julien's de-motivated behaviour: 'the
paradoxical outcome of Stendhal's silences has been to spawn critical and
interpretative discourse on a large scale; around those gaps the languages of criticism
9QO
has garrulously swarmed, usually in the mode of uncritical celebration'. Michel
Crouzet, the controversial doyen of Stendhal studies, takes one step further these
views when he argues that the critic robs the shooting scene of its sublime
'imprevisibilite' by grafting his/her voice onto its 'rhetorique du non-dit'.299 The
critic should instead 'renoncer a rendre explicable Julien, et surtout a le rendre
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coherent ou clair en termes de psychologie'.300 Crouzet attacks critical approaches, in
particular psychoanalysis, which aim to 'explain' Julien.
Une fois admis que le Rouge etait un roman psychologique, ou une
fois admises les methodes d'interpretation plus « modernes » qui se
croient en droit de ne pas tenir compte vraiment des textes, et de
deployer a leur place une grille psychologique qui dit hautement et
clairement le « non-dit », et en fait reconstitue le texte tel qu'il
devrait etre pour confirmer la methode, nous perdons la possibility
de suivre justement le non-dit du texte, de respecter ses ombres et
ses hiatus comme des donnees qui lui sont propres et
indispensables.301
In Crouzet's view, it is within these 'ombres' and 'hiatus' that lurks the 'Sublime'.
To shed light on these shadows is to diminish the grandeur of Julien's sublime status.
La critique se trompe quand elle veut rendre explicable ce qui ne
1'est pas necessairement et surtout en supprimant ce qui nous est
donne comme non explicable ou a peine explicable; nous perdons
le texte, et surtout les effets sublimes, en meconnaissant qu'il y a
une discipline de l'irrationnel, une rhetorique du non-dit. [...] La
psychanalyse, peut-etre parce qu'elle travestit et aplatit ou trahit le
Sublime semble mortelle pour ce concept-forme propre a la
modernite romantique.302
Crouzet's argument seems misguided, however, as there is little textual evidence to
suggest that Julien's crime is inexplicable - indeed, as we saw in part II chapter one,
Julien himself proposes a wide range of possible (if confusing) motives for his
behaviour. In a wider sense, Prendergast's and Crouzet's arguments provoke a
question which is relevant to each of the novels under examination: should the
silence of the text impose a reciprocal silence on the critic? I would argue that this
should not be the case for the simple reason that textual silences make for the most
fecund of all sources of literary value as, for example, the poetry of Mallarme
demonstrates. Furthermore, so much within Le Rouge et le Noir remains
'unexplained' and potentially inexplicable - Julien's behaviour at the trial; the
bizarre and sometimes fictitious epigraphs; the lack of references to the 1830








XIX siecle'; the silence veiling Julien's decapitation - that one wonders whether
Crouzet and Prendergast believe analysis of these unexplained areas should be
similarly censored.
In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that my anti-psychiatric approach is
founded on the principle that the actions of the main protagonist of each novel are
considerably more logical and 'context-sensible' than they at first appear if they are
placed within the protagonist's existential context. It would be disingenuous to
suggest that anti-psychiatry represents the only critical approach to argue for the
inherent comprehensibility of Julien's actions. Allan H. Pasco, for instance, situates
Julien's behaviour within the wider political context of its day and sees the shooting
303
as fully intelligible 'given the powerful forces at work in Romantic France'.
Pierre-Georges Castex also writes: 'en se vengeant de celle qui l'a perdu et qui
represente alors a ses yeux une caste maudite, il [Julien] permet a son orgueil d'avoir
le dernier mot'.304 Yet such a view that Julien is driven to commit his crime for
similar reasons - disappointed ambition or class envy - is not without its problems.
We have seen in the previous chapter that this is the case in relation to the evidence
which the novel itself puts forward yet this fact has not, however, prevented many
critics from proposing just such a view. Yet as Roger Pearson makes clear, the idea
that Julien wishes to take revenge on the social class which has thwarted his plebeian
ambitions stands clearly 'at odds with the nobility of soul which Stendhal is at pains
to show in Julien'.305 Leo Bersani also writes in this regard that Julien is ultimately
uninterested
in changing "the whole way of life in a great country", neither does
he really care [...] for the recognitions he appears to be seeking.
He is fit to be neither a revolutionary nor a parvenu because his
social ambitions include very little interest in society; instead, he
wants to be powerful enough to do without society. Julien sees
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Napoleon not as the man who changed society, but rather as a
historical metaphor for his own dream of a secure solitude in which
people will no longer be able to hurt him.306
Also rejecting a class warfare motivation is the critic Moya Longstaffe who points
out that 'un assassin politique aurait du choisir comme victime non pas une pauvre
307
mere de famille, mais un homme public, Frilair, par exemple'. By the same token,
she goes on to argue that: 'quant au discours prononce devant les jures, il est du a
une inspiration subite, provoquee par l'idee de ce que Mme Derville va dire a Mme
de Renal'.308
A further line of criticism which foregrounds the comprehensibility of Julien's
behaviour is 'la psychocritique'. Allan H. Pasco describes Julien, like so many of his
Romantic brothers, as 'paternally challenged'309 and puts forward the view that:
Romantic heroes had fathers [who] were cruel, capricious, stupid,
or brutish, and they behaved in ways that kept their children from
accomplishing their greatest potential. Such fathers were regularly
rejected by the main characters of Romantic literature. [...] What
has not been pointed out, however, is that the offspring of such
paternity tend to be, like Julien, selfish and violent. [...] Julien's
relationship to his father is to a large degree the reason that Julien
behaves as he does.310
While Julien certainly acts selfishly on many (indeed, perhaps most) occasions, there
is surely insufficient textual evidence to back up Pasco's claim. We see Julien in the
presence of his father on only a limited number of occasions, such as in the sawmills
at the beginning of the novel and in the prison cell towards the end. On these
occasions, M. Sorel inspires feelings of 'haine' (RN, 233) and 'desespoir' (RN, 688)
in his son, yet to suggest that Julien's behaviour is determined in large measure by
this troubled relationship with his father is to take a very long jump in the analytical
dark.
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While Pasco emphasises the role of the father within Julien's thought processes,
Gilbert D. Chaitin, the author of perhaps the best known psychoanalytic study of
Stendhal's work, foregrounds the role of the mother-figure and builds his
interpretation of the novel on a biographical analysis of Henri Beyle. Chaitin equates
the shooting scene's intrusion into the novel with the
sudden death of Beyle's mother [which] put an abrupt end to the
romance of his childhood [and which] not only ruined his chances
for future happiness by making his childhood fixation to her
definitive, thus barring the normal transfer of his love and desire
during puberty onto another woman, it also set up within him a
compulsion to repeat her "murder".311
This compulsion, in Chaitin's view, left Beyle particularly receptive to the stories of
Antoine Berthet and Adrien Lafargue, tales in which a man killed his mistress. He
concludes:
it was this very ending, planned from the outset, which gave rise to
his [Beyle's] creative efforts in writing Le Rouge et le Noir. The
only two avenues of libidinal gratification open to him were the
sadistic murder of his love object or the masochistic reversal of this
same desire, death at her hands or suicide, due to his guilt feeling.
Both of these conditions find their optimum satisfaction in the
denouement of Le Rouge et le Noir, where Julien murders Mine de
Renal and is executed because of this crime.312
Chaitin's interpretation, for all its attractiveness, has the misfortune of being more
interested in that most elusive of literary subjects, Henri Beyle, than in his fictional
creation, Julien Sorel, even if this is one trait Chaitin shares with many other
psychoanalysis-minded critics such as Robert Andre who writes that with his novels
Stendhal does nothing but 'donnefr] un champ operatoire a la thematique profonde
in
de sa conscience'. Likewise, Genevieve Mouillaud states that the subject of her
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work on Le Rouge et le Noir is a composite of three entities: Henri Beyle, Stendhal
and Julien Sorel.314 Such approaches seem unhelpful therefore when responding to
the questions outlined in the previous chapter which focus purely on Julien Sorel and
his thought processes before, during and after the shooting scene.
In this short discussion of some of the voluminous critical literature devoted to Le
Rouge et le Noir, it has become apparent that many of the responses to the questions
regarding Julien Sorel's attempt to kill Louise de Renal at such an 'invraisemblable'
moment in the narrative are characterised by inconsistencies and shortcomings. Once
my anti-psychiatric analysis of the shooting scene is complete, I shall return to these
various schools of critical thought and demonstrate how an anti-psychiatric approach
contradicts or reinforces certain of these strands of Stendhal criticism.
Renee Mauperin
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sections of their correspondence;317 the establishment in 1992 of the Cahiers Edmond
Mossman, The Narrative Matrix; Maryline Lukaclier, Maternal Fictions: Stendhal, Sand,
Rachilde and Bataille (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 17-60; Grazia Merler,
'Stendhal dans la perspective adlerienne', Nineteenth-Century French Studies, 23 (1994-5),
108-26.
314 Genevieve Mouillaud, 'Le Rouge et le Noir' de Stendhal: Le rornan possible (Paris:
Larousse, 1973), pp. 199.
313 Edmond et Jules de Goncourt, Journal: Memoires de la vie litteraire, three volumes,
edited by Robert Kopp and Robert Ricatte (Paris: Laffont, 1989). A CD-ROM version of the
Journal is also currently in production.
316 For example: Renee Mauperin (1989), Charles Demailly, (1990), Sceur Philomene (1996),
Manette Salomon (1996).
317 Maria Luis Cappello, editor, 'Louis Bouilhet et les Goncourt: Relations epistolaires et
litteraires [Lettres inedites]', Cahiers Edmond et Jules de Goncourt, 3 (1994), 78-90; Pierre-
Jean Dufief, editor, 'Correspondance E. de Goncourt - Labille, inedit', Cahiers Edmond et
Jules de Goncourt, 3 (1994), 91-103; Pierre-Jean Dufief and Anne-Sophie Dufief, editors,
Correspondance Edmond de Goncourt et Alphonse Daudet (Geneva: Droz, 1996); Silvia
Disegni, editor, 'J. Primoli et E. de Goncourt: Lettres et textes inedits', Cahiers Edmond et
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et Jules de Goncourt, the organisation of several 'colloques' devoted to their
work;318 the publication of several important scholarly monographs;319 and finally
the issue in 2000 of an edition of the prestigious Revue des Sciences Humaines
devoted to the brothers' work.320 It would seem reasonable to expect then that this
wave of critical interest should have also washed over Renee Mauperin, a novel
which, after all, was so warmly received by its authors' literary contemporaries:
321 • 322
Flaubert, for example, declared himself 'charme' and Bouilhet toque' by the
novel, while Zola enthused: 'pour bien des personnes, [...] Renee Mauperin est le
chef d'oeuvre de MM. de Goncourt'.323 One might also expect that the questions
outlined in part II chapter one would have been discussed at some length in some of
the recent Goncourt analyses. This, however, has not proven to be the case given that
almost no critical work has been devoted to Renee Mauperin, let alone to the manner
of Renee's death.324
Jules de Goncourt, 5 (1997), 254-81; Pierre-Jean Dufief, editor, Correspondance: Gustave
Flaubert - Les Goncourt (Paris: Flammarion, 1998); Silvia Disegni, editor, 'Une
correspondance Alexis - Goncourt', Cahiers Edmond et Jules de Goncourt, 7 (1999-2000),
11-68; Pierre-Jean Dufief, editor, 'Correspondance Goncourt - Montesquiou', Cahiers
Edmond et Jules de Goncourt, 7 (1999-2000), 69-96; Pierre-Jean Dufief, editor,
'Correspondance Goncourt - Nadar', Cahiers Edmond et Jules de Goncourt, 8 (2001), 213-
27; Jean-Michel Pottier, editor, 'Le Persan et la « Terre natale ». Lettres d'Edmond de
Goncourt a J. - H. Rosny', Cahiers Edmond et Jules de Goncourt, 8 (2001), 228-42.
318 A conference was held at the Sorbonne in 1989 to celebrate Kopp's and Ricatte's new
edition of the Journal and the Histoire de la societe frangaise pendant la Revolution. The
proceedings were published in the spring and autumn 1990 editions of Francofonia. A
further 'colloque' was held in 1996 in Bordeaux to commemorate the centenary of Edmond
de Goncourt's death. Edited proceedings can be found in Jean-Louis Cabanes, editor, Les
Freres Goncourt: Art et Ecriture (Talence: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1997).
319 See Jean-Louis Cabanes, Le Corps et la maladie dans les recits realistes (1856-1893),
two volumes (Paris: Klincksieck, 1991); Michel Caffier, Les Freres Goncourt: « Un
deshabille de I'dme » (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1994); Bernard Vouilloux,
L 'Art des Goncourt: Une esthetique du style (Paris: Harmattan, 1997); Stephanie Champeau,
La Notion d'artiste chez les Goncourt (Paris: Champion, 1999).
320 See Revue des Sciences Humaines, 259 (2000).
321
Dufief, editor, Correspondance: Gustave Flaubert - Les Goncourt, pp. 124-5.
322
Quoted in Cappello, 'Louis Bouilhet et les Goncourt', p. 83.
'23 Emile Zola, 'Edmond et Jules de Goncourt', in 'Les Romanciers naturalistes', in CEuvres
completes, 15 volumes, edited by Herni Mitterand (Paris: Cercle du livre precieux, 1966-70),
XI: CEuvres critiques II, (1968), pp. 157-75 (p. 169).
324 The one exception in this regard is Amy Reid's recent examination of the novel's
representation of platonic friendship between women. See Amy Reid, iAmitie Feminine,
Naturalism's Blind Spot: The Case of the Goncourts' Renee Mauperin', Women in French
Studies, 7 (1999), 88-99. It is interesting to note that of the thirty-one papers collected in
Cabanes's Art et ecriture, none addresses Renee Mauperin directly while five are devoted,
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It is, however, disingenuous to claim that no critics investigate the curious manner of
Renee's death. Although many Goncourt critics ignore the circumstances
surrounding Renee's death - a surprising omission given that this event leads to the
novel's closure - a few do, however, address the issue. Several attribute Renee's
death to a simple Romantic 'maladie de coeur': Francois Fosca, for example, focuses
purely on the grief and guilt she suffers as a result of having inadvertently brought
about her brother's death. He writes:
Denoisel, qui a ete le temoin d'Henri et ignore comme tout le
monde que c'est Renee qui a envoye le journal, lui [a Renee]
revele ce qui a cause la mort de son frere. Desesperee, Renee est
atteinte d'une maladie de coeur qui l'emporte en quelques mois.326
What is interesting about such views is the heavy emphasis they place on the
physiological aspect of Renee's death. Robert Ricatte writes:
apres la mort d'Henri, quand la machine infernale a rempli son
office, les Goncourt, peu soucieux de varier leurs denouements,
laissent lentement se desintegrer le personnage qui reste en cause
[Renee]; comme dans leurs romans anterieurs, la physiologie
triomphe alors, puisque c'est a elle d'etudier les effets de la folie
sur Demailly, de I'alcool sur Barnier, d'une hypertrophic de cceur
sur Renee.327
Ricatte is particularly illuminating in this regard as he berates the Goncourts for their
lack of scientific accuracy and fidelity to the medical theories of the day.
for example, to the Journal, three to Germinie Lacerteux, and two each to Charles Demailly,
Madame Gervaisais and La Faustin. The recent issue of the Revue des Sciences Humaines
shows a similar emphasis, concentrating on the brothers' early works as well as on the
novels composed by Edmond alone, with almost no references made at all to Renee
Mauperin.
325 Such is the case in Marcel Sauvage, Jules et Edmond de Goncourt (Paris: Mercure de
France, 1970); Lazare Prajs, La Fallacite de I'ceuvre romanesque des freres Goncourt (Paris:
Nizet, 1974); Jean-Louis Cabanes, editor, Les Freres Goncourt: Art et Ecriture; Champeau,
La Notion d 'artiste chez les Goncourt.
326
Francois Fosca, Edmond et Jules de Goncourt (Paris: Albin Michel, 1941), p. 183. Other
critics to take the same line include Alfred-Auguste Cuvillier-FIeury, 'Les mceurs
parisiennes', in Etudes et portraits (Paris: Albin Michel, 1865), pp. 380-7 (p. 380); F. de
Lagenevais, 'Le petit roman', Revue des Deux-Mondes, 15 February 1865, pp. 1061-9;
Alidor Delzant, Les Goncourt (Paris: Charpentier, 1889), p. 1067; Pierre Sabatier, 'Germinie
Lacerteux' des Goncourt (Paris: SFELT, 1948), p. 28.
327
Ricatte, La Creation romanesque chez les Goncourt. p. 194.
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Les Goncourt ont In et annote 1 'Essai sur les Maladies du Cceur de
Corvisart, et surtout le Traite des Maladies de Cceur de Bouillaud.
[...] Je lie suis pas medecin, mais, ayant lu Corvisart et Bouillaud,
j'ai pu me rendre compte que les auteurs de Renee leur ont
demande bien peu.328
The scandalised Ricatte complains that 'le rornan lui-meme n'indique pas de quelle
maladie precise souffre Renee', and that Tagonie de Renee est une agonie tres
330
decorative; celles que decrit Bouillaud sont autrement effrayantes'. One wonders
why then Ricatte does not conclude that there may be some more important if as yet
unspecified aspects to Renee's death other than the authors' fidelity to nineteenth-
century medical theories. In a similar vein, Robert Baldick writes: 'shocked and
grief-stricken [at Henri's death], Renee falls ill, and after a few months, she dies of a
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hypertrophied heart'; while Jean-Louis Cabanes claimed in 1991 that:
la plupart de leurs [Goncourt] recits se fondent sur la description de
cas pathologiques: folie de Charles Demailly, puberte maladive de
sceur Philomene, crise cardiaque de Renee Mauperin, hysterie de
Germinie Lacerteux, de la fille Elisa, nevrose de Cherie
Haudancourt' ,332
Cabanes's views on Renee Mauperin are of particular interest not merely because he
is one of the leading French critics currently working on the Goncourts, but, more
significantly, because his views undergo a noticeable evolution over the course of the
1990's, as if in a demonstration of the shift he can arguably be said to have made
between two schools of critical thought on Renee's death. The first such school is
that which we have just seen and which focuses both on the 'idee reque' that Renee
dies as a result of the guilt she feels over her brother's death and on the extent to
which the symptoms of her illness conform to the descriptions of a 'maladie de coeur'
available to the Goncourts in nineteenth-century medical text-books. One further







Robert Baldick, The Goncourt Brothers (London: Bowers and Bowers, 1960), p. 28.
332 Cabanes, Le Corps et les maladies dans les recits realistes, p. 10.
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once she falls ill, [...] her death is very decorative. One might even
say that her death has a decidedly literary flavour (only slightly
disguised by medical terminology) reminiscent of many another
heroine dying of a broken heart. Once again the Goncourts have
inadvertently flawed their novel, which is in many ways a superior
333
creation.
The second school of critical thought on Renee's death focuses specifically on this
'decorative' or 'literary flavour' to her death and examines what could be termed as
its 'productive' aspects. Cabanes writes in 1995 that the manner of Renee's 'mort
edifiante' demonstrates Texemplarite de l'agonie, hors de toute reference explicite
r • • r 334
aux rites religieux, est manifestation et devoilement d'une interiorite'. Yet he
makes no suggestion as to what exactly this 'interiorite' might be. Caramaschi takes
a similar line when he argues: 'Renee, pour mourir, s'y prend autrement que Barnier
ou Germinie: la souffrance la change, la purifie, la murit, la depouille de toutes les
scories de l'humain'.335 Another critic and a contemporary of the Goncourts, Paul de
336
Saint-Victor, points out that in death Renee undergoes 'des changements divins'
yet he still attributes her death purely to 'le remords et la douleur lorsqu'elle a
provoque, sans le vouloir, le duel ou son frere succombe'.
The most obvious fact to emerge from this short review of Renee Mauperin criticism
is that analyses of Renee's demise are few in number. Nonetheless, two schools of
thought have emerged on the subject: one which accepts as an 'idee reque' the fact
that Renee dies of a broken heart caused by the grief and guilt she suffers as a result
of having inadvertently brought about the death of her brother; and one which
focuses instead on the productive effects of her death and on the messianic status she
assumes on her death-bed. I shall return to these two schools of thought in the thesis
conclusion to examime how they correspond with or contradict the anti-psychiatric
analysis I undertake in part III.
333 Richard B. Grant, The Goncourt Brothers (New York: Twayne, 1972), p. 61.
334
Cabanes, 'L'art de mourir dans Renee Mauperin et Le Docteur Pascal', p. 100.
335
Caramaschi, Realisme et impressionnisme dans I'ceuvre desfreres Goncourt, p. 241.
336 Paul de Saint-Victor, 'Renee Mauperin', La Presse, 11 April 1864, quoted in
'Documents', RM, 265-71 (p. 269).
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L'CEuvre
If the key question of Renee Mauperin - why Renee dies in such a beatified manner
- remains relatively under-explored by critics, one can perhaps attribute such an
oversight to the relative lack of critical studies devoted to the brothers. Such an
explanation does not hold, however, when we turn to Zola's L'CEuvre which has
been analysed extensively by literary critics. Nonetheless, the key question of the
novel - why Claude commits suicide at such an 'invraisemblable' point of the novel
- has been largely neglected by critics. The majority of the vast amount of work
devoted to the novel concentrates instead on its possible significance for the art
historian, examining, for instance, whether L 'CEuvre should be read as 'the novel in
which Zola travestied Impressionism',3 9 or the one in which he proposes 'a
condemnation [not] of Impressionism but of its aftermath'.340 Similarly, much
detective work has been devoted to unearthing the various real-life figures who could
have acted as the models for Sandoz or Claude Lantier. While critical opinion has
assumed an unusual degree of unanimity in decreeing that Sandoz represents the
voice of Emile Zola341 (a not altogether surprising conclusion in view of Zola's
statement: 'Sandoz n'est la que pour donner mes idees sur l'art'342), critics are more
deeply divided over which artist could have provided the inspiration for Claude
338 Useful summaries of the voluminous criticism on the novel can be found in David
Baguley, '« Zola et les arts » (1966-1991)', Les Cahiers Naturalistes, 66 (1992), 337-46; and
William J. Berg, The Visual Novel: Emile Zola and the Arts ofHis Times (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 12-18.
339 Phoebe Pool, Impressionism (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 217. Similar points of view
are put forward in: Pierre Aubrey, 'Zola peintre et la litterature', in Zola and the Arts:
Centennial of the Publication of 'L'CEuvre', edited by Jean-Max Guieu and Alison Hilton
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1988), pp. 1-8; Joyce Medina, Cezanne and
Modernism: The Politics ofPainting (Albany: State University ofNew York, 1995), p. 88.
340
Berg, The Visual Novel, p. 44. An illuminating analysis of the historical roots of this
entire field of criticism is to be found in Robert J. Niess, 'Another View of Zola's L 'CEuvre ',
Romanic Review, 39 (1948), 282-300 (pp. 282-4).
341 F. W. J. Hemmings, Emile Zola (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953), p. 213; Allan H. Pasco, 'The
Failure ofL'CEuvre', Esprit Createur, 11 (1971), 45-55 (p. 54); Naomi Schor, Zola's Crowds
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 179-80; Brady, 'L'CEuvre', pp.
258-77.
342 Emile Zola, 'Notes autographes de Zola sur le personnage de Pierre Sandoz', in Emile
Zola: Exposition organisee pour le cinquantieme anniversaire de sa mort, edited by Julian
Cain (Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale, 1952), p. 53, a view given further bolstering by Zola's
editor and son-in-law Maurice Le Blond: 'nul n'ignore que Zola s'est mis lui-meme en scene
sous les traits de Sandoz'. Quoted in Robert J. Niess, 'Zola's "L'CEuvre" and "Reconquista"
ofGamboa', PMLA, 61 (1946), 577-83 (p. 578).
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Lantier. The model most commonly cited is Zola's close childhood friend Paul
Cezanne,343 an argument lent credence not only by evidence from the novel's
'dossier preparatoire',344 but also by Zola's daughter's 1931 statement: 'Claude
Lantier, c'est Paul Cezanne. Evidemment, tout le monde le sait'.345 Close behind
Cezanne in the identification stakes come Manet346 and Monet,347 while other critics,
Patrick Brady and Joy Newton foremost among them, have adopted F. W. J.
Hemmings' line that it is too reductive to suggest that Claude is modelled on one
single artist alone. Instead Hemmings believes that 'there remains much in Zola's
T4.8
portrait of Claude that reminds us of quite different painters', with the result that
the list of painters from whose lives and work Zola allegedly borrowed elements
extends to include Pissarro, Guillmet, Gill, Moreau, Redon, Duranty, Gaston
Jourdan, Mirbeau, Roybet, Jongkind, Holtzapfel or Lepine.349 L 'GEuvre is but a
'roman a clef in the view of many critics: all we have to do is find the correct
combination of real-life equivalents of Claude and/or the secondary characters, the
350
key will turn, and the code to the novel will be cracked.
This biographical approach is not without its shortcomings, as one might expect. For
example, one would have thought that the considerable number of potential real-life
models for Claude Lantier would have critically undermined such a biographical
approach. Furthermore, as one critic points out, this is a 'roman a clef for which 'les
clefs [...] s'ouvrent mal'.351 The most obvious demonstration of this fact is surely
343 For useful summaries of the history of this view, see Niess, 'Another View', pp. 282-4;
and Patrick Brady, 'Claude Lantier', Les Cahiers Naturalistes, 17 (1961), 10-19 (p. 10).
344 Zola lays out his plans for chapter two of the novel thus: 'Claude, moi, plus l'architecte.
Le tableau pose. Toute notre amitie [i.e. that between Zola and Cezanne] a Plassans'. Paris,
Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscrits Nouvelles acquisitions fran^aises, Ms. 10316, fol. 2.
345 Denise LeBlond-Zola, Emile Zola racontepar safille (Paris: Fasquelle, 1931), p. 141.
346
For a useful summary of the numerous critics to have seen Manet as a key inspiration, see
Margaret Armburst-Seibert, 'Victoirine Meurent, prototype d'lrma Becot dans L'CEuvre',
Les Cahiers Naturalistes, 66 (1992), 113-22.
347 See for example Rodolphe Walter, 'Emile Zola and Claude Monet', Les Cahiers
Naturalistes, 26 (1964), 51-61.
348
Hemmings, Emile Zola, p. 222.
349 For a full summary see Brady, X 'GEuvre', pp. 225-57.
350 Patrick Brady's article is a classic example of such an approach: 'Les clefs de L'CEuvre\
Australian Journal ofFrench Studies, 1 (1964), 257-71.
351 Bruno Foucart, 'Preface', in Emile Zola, L'CEuvre (Paris: Gallimard, 'Folio', 1983), pp.
7-25 (p. 9).
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that neither Monet, Manet nor Cezanne committed suicide. Secondly, despite his
initial rejection from the Salon and his ultimate miserable demise, Claude Lantier can
be seen as the leader of the 'Ecole du Plein-air' in view of the seminal influence he
comes to exert over the artistic world. Cezanne, on the other hand, could never be
described as leader of the Impressionist movement. Thirdly, the final painting to
which Claude devotes himself with such fatal consequences is, in Robert Niess's
estimation, 'certainly not typical of the works of the mature Cezanne: it is [...] the
exact opposite, in short, of the kind of composition Cezanne had been attempting for
some fifteen years before 1885'. Finally, as Jean-Francois Thibault points out,
Zola is highly reluctant to describe in technical terms any of the pictures presented in
L'CEuvre,353 Indeed, for a novel which allegedly documents the history of the
Impressionist movement, there are remarkably few references to real paintings and
real political or historical events such as the siege of Paris or the Commune. Contrast
that situation with, for example, the Goncourts' Manette Salomon in which artistic
and political references abound. Reading L 'CEuvre as a history of the Impressionist
movement and / or the lives of its painter-members is an intensely problematic
enterprise, and as such, the primary function of L 'CEuvre is surely not to serve as a
document of interest only to the art historian. As Antoinette Ehrard makes clear (if
perhaps a little too polemically): Tire L'CEuvre comme un roman 'a clef est la
lecture la plus reductrice qu'on puisse en faire'.324
What other routes have critics taken when dealing with Claude's suicide and the
questions raised in part II chapter one? One has answered these questions through
equating Claude's obsession with his painted 'femme fatale' with some form of
clinical madness, thus establishing an immediate parallel with some of the critical
approaches taken to the lives of Julien Sorel and Louis Lambert. Adolfo Fernandez-
Zoi'la, a practising psychiatrist who has long held a keen interest in the 'Rougon-
352
Niess, 'Another View of Zola's L 'CEuvre', p. 286.
353
Jean-Frani^ois Thibault, 'La peinture en marche: Academie et modernite chez Claude
Lantier', in Emile Zola and the Arts, edited by Guieu and Hilton, pp. 25-33 (pp. 25-6).
354 Antoinette Ehrard, 'Emile Zola: L'art de voir et la passion de dire', in La Critique
artistique: Un genre litteraire, edited by Jean Gaulmier, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1983), pp. 101-22 (p. 101).
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Macquart' cycle, describes Claude as suffering from 'une « hallucinose »
psychedelique',355 and as prone to 'des moments « maniaques »'.356 Significantly
Fernandez-Zo'ila describes Claude's entrapment within
le labyrinthe d'une psychose maniaco-depressive qui le menera pas
a pas au suicide. Issue banale dans des cas cliniques. [...] En bon
psychotique, il ne peut pas, il ne sait pas, elaborer les mediations et
Ies mediatisations (cognitives, psycho-amoureuses, sociales,
artistiques, picturales...) qui chez l'homme « ordinaire »
parviennent a se constituer en savoir-faire, en savoir-pouvoir, en
/v 357
savoir-etre.
Yet to blame Claude's suicide on a 'psychose' surely replicates a critical error which
we saw in relation to Julien Sorel: namely, it robs him of his intentionality when
there is no specific textual evidence to suggest that he kills himself involuntarily, as
if under the influence of the malign forces of a clinical insanity.
Other critical approaches to the question of Claude's suicide include that by Robert
Niess who suggests that Claude hangs himself on an impulse after hearing
358Christine's bitter words on the subject of his failed final painting. Yet such a view
overlooks the facts that Claude appears to have abjured his artistic obsessions in the
hours following Christine's dismissal of his efforts and that he appears to take the
opportunity for salvation which Christine offers him. The author of several studies of
L'CEuvre, Patrick Brady compares Claude Monet's 1868 attempted suicide with
Claude Lantier's successful suicide: 'la tentative de suicide de Monet est provoquee
par son renvoi de Tauberge ou il avait pris pension avec sa compagne et son fils en
juin 1868, les causes immediates du suicide de Claude [Lantier] ne sont pas d'ordre
materiel". ~ Yet Brady gives no indication as to the 'ordre' of the immediate causes
for Claude's suicide. A further study by the prolific Brady takes a psychoanalytical
approach to the novel by paralleling Claude's life with that of his creator - a common
355 Adolfo Fernandez-Zoi'la, 'Les inapparences de la creation dans L 'CEiivre', Les Cahiers
Naturalistes, 60 (1986), 139-56 (p. 156).
356
ibid., p. 152.
357 Adolfo Femandez-Zo'ila, 'Le systeme ecriture-peinture et le figural dans L'CEuvre'', Les
Cahiers Naturalistes, 66 (1992), 91-103 (p. 92).
358
Niess, 'Another View of Zola's L 'CEuvre', p. 298.
359
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trait of psychoanalytic criticism as we have already seen in our analysis of Stendhal
criticism.
In L'CEuvre, the novelist [Sandoz] gives himself more and more
obsessively to his work; in real life, Zola does the same until, less
than three years after finishing his autobiographical novel (22
February 1886) [L 'CEuvre], he makes Jeanne Rozerot his mistress
(11 December 1888). [...] It seems [...] he went to her because she
provided him with a sexual relationship free of the incest taboo that
had soon come to inhibit him with his wife.360
As we saw in relation to Le Rouge et le Noir, approaches which relate the plot of the
novel to the writer's life are unhelpful when responding to the questions outlined in
the first chapter of part II which focus on Claude Lantier's thought processes both
throughout the novel and, specifically, in the period leading up to his suicide.
Other critics to tackle the issue of Claude's suicide include J. A. Hiddleston who
equates Claude's demise with Zola's personal intellectual difficulties. He poses the
question: 'does not the gruesome and essentially realist suicide by hanging of Claude
Lantier point [...] to certain fundamental contradictions at the heart of Zola's
thinking and novelistic universe?'361 While keeping to a biographical approach,
Hiddleston's response to this question promises more than the routes adopted by
Brady and Niess. He concludes:
one wonders if the suicide is not that of Zola himself, or rather if it
is not more like a murder of Zola the Romantic by Zola the
Naturalist, [...] involving an abortive attempt at purgation which,
no doubt fortunately, does not extend beyond the novel itself.362
Hiddleston thus suggests that at the heart of L'CEuvre lies, in Jean-Pierre Leduc-
Adine's words, 'une allegorie des difficultes et de la misere auxquelles sont en butte
les createurs'.363 While both Hiddleston and Leduc-Adine reduce L'CEuvre to the
status of a socio-historical and/or biographical document, they nonetheless raise the
360 Patrick Brady, 'Scripting, Surrogate Mothers, Incest Taboo, and Creativity: Zola's
Twofold Self-Betrayal in L'CEuvre', Neophilologus, 69 (1985), 533-8 (p. 537).
361
Hiddleston, 'Literature and Suicide', p. 222.
362
ibid., p. 223.
363 Jean-Pierre Leduc-Adine, 'Aspects de la genese d'un discours mythique dans L'CEuvre
d'Emile Zola', La Licorne, 18 (1990), 41-50 (p. 48).
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valuable point that the central theme of the novel rests on the psychological torture
over the artistic and ideological choices which the creative act necessarily engenders.
In a further small group of studies, the extra dimension of 'the absolute' is factored
into the notion of reading L 'CEuvre as an examination of the travails of the artist in
general rather than of any specific, historically identifiable group of artists. In one of
the few extended critiques of the novel not to stem from the field of word and image
studies, James Reid suggests that L'CEuvre may be read as 'an allegory of how late
nineteenth-century France confronted, in order to question, the fear that history was
ironically effacing, rather than inscribing, the past'.364 Reid views Claude's suicide
as 'an allegory not only of his forgetting contemporary reality, but of his being
forgotten by it' which arises as a direct result of his life-long search for a de-
historicized artistic absolute which would surpass the depressing limitations of
contemporary reality. For this heresy, his punishment is to leave no trace of his
existence on this earth after his death. Robert Niess, in his comparison of L 'CEuvre
and Balzac's Le Chefd'ceuvre inconnu, also suggests that 'the pursuit of the absolute
is quite evidently the theme of both works, the typically romantic quest for the
"distant princesses" of art'. Max Milner expands on this point in a further
comparative study when he suggests that the key to such works is to be found in the
artist's desire to become a new Prometheus: Tartiste qui s'est eleve au-dessus de la
condition humaine, qui a voulu rivaliser avec Dieu'.367 It would seem, then, that the
psychology lying behind the creative act and the desire for self-deification is the
more important but, as yet, less investigated facet of the novel.
While both Milner and Niess engage with this idea from the point of view of art
aesthetics, other critics confront the psychological battle going on within Claude's
mind from a slightly modified angle. Philip D. Walker describes Claude and
Sandoz's attraction to two mutually exclusive artistic poles: 'chacun d'eux est un
64
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esprit double, dechire entre les deux tendances romantiques contradictories [...]
368
mais, en chacun, l'une de ces deux tendances, finit par prendre le pas sur l'autre'.
0/-Q
For Claude, it is Torgueil romantique et l'ambition' which wins over the realist
desire to paint a faithful depiction of nature: 'non seulement il veut laisser son
empreinte sur l'histoire, mais il veut devenir semblable a Dieu, parfait, immortel,
tout-puissant, il veut creer la vie; et c'est ce qui le mene a son ultime defaite et a sa
rnort'.370 Although Walker uses this analysis to draw parallels with Zola's own life,
his study nonetheless remains a powerful one, and it is one which finds strong
resonance in an equally significant study by Thomas Zamperelli who puts forward
the case that 'Zola is more concerned with depicting the agonising process of artistic
creation than with defining the exact nature of the product. It cannot be emphasised
too strongly that the aesthetic problem per se is a secondary consideration for
Zola'.371 What the critic and reader should focus on instead is 'the most fundamental
dichotomy of the novel' which, in Zamparelli's view, 'is that which exists between
true and false artists and true and false art. [...] It is the problem of authenticity in art
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which forms the nucleus around which the whole novel turns'. Zamparelli defines
the authentic artist, seen in L 'CEuvre in the guise of Claude and Sandoz, as 'proud,
fiercely idealistic, victimised by romanticism, burning with boundless ambition and
T7T
insatiable appetites'. Moreover, for such artists, 'there is no masterpiece without
physical pain. The anguish of creation is a prerequisite for the production of
authentic art'.374 Zamparelli argues that a preoccupation with authenticity is central
to Zola's L 'CEuvre. If Zola tells us little about the political events of the day, it is
because he concentrates on the mental suffering, torture and anguish which
accompanies the desire to remain true to an Absolute and to place authenticity and
adherence to ideals above all else. Zamparelli argues that although Zola sets his drive
for authenticity within an artistic milieu simply because it is one he knew well,
>6S















Claude's search for authenticity could be that of any 'artist' in the widest sense of the
word or that of any individual seeking an authentic 'mode de vie'. The one drawback
to Zamparelli's persuasive study is that it does not focus on the day-to-day
psychological processes which Claude goes through, the processes within this mental
torture and anguish which he so rightly points to and which eventually become so
untenable that they provoke Claude's suicide.
119
Part II Conclusion
In part II, several important assertions have been made which provide a foundation
on which to construct a Laingian analysis of literary texts. Firstly, we have seen that
a congruence of concerns does indeed exist between anti-psychiatry and the four
novels in question. It is one which revolves around, firstly, questioning received
notions of madness and the necessarily negative status which is attributed to
'madness'; and, secondly, the equation of textual 'invraisemblance' with the anti-
psychiatric view of 'madness' as that which strikes at the syntax of accepted
behaviour. In relation to Louis Lambert, if not to the other three novels, we saw that a
further congruence of concerns exists: namely, that both the alleged madman and the
protagonists may well be behaving in more logical, comprehensible ways than it first
appears if we examine their respective existential situations. Secondly, a series of
questions has emerged in relation to the key event of each novel. These questions
revolve around why each protagonist carries out an action which is detrimental to
their self-interest at such an unexpected moment of the narrative - why they in effect
act so 'madly'. With the help of the anti-psychiatric theories of R. D. Laing, I will
attempt in part III to propose answers to these questions. In so doing, I will
demonstrate that the view which suggests that Louis Lambert may be acting in a
more comprehensible manner than it first seems is also applicable to Le Rouge et le
Noir, Renee Mauperin and L'CEuvre. Finally, some of the interpretative approaches
which other critics have taken to this series of questions have been reviewed. In
relation to Louis Lambert, we have seen that critics remain divided over, firstly,
whether Louis's condition represents a tragic failure or a cause for celebration;
secondly, the role played by Pauline de Villenoix and by love more widely in Louis's
down-fall / ascent; and, thirdly, the role played by the body in Louis's philosophical
pursuits. With respect to Le Rouge et le Noir, we have seen that some critics view
Julien's actions as inherently inexplicable and, as such, symptomatic of his clinical
madness while others propose explanations based on the political situation of the day
or on analyses of his family background. All these approaches, it appears, are
characterised by inconsistencies or drawbacks. Turning to Renee Mauperin, it is clear
that although relatively little critical work has been devoted to the novel and
therefore to the questions outlined in part II chapter one, two schools of critical
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thought do nonetheless emerge with regard to her series of mad actions and overtly
beatified death. The first attributes without any further discussion Renee's death to
feelings of guilt and grief over her brother's untimely death, while the second
focuses on the quasi-messianic transformation of transfiguration she undergoes in her
death throes. With regard to Zola's L'GZuvre, much of the enormous level of critical
interest inspired by the novel has been directed towards establishing its importance
as a document of art history while the psychological aspects of Claude's demise have
been, in relative terms, overlooked. The schools of thought which do emerge in this
domain, however, vary from that which sees Claude's suicide as symptomatic of his
clinical insanity to those which relate the novel's central act to Zola's personal,
fraught mission as a novelist or to Claude's desires to put himself on a par with God
and reach an impossible absolute of artistic perfection and authenticity. In part III,
therefore, I undertake a detailed analysis of the four protagonists' existential
positions from an anti-psychiatric perspective in order, firstly, to put forward an anti-
psychiatric response to the questions raised in part II chapter one and, secondly, to
show how any such anti-psychiatric analysis reinforces or contradicts certain of the
schools of critical thought outlined in part II chapter two.
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PART III:
'Two Souls in One Breast'
122
Introduction to part III
A Laingian approach to literary analysis must be founded on two methodological
principles which form the basis to Laing's approach to schizophrenia and which he
first outlined in his 1960 work The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and
Madness. The first of these principles reads: 'the other as person is seen by me as
responsible, as capable of choice, in short, as a self-acting agent' (TDS, 22). Not only
does Laing herein demonstrate his difference from his mainstream psychiatric
colleagues who, as we saw in part one, rob the schizophrenic of his intentionality, but
he also illustrates the substantial existentialist influence weighing down on his
thought. Indeed, Laing admits that in formulating his ontology of schizophrenia he
was influenced less by the observation and analysis of experiments, case studies and
control groups than by 'the works of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre,
Binswanger, and Tillich' (TDS, 9). Given that the patient is seen as a 'self-acting
agent', the analyst must aim to 'reconstruct the patient's way of being himself in his
world' (TDS, 25) to have any chance of grasping the magnitude of the existential
crisis into which the schizophrenic has been plunged. A patient's behaviour should
not be reduced to a series of neurological imbalances but should instead be read 'as
expressive of his existence' (TDS, 31): the patient is thus no longer a mere 'object-
to-be-changed' but 'a person-to-be-accepted' (PE, 45).
The second methodological foundation to Laing's approach arises out of this desire
to 'reconstruct the patient's way of being himself in the world'. He writes that 'in
describing one way of going mad [in The Divided Self], I shall try to show that there
is a comprehensible transition from the sane schizoid way of being-in-the-world to a
psychotic way of being-in-the-world' (TDS, 17, my italics). In the three chapters
which make up part III, I undertake a similar venture to that which Laing describes
here given that I reconstruct the protagonists' 'ways of being themselves in their
worlds'. I carry out a diachronic examination of the protagonists' existential
positions, examining in chapters one and two only their behaviour prior to the largely
375 As is clear from this quotation, Laing only uses the masculine third person personal
pronoun when referring to his patients, both male and female. In my discussion of Laing's
work, I will attempt, where possible, to use gender-inclusive personal pronouns.
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de-motivated turning point of each novel. In the third chapter, I extend this
diachronic analysis to include the period surrounding and subsequent to their
irrational deeds. Through this reconstruction of their 'ways of being themselves in
their worlds', it will become clear that for these protagonists, much like for the
Laingian schizophrenic, there is a comprehensible transition from their being-in-the-
world in the early stages of each novel to their being-in-the-world at the point where
they commit the actions which, as we saw in part II, seem strangely irrational and
often inadequately explained. It is apposite to note at this point that in undertaking a
Laingian analysis of the four novels, I have no intention of 'diagnosing' Louis,
Julien, Claude and Renee as 'schizophrenic' on the basis of Laing's writings. Such a
diagnosis would in fact be inaccurate as there are significant divergences between the
Laingian ontology of schizophrenia and the existential positions of the four
protagonists, as will become apparent in the course of the next three chapters. What
is important, however, is that Laing's work provides an interpretative framework
with which to scrutinise the protagonists' behaviour.
In the first chapter of part III, I structure my psychological reconstruction around the
argument that the four protagonists are governed by two competing and mutually
exclusive sets of compulsions and pressures. On the one hand, they are motivated by
a series of 'separatist' ideals which impels them centrifugally towards a position of
subversive marginality, a desire and capacity for authenticity and a quasi-messianic
status. At the same time, however, an 'integrationist', centripetal set of forces exerts
on them an opposite pressure pulling them back from such authenticity and
Promethean ventures and, by definition, directing them towards conformity and
mediocrity. This division characterising each of the protagonists, I argue, parallels
that which lies at the heart of the schizophrenic's life as described by Laing in The
Divided Self. I rely most upon this work in my examination of the novels because of
the telling insights it offers into the psychology of the schizophrenic and because of
its relatively straightforward descriptions of what it is like to be schizophrenic. Such
descriptions can then be used as a tool for literary analysis. Moreover, The Divided
Self is the one work by Laing to remain a master-piece even in the eyes of his most
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virulent critics. Frank McLynn, for example, admits grudgingly that it is 'the only
decent book he ever wrote';376 while Anthony Clare describes it as 'truly astonishing,
[...] a brilliant, insightful and imaginative account of the disintegration of the
self.377 In part III chapter two, I continue with my reliance on The Divided Self and
borrow Laing's concepts of isolation, depersonalisation and disembodiment in order
to reconceptualise the defence mechanisms which the four protagonists employ to
protect their separatist ideals from the normalising, integrationist pressures at work
on them. In the third chapter of part III, I extend the diachronic analysis of the four
novels to include the period surrounding and subsequent to their irrational deeds. It is
in this chapter that I propose anti-psychiatry-inspired responses to the questions
concerning the irrationality of each protagonist's behaviour, demonstrating that their
alleged 'madness' represents what Laing would call 'a special sort of strategy that a
person invents in order to live in an unliveable situation' (PE, 95).
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McLynn, 'Divided Opinions on the Two Ronnies', p. 20.
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Anthony Clare, 'Laing Returns to the Fold', Spectator, 3 February 1973, pp. 148-9 (p.
148).
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PART III Chapter One:
Their Divided Selves
Ah! s'ecria-t-il, que Napoleon etait bien I'homme envoye de Dieu
pour les jeunes Frangais! Qui le remplacera? (RN, 304)
The success of this idea is based not on its description of a
psychopathology but rather on the fact that 'ontological insecurity'
characterises ordinary human experience.378
378
Emmy van Deurzen-Smith, 'Ontological Insecurity Revisited', Journal of the Society for
Existential Analysis, 2 (1991), 38-48 (p. 38).
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Their separatist ideals
Lambert's separatist desires and capacities emerge early in Balzac's novella, right
from Louis's days at the College de Vendome. For instance, it becomes apparent that
his difference from his school-boy colleagues extends well beyond his astonishing
memory, 'ses gouts studieux et sa precoce intelligence' (LL, 590). As the narrator
confides: 'pour exprimer en deux mots son talent, il eut ecrit Zadig aussi
spirituellement que l'ecrivit Voltaire; il aurait aussi fortement que Montesquieu
pense le Dialogue de Sylla et d'Eucrate' (LL, 640). Arising out of such intellectual
brilliance is his growing awareness that he may be on the verge of making
momentous philosophical discoveries. He hints at what these might entail in his work
entitled Traite de la volonte in which he describes his life goals as becoming a
'chimiste de la volonte' (LL, 623) and unearthing the secret of 'la generation de la
pensee' (LL, 615). The quasi-Promethean qualities of these ambitions are amplified
by the many messianic echoes which resonate throughout the text. Despite his
diminutive stature, Louis is capable of summoning up a physical strength which is
seemingly greater than that of any other human being and which is reminiscent of
Christ working miracles: we read of him lifting a wooden table at his school, for
example, which ten other boys working together could not budge. Elsewhere, he
suggests he can undertake a form of re-modelling nature:
quand je le veux [...], je tire un voile sur mes yeux. Soudain je
rentre en moi-meme, et j'y trouve line chainbre noire oil les
accidents de la nature viennent se reproduire sous une forme plus
pure que la forme sous laquelle ils sont d'abord apparus a mes sens
exterieurs. (LL, 593)
Thirdly, Louis has the potential to act as a conduit for a form of higher, divine
wisdom. He exclaims: 'je suis assurement occupe de pensees graves, je marche a
certaines decouvertes, une force invincible m'entraine vers une lumiere qui a brille
de bonne heure dans les tenebres de ma vie morale' (LL, 651). This messianic topos
is initiated by the incident in which Mme de Stael discovers Louis, Moses-like in the
bulrushes, dressed in rags, his nose pressed deep into the philosophy of Swedenborg.
Her words - 'c 'est un vrai voyanf (LL, 595) - inspire parallels not only with Moses,
the Israelite chosen to lead his people towards the Promised Land, but also with the
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Jesus who, as a mere twelve year old, amazed his teachers in the Temple 'with his
T7Q
understanding and his answers'.
Parallels between Louis and Christ grow stronger by the time he reaches the College
de Vendome thanks to the patronage of Mme de Stael. Here, according to the
narrator, he demonstrates evidence of 'une ame sublime' (LL, 606), a 'mens divinor'
(LL, 594), and a 'gout pour les choses du del' (LL, 594), all of which 'eleverent son
coeur, le purifierent, l'ennoblirent, lui donnerent appetit de la nature divine' (LL,
594). Living 'sous le joug d'une imagination presque divine' (LL, 611), he is capable
of 'une patience divine' (LL, 638): even his physical features are endowed with an
ineffable beauty (LL, 605), while his forehead is allegedly 'prophctique' (LL, 605).
Louis's similarities with the Christian messiah are further reinforced by his echoing
Jesus' designation as the Tight of the world': both act as seductive sources of
spiritual illumination to those around them. In Louis's case, 'apres l'avoir entendu
parlant ainsi, apres avoir requ dans fame son regard comme une lumiere, il etait
difficile de ne pas etre ebloui par sa conviction, entraine par ses raisonnements' (LL,
633). Radiating philosophical insights, he becomes one with his work and thought to
the extent that 'ses yeux dardaient la pensee' (LL, 623). Louis evokes further
parallels with the Christian messiah by way of the syntactic structure he employs in a
letter to his uncle in which he places himself on an equal footing with the principal
prophets of Islam and Christianity: 'a Mahomet le sabre, a Jesus la croix, a moi la
mort obscure' (LL, 655). In view of his self-evident 'esprit superieur' (LL, 657), he
feels that he is left with no option but to withdraw, Jesus-like, into a self-imposed
exile: 'des trente-trois annees de Jesus, il n'en est que neuf de connues; sa vie
silencieuse a prepare sa vie glorieuse. A moi aussi, il me faut le desert!' (LL, 657) for
the simple reason that he wishes to find there Tes lois constitutives de l'humanite
380
future, de la Jerusalem nouvelle'. Louis's principal interest lies, therefore, in
satisfying his quasi-Promethean desires to attain 'une connaissance parfaite des lois
381
physiques et spirituelles de la Creation'. Like those other Balzacian heroes
379 Luke 2:47.
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Frenhofer and Balthasar who are driven by the desire to 'derobe[r] le secret de
oo 'j t t
Dieu', Louis wants to discover 'les rapports reels qui peuvent exister entre
l'homme et Dieu' (LL, 652) and bring about a complete 'renovation sociale' (LL,
645), thereby leading mankind, Moses-like, towards the Promised Land of a new
society which 'ne doit pas etre constitute comme l'est la notre' (LL, 653). In sum, he
is 'le chercheur d'absolu, le solitaire contemplatif dont l'esprit exige la possession
TOO
d'une verite indetaillable, tenant ensemble l'Un et le Tout'.
Of the three other protagonists under consideration, it is Claude Lantier in Zola's
L 'CEuvre who resembles Louis Lambert most closely in this respect given that his
separatist desires are also oriented towards quasi-Promethean revolution, this time
within the sphere of artistic achievement. With this desire he forms part of a line of
nineteenth-century fictional artists, from Balzac's Frenhofer, Flaubert's Pellerin to
the Goncourts' Coriolis, who are all constantly on the search for the absolute, living
only for their art. Each one is, in Max Milner's words, 'un artiste qui s'est eleve au-
dessus de la condition humaine, qui a voulu rivaliser avec Dieu'. Claude's artistic
ambition to 'tout voir, tout faire, tout conquerir' (LO, 203) thus also mirrors Zola's
own stated wish to 'tout savoir, tout pouvoir, tout conquerir':385 indeed, Zola's
famous phrase - Toeuvre d'art [...] doit embrasser l'horizon entier'386 - could just as
easily be attributed to Lantier as to his creator. Claude aims to create 'un art
revolutionnaire' (LO, 210) in which T'oeil effare ne trouvait aucune des conventions
admises' (LO, 210); an art which will have a cataclysmic effect on existing
institutions: he will 'ecraser Paris' (LO, 160) through painting 'une sacree suite de
toiles a faire eclater le Louvre!' (LO, 47). This revolution will not lead to a staid,
academic, institutionalised form of art conforming to the stultifying exigencies of the
Ecole des Beaux-Arts; nor will it accept any compromise, neither artistic - 'est-ce
qu'une botte de carottes, oui, une botte de carottes! etudiee directement, peinte
,82
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naivement, dans la note personnelle ou on la voit, ne valait pas les eternelles tartines
de l'Ecole, cette peinture honteusement cuisinee d'apres les recettes?' (LO, 44) - nor
commercial - 'est-ce qu'il ne valait pas mieux detruire une oeuvre que de la livrer
mediocre? Oui, c'etait degoutant, ce bas interet de commerce!' (LO, 73). As the
narrator points out, Claude 'aimait mieux crever la faim, que de recourir au
commerce, a la fabrication des portraits bourgeois, des saintetes de pacotille, des
stores de restaurants et des enseignes de sage-femme' (LO, 42). Why should this be
the case? John J. Duffy writes: 'the economy is a force that must always prevent
artistic expression, attaching itself to the painter, using what it can of his work, then
discarding him when he is of no further use. [...] Commerce is a parasite on the body
of artistic imagination',3 7 a parasite which only saps his messianic vigour. The most
significant characteristic of Claude's revolutionary art is that it represents his
aspiration to be placed on a par with the Creator as he gives himself over to 'cet
effort de creation dans l'oeuvre d'art, cet effort de sang et de larmes dont il agonisait,
pour creer de la chair, souffler de la vieV (LO, 245, my italics). In the same way that
God breathed life into Adam, Claude desires above all to 'faire vivante [...] la
Femme nue' of his final painting (LO, 343, my italics). Artistic creation for Claude
Lantier is thus synonymous with procreation and with breathing life into his own
artistic subjects. The procreative significance of Claude's ambitions is emphasised in
Zola's 'ebauche' to the novel which opens with the lines 'avec Claude Lantier, je
veux peindre [...] I'effort de la creation dans l'oeuvre d'art, effort de sang et de
TOO
larmes pour donner sa chair, faire de la vie\ Philip Walker points out that the first
line of the 'ebauche' to several of Zola's novels contains that novel's 'central theme
in a nutshell'.389 Accordingly, the highlighted portions of this extract from the
'ebauche' provide further backing for the view initially put forward in part II chapter
two: namely, that L 'CEuvre should be read not so much as a 'roman a clef which
charts the historical rise and fall of the Impressionist movement but instead as an
387 John J. Duffy, 'Sidelines: Art and Economy in Zola's L'CEuvre', Nineteenth-Century
French Studies, 24 (1995-6), 178-91 (p. 179).
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of Fiction, edited by Lethbridge and Keefe, pp. 28-43 (p. 29). In addition to L'CEuvre,
Walker notes that the central theme of the novel is also summed up in the first line of the
'ebauches' to La Conquete de Plassans and L 'Assommoir.
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exposition of Claude's desire to become an artistic Prometheus and to rival God
through managing to 'faire de la vie'.
To satisfy these aspirations towards the divine, Claude uses as his spring-board his
immediate physical surroundings, proclaiming:
ah! la vie, la vie! la sentir et la rendre dans sa realite, l'aimer pour
elle, y voir la seule beaute vraie, eternelle et changeante, ne pas
avoir 1'idee bete de l'anoblir en la chatrant, comprendre que les
pretendues laideurs ne sont que les saillies des caracteres, et faire
vivre, et faire des homines, la seule faqon d'etre Dieu. (LO, 83, my
italics)
It is entirely appropriate, then, that Claude should choose the city of Paris as the
subject of his final ground-breaking painting. 'Paris, l'axe immortel, Paris, l'axe du
rnonde'390 is the one place he must capture and master for his Promethean ambitions
to be fulfilled. In the post-Revolution nineteenth century, Paris had become France's
undisputed capital, its royal rival at Versailles long since moth-balled. As Louis
Veuillot wrote: 'par le fait, depuis 89, il y a toujours un roi de France, et il n'y en a
eu qu'un seul: c'est Paris'.391 Historians have commented on how nineteenth-century
Paris functioned as a constant physical representation of revolution, be it the
revolution which overthrew the Bourbon monarchy or that which was physically
rising up at the command of Baron Haussmann. Priscilla Ferguson writes that in the
nineteenth century: 'whatever other associations it might acquire, and whether it was
feared or revered, Paris persisted as the city of the guillotine, the city of popular riots
and coups d'etat, the city that stages revolutions as a matter of course and of
principle'.392 Through capturing on canvas the essence of Paris, Claude would
contribute to the prolonging of that staging or representation of revolution. Denis
Hollier contends that in re-modelling the city-scape of Paris, Lantier 'becomes an
390 Alfred de Vigny, 'Paris', in Qsuvres completes, 2 volumes, edited by Francis Germain
and Andre Jarry (Paris: Gallimard, 'Pleiade', 1950), I: Poesie, Theatre, p. 107.
391
Quoted in Priscilla Pankhurst Ferguson, 'Is Paris France?', French Review, 73 (2000),
1052-64 (p. 1061-2).
392 Priscilla Pankhurst Ferguson, Paris as Revolution: Writing the Nineteenth-Century City
(Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1994), p. 12.
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unexpected comrade of Souvarine, the revolutionary from Germinal'. In fact,
Claude's revolution arguably assumes symbolically greater proportions than
Souvarine's given that his insurrectional gaze falls on the very birth-place and
religious and political epicentre of France - the Seine and the lie de la Cite. It is no
accident, then, that his ultimate artistic ambition should be to revolutionise and re¬
create the vista not of the Impressionist artists' stomping-grounds of Montmartre or
the rue des Batignolles, but of 'ce coeur de Paris' (LO, 232). For Claude, 'rien
n'existait que Paris, et encore, dans Paris, il n'existait qu'un horizon, la pointe de la
Cite, cette vision qui le hantait toujours et partout, ce coin unique ou il laissait son
coeur' (LO, 312). To re-fashion the lie de la Cite according to his personal design
would equate to a symbolic and supreme reign over French life.394 No other
panorama could satisfy his ambition to 'tout voir, tout faire, tout conquerir' (LO,
203).
The third novel under examination - Renee Mauperin - presents a rather different
range of separatist desires from those apparent in Louis Lambert and L 'CEuvre. Even
if in the early stage of the novel Renee is occasionally associated with imagery of the
divine - she resembles 'ces divinites de la mer' (RM, 53), for example, and indulges
in 'des betises divines' (RM, 62) with her father at Morimond - it is only towards the
end of her life that her messianic qualities and aspirations come to the fore, as we
saw in part II. What is visible from the first line of the novel and, indeed, what forms
the novel's primary focus, is Renee's core of difference which can in turn be
identified with her separatist desires. This core of difference leads Renee to behave
393 Denis Hollier, 'A Room with a View on the Wall', in Emile Zola and the Arts, edited by
Guieu and Hilton, pp. 177-84 (p. 177).
394 The prominence of the city of Paris on Zola's palette of imagery has long been a source of
interest for Zola critics. See in this connection Stefan Max, Les Metamorphoses de la grande
ville dans les Rougon-Macquart (Paris: Nizet, 1966); Nathan Kranowski and Jean-Albert
Bede, Paris dans les romans d'Emile Zola (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968);
Jean-Pierre Leduc-Adine, 'Paris et l'ordre spatial dans L 'CEuvre', in Emile Zola and the Arts,
edited by Guieu and Hilton, pp. 165-75; P. M. Wetherill, 'Flaubert, Zola, Proust and Paris:
An Evolving City in a Shifting Text', Forum for Modern Language Studies, 32 (1996), 228-
39; Colette Becker, "'On s'enferme a Aix, mais [a Paris], 1'on marche'", in Province-Paris:
Topographies litteraires du XIXsiecle, edited by Amelie Djourachkovitch and Yvan Leclerc
(Rouen: Publications de l'Universite de Rouen, 2000), pp. 251-60.
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395in an unorthodox manner which 'strikes at the syntax of conduct' ' adhered to by
her family and contemporaries. While the separatist desires experienced by Louis
Lambert and Claude Lantier are of an intellectual nature, as we have just seen,
relating primarily to their as yet unrealised philosophical or artistic promise, Renee
Mauperin's separatism, on the other hand, filters down to a more practical level
regarding how she should live her life on a day-to-day basis. This is perhaps most
evident in her attitude towards marriage - the social institution which is central to the
novel's development. Considered by her mother to be 'si difficile a marier' (RM,
76), Renee spurns the advances of at least a dozen suitors (RM, 197), each of whom,
her mother insists could offer her 'un mariage oil il y [a] tout... de la fortune, une
famille honorable' (RM, 182-3). Yet it is precisely from within Mme Mauperin's
description of the key attributes of any successful marriage - 'de la fortune', 'une
famille honorable' - that Renee's reservations about marriage emerge as her personal
priorities are ordered very differently from those of her mother. Her views on
probity, for example, are trenchant and allow no room for moral relativism: 'moi, je
ne connais que deux sortes de gens, d'abord: ceux qui sont honnetes... et les
autres...' (RM, 174). She goes on:
toutes les fois que je vois quelqu'un que je connais... ou meme que
je ne connais pas... manquer a ce que vous, les homines, vous
appelez l'honneur... eh bien, c'est plus fort que moi... c'est
comme si je voyais un crapaud! Ca me repugne, pa me degoute...
et je marche dessus!... Voyons, est-on un homme d'honneur parce
qu'on ne fait que les saletes qui ne menent pas devant les
tribunaux? Est-on un homme d'honneur quand on a dans sa vie une
de ces actions qui font rougir quand on est seul? un homme
d'honneur quand on a fait de ces choses que personne ne vous
reproche, que rien ne punit, mais qui vous ternissent la conscience?
(RM, 175)
Her values are absolutes, almost to the point of being simplistic: 'en art, en livres, je
suis pour le beau... et pas pour ce qui est vilain' (RM, 176). Furthermore, Renee
appears to feel an aspirational yearning for originality and authenticity: she therefore
resents the fact that her family put pressure on her to try to ' [la] faire vivre pour toute
la vie, cote a cote avec [...] un homme qui ne repondrait pas du tout a certaines
395 Goffman, 'The Insanity of Place', p. 411.
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petites exigences delicates de [ma] nature, qui ne [me] semblerait pas poetique' (RM,
179). She sees herself as someone who has no wish to 'se marier comme on se marie,
avec un monsieur comme les autres, un homme qui n'a rien d'extraordinaire, qui
entre simplement par la porte, qui vous est presente par papa et maman' (RM, 178).
Her ideal partner must be 'poetique', must live up to to her stringent definitions of
honour and probity, and must exhibit 'la bonte', a quality which she has previously
only encoutered 'a l'etat vierge chez deux ou trois bourgeois de ma vie' (RM, 179).
Authenticity, honour and 'singularity' are in short supply among her contemporaries,
much to her chagrin.
One might think in this regard that if Renee resembles any character from the other
three novels under consideration, it would be Mathilde de La Mole of Le Rouge et le
Noir. Neither woman, after all, is content to 'se marier comme on se marie' (RM,
178), and Mathilde, much like Renee, berates her many suitors' 'manque de
caractere' (RN, 528). Her opinion is instead:
etre dans une veritable bataille, une bataille de Napoleon, ou l'on
tuait dix mille soldats, cela prouve du courage. S'exposer au
danger eleve 1'ame et la sauve de l'ennui ou mes pauvres
adorateurs semblent plonges; et il est contagieux, cet ennui. Lequel
d'entre eux a fidee de faire quelque chose d'extraordinaire? (RN,
511)
Any resemblance between the two protagonists is, however, illusory as Mathilde's
search for 'singularity' is founded on 'toutes les descriptions de passion qu'elle avait
lues dans Manon Lescaut, la Nouvelle Helo'ise, les Lettres d'une Religieuse
portugaise, etc. etc.' (RN, 512) and also on an attempt to recreate the destinies of her
sixteenth-century ancestor Boniface de La Mole and his lover Marguerite de Navarre
(RN, 504). Renee's drive for authenticity and originality, on the other hand, is
founded not on second-hand romanticised imagery - she finds such novelistic figures
'ecoeurants' (RM, 179) - but on an urge to escape from such imitative practices and
to experience some form of more authentic if as yet undefined mutual encounter.
However, the range of suitors which have so far been presented to Renee are unlikely
to fulfil this desire, as is exemplified by Reverchon who is introduced in the chapter
one bathing scene: 'des jeunes Reverchon, ce n'est pas unique, on en retrouve, au
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lieu que des filles comme ma fille...' (RM, 83), notes Renee's father sagely. Each of
her colourless suitors, of whom Reverchon is but one representative example, 'n'a
rien d'extraordinaire' (RM, 178) and would certainly fail to fulfil Renee's undefined
or perhaps even indefinable desires for individuality. In Reverchon's case, he is not
even accorded the distinction of a name until the final sentence of this chapter in a
clear demonstration of the fact that his only role is to fulfil the function of wallet-
provider and dowry-chaser. Renee's attitude towards marriage is thus symptomatic
of the way in which she constantly attempts to avoid conforming to what 'one' does,
in a Heideggerian sense, and seeks out instead a 'Dasein' of individuality and
authenticity, 'an authentic own self no longer caught in the narrowed-down mentality
of an anonymous inauthentic. 'everybody".396 As the Goncourts said of Blanche
Passy, the real-life model for Renee, she is 'un esprit enleve, on ne sait comment, du
OQ7
milieu bourgeois dans lequel il a ete eleve'. By contrast, the 'Dasein' of those like
o no
Reverchon seems to be entirely dominated by the 'they-self. Each of them
behaves in a particular fashion 'because that is what one does',399 as Denoisel
illustrates when he claims with regard to one of them: 'c'est une affiche de modes'
(RM, 80). All the men presented to her are characterised only by 'la distinction
commune, la distinction faite avec la vulgarite de toutes les elegances' (RM, 80),
each lacks distinctive, individuating principles, always remaining content to 'satisfy
the easily handled rules and public norms of the 'they". 00 It is precisely this sense of
inauthenticity which Renee, thanks to her core of separatist values, so emphatically
rejects.
Renee's aspiration towards authenticity is also brought into focus by her views on
language and communication. She is unique among the characters of the novel for
producing unpremeditated, spontaneous utterances, and, at the time of the novel's
publication in 1864, it was her use of language which most irked critics and which
396 Medard Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, translated by Ludwig Lefebre (New
York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 47.
397
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398 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
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led them to brand the novel 'invraisemblable'.401 How, the critics cried, could a lady
of Renee's breeding and social standing speak in such unbecoming and un-ladylike
tones? To take the example of one critic, Cuvillier-Fleury of the Journal des Debats
complains:
c'est l'invraisemblance des caracteres qui est choquante. [...] Je me
demande ce que Renee Mauperin eut perdu si elle eut parle la
langue de son education litteraire au lieu de celle de sa fantaisie
triviale, et si, etant plus agreable, mieux apprise et plus polie, elle
/V f r • • r 402
eut ete moms « inventee ».
Renee is 'grossiere' et 'mal embouchee' in his view because she insists on speaking
'la langue des rapins' and in 'le style le moins poetique'.403 He ends his review by
lamenting the lack of'bon ton' which characterises her utterances: 'Renee Mauperin,
dans le petit drame de MM. de Goncourt, me fait l'effet d'une charmante cantatrice,
ayant un bon role, qu'elle chanterait faux d'un bout a l'autre'. 04 He is thus most
upset by Renee's refusal to accept the role which her gender and social status dictate:
she dares to act out of character, committing a series of 'wilful situational
improprieties'.405 Although Cuvillier-Fleury cites no specific examples of her
inappropriate language, it is certain that her use of the word 'zut' in the first chapter,
for example, would have been considered unsuitable for a girl of her standing as
would 'la libre syntaxe et les idiotismes de la langue quotidienne' which Robert
Ricatte claims are characteristic of her speech.406 Secondly, Renee's speech, when
typographically represented, is full of dots and ellipses: the scenes in which Renee
and Reverchon are bathing in the Seine (RM, 51-3; 55) and that in which Renee and
Denoisel are engaged in friendly banter (RM, 76) both make for salient examples in
this respect. The significance of Renee's unusual speech patterns lies in the contrast
they permit us to establish with the long, flowing, pre-meditated sentences produced
401
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by the abbe Blampoix or M. Bourjot, characters who exist only 'grace au dialogue'407
and who appear to lack any further individuating characteristics. Similarly, Henri
Mauperin only uses language which is carefully pre-prepared and hermeneutically
sealed from all passion and spontaneity. Even his seemingly off-the-cuff remarks are
well rehearsed: 'il recitait le discours qu'il avait improvise la journee a son cercle'
(RM, 169). Renee's contemporaries - 'des jeunes gens a citations' (RM, 51), she
calls them - are characterised by speech which, as exemplified once again by
Reverchon, is so formulaic and cliche-ridden that Renee is able to complete his
sentences for him (RM, 52).
This contrast between Renee's spontaneous, unpremeditated utterances and the
stultified speech of her friends and family is also significant for a second parallel
which can be drawn between the novel and Heidegger's notion of authenticity.
Linked to the desire to 'satisfy the easily handled rules and public norms of the
'they" which is characteristic of the inauthentic Dasein already attributed to Renee's
contemporaries is the concept of 'Gerede', translated variously as 'idle talk',
'chatter', or simply 'talk'. For Heidegger, this is pseudo-communication, 'an echo
chamber of incessant, vacant loquacity',408 an exchange
in which the participants do not stand in any meaningful relation to
one another and / or to the subject of their conversation, which
leads to superficiality of discourse - speaking for the sake of
speaking, and being spoken to, regardless of whether one has
anything meaningful to say.409
The narrator describes an instance of such 'Gerede' arising out of a conversation
between a group ofwomen including Renee, her mother and sister. 'On se parlait, on
se repondait, on ne s'ecoutait pas. Toutes caquetaient ensemble. Les mots, les
questions, les voix se croisaient dans le babillage: c'etait le ramage d'une voiliere'
(RM, 163). It is perhaps all too easy, however, to criticise Renee's contemporaries on
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achieve any greater degree of authenticity or any greater avoidance of 'Gerede' than
those around her? It would appear that she does not, and, more pointedly, that she
cannot given that inauthenticity and its corollary 'Gerede', in Heidegger's view, 'are
inevitable features of the human predicament; we cannot step outside our own
condition to assess it by an external standard'.410 It is the 'always already' from
which Renee too cannot by definition be exempt. In the face of the 'babillage
intarissable' (RM, 187) which surrounds her, one option open to Renee is to take
refuge in silence. Her separatist tendencies therefore find eloquent expression in a
significant aesthetic of silence which spans the entire novel. In the opening exchange
of chapter one, for example, Reverchon asks Renee:
« Vous n'aimez pas le monde, mademoiselle ?
— Vous ne le direz pas ? J'y avale ma langue ... Voila l'effet que
me fait le monde, a moi [...] Je suis tombee sur des jeunes gens
serieux, des amis a mon frere, des jeunes gens a citations, comme
je les appelle. [...] C'est borne, I'entretien avec mes
contemporaines. (RM, 51)
The thematic importance of Renee's unease with speech and the 'deja-dit' along with
her wish to 'avaler sa langue' surely cannot be over-emphasised given the
prominence accorded to these themes through their position in the novel's opening
lines. Jean de Palacio has recently argued that 'la communication entre les etres
demeure en effet le principal enjeu de l'oeuvre des Goncourt'.4" One should perhaps
say instead that it is, more precisely, the impossibility of communication - or, at
least, the difficulties inherent to communication - which remains the 'principal enjeu'
of their work. One of these difficulties (and this point goes some way towards
explaining Renee's reluctance to engage in speech) springs from one of the
foundations to language which the linguistic theorist H. P. Grice points to in his
discussion of'the co-operative principle' on which 'talk exchange' (or conversation)
is based. 'Our talk exchanges [...] are [...] co-operative efforts; and each participant
recognises in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least
410
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a mutually accepted direction'.412 This 'mutually accepted direction' which
conversation implies only leads Renee away from and dumbs down her separatist
desires. After all, as Michel Crouzet puts it: 'le langage dit moins ce que je suis que
ce que je dois etre'. 13 Isolation - or isolation and withdrawal from speech - offers her
an opportunity, albeit a necessarily limited one, to protect her separatist desires from
the highly corrosive, normalising impact of speech.
To surpass the limitations which speech places on her separatist desires, Renee
develops a more abstract, extra-linguistic means of communication through her piano
playing. Music enables her to circumvent language and access a means of expression
which is more authentic than the necessarily constraining and pre-determining
speech. We read, for example, in what makes for one of the novel's most poetic
passages:
son corps ondulait comme sous un enlacement, sa taille marquait le
rythme. [...] [Ejlle se retourna vers le piano; sa tete se mit a battre
doucement la mesure; ses yeux coururent avec ses mains sur les
touches noires et blanches. Penchee sur la musique qu'elle faisait,
el le semblait battre les notes ou les caresser, leur parler, les
grander, leur sourire, les bercer, les endormir. El le appuyait sur le
tapage; elle jouait avec la melodie; elle avait de petits mouvements
tendres et de petits gestes passionnes. (RM, 74)
Renee's father is the only other individual capable of appreciating the extent of her
physical and mental investment in her music, saying only 'et c'est d'elle...' (RM, 75),
as if to echo Barthes's claim that 'on echoue toujours a parler de ce qu'on aime'.414
Both he and Renee are incapable of speech in the face of the ethereal beauty of this
'primitif du plaisir qu'on cherche toujours a retrouver, jamais a expliquer'.415 The
immense value of music within Renee's life mirrors Schopenhauer's vision of music
as the purest form of art because of its function as a non-referential and therefore
412 H. P. Grice, 'Logic and Conversation', in Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge MA:
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authentic 'copy of the will itself.416 Schopenhauer attributes music's singular power
to the fact that 'it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly
believed in yet ever distant from us', and because 'it restores to us all the emotions of
our inmost nature, but entirely without reality and far removed from their pain'.417
Music is therefore one of the few vehicles with which she can take forward -
however briefly - her separatist desires and which offers her a 'vision of paradise'.
While the principal focus of Renee Mauperin rests on the chief protagonist's
separatist urges, a rather different picture emerges in Le Rouge et le Noir. Here the
narrative gaze is turned almost exclusively towards the numerous and powerful
forces which militate against Julien Sorel's separatist agenda. His separatist desires
are still visible all the same, and from his initial entry into the novel, it is his
'singularite' - physical, intellectual and emotional - which is constantly emphasised.
Less brutally rugged than his brothers, Julien's passion for books and 'son air
extremement pensif (RM, 233) immediately accord him a marginal but privileged
place in Verrieres. Yet it is his aspirations towards the Infinite and authenticity which
distinguish him most sharply from his contemporaries. One important example arises
during a service in Besanqon cathedral celebrating the feast of Corpus Christi. When
Julien hears the cathedral bells, 'son imagination n'etait plus sur la terre' (RN, 399):
indeed, Tame de Julien, exaltee par ces sons si males et si pleins, errait dans les
espaces imaginaires' (RN, 399). The clearest illustrations of Julien's capacity for
authenticity and authentic encounters emerge at the de Renal's country retreat at
Vergy, albeit only fleetingly. It is in the garden there that Julien and Louise de Renal
have the opportunity to join 'the realm of the "happy few" who attempt to defy
relative social conventions for the sake of absolute personal happiness'.418 Julien's
inner sense of authenticity comes to the fore here, and his relationship with Mme de
Renal is characterised in only a few brief instances by 'a degree of the original,
unselfconscious quality of prelapsarian nature, seemingly isolated from the effects of
416 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, 4 volumes, translated by R. B.
Haldane and J. Kemp (London: Tuebner, 1883), volume 1, p. 333.
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civilisation'.419 During all the time that M. de Renal is preoccupied only by prosaic,
materialistic concerns about 'chacun de ces maudits noyers [...] [qui lui] coute[nt] la
recolte d'un demi-arpent' (RN, 262), his wife Louise is instead basking in Rousseau-
esque raptures:
pour Madame de Renal, la main dans celle de Julien, elle ne
pensait a rien; elle se laissait vivre. Les heures qu'on passa sous ce
grand tilleul, que la tradition du pays dit plante par Charles le
Temeraire, furent pour elle une epoque de bonheur. Elle ecoutait
avec delices les gemissements du vent dans l'epais feuillage du
tilleul, et le bruit de quelques gouttes rares qui commenqaient a
tomber sur ses feuilles les plus basses. (RN, 268)
Julien, too, is presented with the rare opportunity to 'se livr[er] au plaisir d'exister, si
vif a cet age, et au milieu des plus belles montagnes du rnonde' (RN, 264). The
narrator tells us significantly: 'a Vergy, il ne trouvait point de ces souvenirs amers;
pour la premiere fois de sa vie, il ne voyait point d'ennemi' (RN, 265). As Michel
Crouzet has put it, life at Vergy provides Julien with the chance to experience
Tunite de soi, hors de l'existence sociale'.420 Julien and Louise would seem to effect
very briefly the type of authentic encounter or genuine mutual relatedness which
Laing saw as being essential to the restoration of the state of authenticity.42' A heavy
influence on Laing in formulating his views on genuine mutual relatedness was
Martin Buber's distinction between I-You and I-lt forms of relatedness, a useful
summary of which is provided by Tamar Kron.
I-You relationships are spontaneous, direct and authentic. They
occur in the reality of the here-and-now. They are the 'between',
the meeting between an authentic open 1 and a unique separate
Other. There is no ulterior motive for the meeting, no objective
other than the meeting itself. Lit relations are partial as the other is
only an object for the I to use and categorise. The other is not
perceived as a separate, independent being, but as a passive
something either to possess or analyse.422
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Julien and Louise have effected a shift from an I-It to an I-You relationship, albeit
only briefly and only in the cloistered isolation of Vergy. The effect of such an
authentic encounter on Julien's life is startling.
Julien ne pensait plus a sa noire ambition, ni a ses projets si
difficiles a executer. Pour la premiere fois de sa vie, il etait entraine
par le pouvoir de la beaute. Perdu dans une reverie vague et douce
si etrangere a son caractere, pressant doucement cette main qui lui
plaisait comme parfaitement jolie, il ecoutait a demi le mouvement
des feuilles du tilleul agitees par ce leger vent de la nuit, et les
chiens du moulin du Doubs qui aboyaient dans le lointain. (RN,
279)
The capacity to achieve a state of authenticity which Julien demonstrates here, one
which is stripped of ambition and which leaves him fleetingly 'reellement sans
projets' (RN, 424), is precisely that which distinguishes him - and indeed
distinguishes all four protagonists - from, for example, Emma Bovary whose
separatist desires are constructed, at least in part, upon an obsession with Paris which
has been inspired at second-hand by her reading of Romantic novels.
If the last lengthy extract from Le Rouge et le Noir exemplifies Julien's capacity for
authenticity, its greatest significance lies in its being followed immediately by the
narratorial revelation that 'cette emotion etait un plaisir et non une passion. En
rentrant dans sa chambre il [Julien] ne songea qu'a un bonheur: celui de reprendre
son livre favori; a vingt ans, l'idee du monde et de l'effet a y produire l'emporte sur
tout' (RN, 279). It is clear, then, that a second aspect to Julien's separatist leanings
exists, unlike in the cases of Louis, Claude and Renee. In addition to the 'si delicieux
plaisir a etre sincere' (RN, 303) which he enjoys transiently in the company ofMme
de Renal, Julien also experiences a Napoleon-inspired yearning to become the
'maitre du monde' (RN, 239). It is this desire which co-exists alongside but also
partially obscures his drive towards the Infinite and authenticity for the majority of
the novel. Julien is shown worshipping the cult of Napoleon from his first entry onto
the narrative stage when the reader finds him perched aloft the machinery of his
father's saw-mill, engrossed in the book 'qu'il affectionnait le plus, Le Memorial de
Sainte-Helene' (RN, 233). While critics may quibble over which precise elements of
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his life replicate the trajectory of Napoleon's career,423 it remains unarguable that the
rise ofNapoleon Bonaparte from his relatively humble Corsican origins to a position
of European political pre-eminence offers the 'plebeien revoke' in Julien an
irresistible role model for the achievement of 'tous les reves heroi'ques de sa
jeunesse' (RN, 287) and of his goals of'faire fortune' (RN, 259) and 'faire les choses
extraordinaires' (RN, 287). For example, when Julien forms part of the guard-of-
honour for the visiting king in Verrieres, 'son bonheur n'eut plus de bornes' as he
could indulge his fantasy of being an 'officier d'ordonnance de Napoleon [qui]
chargeait une batterie' (RN, 312). This Napoleonic obsession materialises on many
further occasions in the novel: for example, when walking back to Verrieres from
Vergy, he takes a circuitous route via the hills and rocks above the villages:
Julien, debout sur son grand rocher, regardait le ciel, embrase par
un soleil d'aout. Les cigales chantaient dans le champ au-dessous
du roclier, quand elles se taisaient tout etait silence autour de lui. II
voyait a ses pieds vingt lieues de pays. Quelque epervier parti des
grandes roches au-dessus de sa tete etait aperqu par lui, de temps a
autre, decrivant en silence ses cercles immenses. L'oeil de Julien
suivait machinalement l'oiseau de proie. Ses mouvements
tranquilles et puissants le frappaient, il enviait cette force, il enviait
cet isolement. C 'etait la destinee de Napoleon, serait-ce un jour la
sienne? (RN, 276-7, my italics)
It is not only in his early career in Verrieres that he entertains notions of becoming a
new Napoleon. In Paris, his thoughts turn to Napoleon when he needs to devise ruses
to get himself out of potentially sticky situations (RN, 499); he desperately wants to
learn how to ride a horse so he can strike that most Napoleonic of poses (RN,
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469);424 and finally, he is reluctant to accept a military decoration unless it is one
which was originally awarded by Napoleon (RN, 594). Indeed it is his similarity with
Napoleon which first attracts admiring glances from Mathilde de La Mole: 'ce Sorel
a quelque chose de fair que mon pere prend quand il fait si bien Napoleon au bal'
(RN, 495).
On the basis of this last quotation, a counter-argument could be introduced, one
which maintains that such Napoleon-inspired goals should not in fact be counted
among Julien's separatist urges due to the imitative practices on which they are
founded. After all, the citational modes of behaviour which Mien relies upon to
realise his Napoleonic aims arc antithetical to the authenticity and purity
characteristic both ofMien's first set of separatist desires we saw coming to the fore
at Vergy as well as of the separatist desires espoused by the other three protagonists.
Despite these indisputable facts, Julien's Napoleonic goals do nonetheless deserve
inclusion on his separatist agenda because they share two important features with the
range of separatist desires discussed thus far. Firstly, Napoleon's personal odyssey
has been coupled many times with imagery of the messianic: he styled himself, after
all, as the 'saviour' of post-Revolution France, and while he certainly saw himself as
a despot, it was nonetheless as 'an enlightened despot [...] exporting lumiere to the
dark continents of ignorance'425 in the manner of Christ acting as 'the light of the
world'. In art, David, Ingres and Gros all portrayed Napoleon not only as a
vanquisher of foes - as in Gros's 'Napoleon visitant le champ de bataille d'Eylau le 9
fevrier 1807' or David's 'Napoleon franchissant le Grand Saint-Bernard' - but also
as a figure capable of Christ-like compassion laying his hands on the sores of the
afflicted - as in Gros's 'Bonaparte visitant les pestiferes de Jaffa le 11 mars 1799'.
Flistorians, too, have made the controversial analogy between Napoleon and Christ:
in Henri Peyre's words, 'both were heroes, that is, daring conquerors, marching with
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their whole being, to meet God'.426 The god-like status assumed by and attributed to
Napoleon thus enables us to establish a parallel between Julien and the messianic
qualities associated with Claude Lantier and Louis Lambert. Furthermore, it mirrors
the sense of revolt and revolution which in Crouzet's estimation is characteristic of
Te beylisme', a 'revolte [qui] est d'abord metaphysique' and which constantly seeks
out Ta candidature a la « divinatio »'.427 Such a candidature is evident in Julien's
declaration to Mme de Renal: 'ah! [...], Napoleon etait bien l'homme envoye de
Dieu pour les jeunes Franqais!' (RN, 304). He immediately goes on to pose the
leading question: 'qui le remplacera?' (RN, 304), thereby sowing in the reader's
mind the seed of the idea that the next god-sent Napoleon could well be a certain
Julien Sorel. Julien's god-like characteristics arc clearly visible in the pre-shooting
stages of the novel: at Vergy, for example, we find him perched 'sur les sommets de
ces rochers coupes a pic', feeling 'heureux, fibre et meme quelque chose de plus, roi
de la maison' (RN, 264, my italics). Later, exhilarated at having seduced Mathilde de
La Mole, he feels 'ivre de bonheur et du sentiment de sa puissance [...]. 11 etait un
Dieu' (RN, 527, my italics). Among the other Christ-like imagery associated with
Julien are the facts that M de Renal's wealth is founded on the manufacture of nails,
the instrument with which Jesus was to meet his death; and that Julien is brought up
as the son of a carpenter named Joseph, yet his paternity is called into question on so
many occasions that the reader is led to believe that Julien's real father, like that of
Jesus, could be some greater, unnameable figure. Finally, Irene Simon points to one
highly significant parallel between Julien and Jesus Christ which has not been
brought out elsewhere. She argues that in 'l'episode de la note secrete' where Julien
is charged with being the messenger for the marquis de La Mole on a politically
sensitive mission, the entire scene should be read 'comme une parodie politique de la
428derniere Cene' given the presence of 'douze personnes assises autour du tapis vert'
426 Henri Peyre, 'Napoleon: Devil, Poet, Saint', Yale French Studies, 26 (1960-1), 21-31 (p.
29). It is surely significant that the now canonical history of the period by Jean Tulard is
entitled Napoleon ou le mvthe du sauveur (Paris: Fayard, 1977), my emphasis.
427 Michel Crouzet, Nature et societe chez Stendhal: La revolte romantique (Villeneuve
d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1985), p. 18.
428 Irene Simon, 'Religion et langage dans Le Rouge et le Noir\ Nineteenth-Century French
Studies, 14 (1985-6), 201-13 (p. 207).
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(RN, 575) whose destiny is dependent on Julien and from whose ranks a treacherous
Judas eventually emerges (RN, 585).
The second reason why Julien's Napoleonic aspirations merit inclusion among his
separatist ideals is that they in fact represent highly subversive values. They are not
predicated on full integration into the doxa but instead revolve around taking control
of the doxa given that Julien is, in Irene Simon's words, 'destine a vivre dans une
periode historiquement sombre qui rejette son heros'.429 Julien's sedition, covert
though it may be, is all the more startling as it comes from the son of a provincial
saw-mill owner who, in Restoration France, ought never to be able to lay a finger on
the levers of power. The subversive nature of Julien's aspirations can be seen clearly
at the Hotel de La Mole, and, in particular, in his seduction of Mathilde, the
motivation for which centres on his quest to triumph over his aristocratic colleagues.
His affair with Mathilde fills him with Te plus vif bonheur d'ambition' (RN, 541)
because, as he realises only too well,
je l'emporte sur le marquis de Croisenois [...], moi qui ne dis que
des choses serieuses! Et lui est si joli! II a des moustaches, un
cliarmante uniforme; il trouve toujours a dire, juste au moment
convenable, un mot spirituel et fin. Julien eut un instant delicieux;
il errait a l'aventure dans le jardin, fou de bonheur. (RN, 523)
As a result, he feels 'ivre de bonheur et du sentiment de sa puissance' (RN, 527).
Julien's Napoleonic goals deserve to be lined up alongside his separatist yearnings
for authenticity because they all represent 'wilful situational improprieties',430 or
irrefutable evidence that Julien is very much not prepared to keep his place.
Thus far in this chapter we have seen that Julien, Renee, Louis and Claude espouse a
range of separatist desires which arguably share two important characteristics: firstly,
they could all be termed 'centrifugal' desires as they each propel the four
protagonists away from conformity to the most socially acceptable values and
practices of the day. In their differing ways, each protagonist pursues ambitions
433
ibid., p. 205.
430 Goffman, 'The Insanity of Place', p. 411.
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which run contrary to the dominant doxai of every social milieu they encounter. In
this way, each of them 'strikes at the syntax of conduct',431 because their behaviour
constitutes evidence of 'wilful situational improprieties [...] and evidence that the
individual is not prepared to keep his place'.432 It is their separatist ideals which push
them towards committing these 'infractions of social rules and social
expectations'.433 Yet if the four protagonists are subject to centrifugal forces pushing
them out towards a position of revolutionary marginality, is it possible to define
more precisely where they are heading? The difficulty in responding to this question
gives rise to the second characteristic of the four protagonists' separatist desires: that
is, their ideals are all, by definition, extremely difficult to define and are without
concrete existence in time and place. For example, Claude's artistic credo when
translated into pictorial reality is by his own admission 'un art incomplet et
revolutionnaire' (LO, 210, my italics) which is so complex and stuffed 'd'une si
grande confusion de details sommaires' (LO, 216) that it eventually becomes
indecipherable. Christine berates him for just this failing in the hours before he
commits suicide (LO, 347). Louis's new Jerusalem can be described only in terms of
which elements of society it will reject rather than in more constructive terms of
what it will positively represent or strive for. In a similar sense, Renee's core of
difference and drive for authenticity help her focus on rejecting and escaping the
mediocrity of her colleagues and suitors and can be expressed in the vaguest of
terms, sometimes finding a voice extra-linguistically through the medium of her
piano music. Finally, Julien's case is more complex given that his separatist desires
comprise two competing elements. Yet this twin set of ideals is subject to the same
principle of undefinability given that his yearning for some form of pre-lapsarian
authentic existence which we witness during his stay at Vergy can only be alluded to
in highly imprecise terms. Even his Napoleonic urges are surely better described as
rebellious rather than revolutionary given that he turns away from and reacts against
a particular value system, as represented by Valenod or the marquis de Croisenois
rather than espousing or attempting to impose a new, revolutionary ideology. The
431
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four protagonists' separatist desires thus surpass precise definition or representation;
all can seemingly be defined or represented only in terms of what they react against.
The defining characteristic of the protagonists' separatist ideals relates to an
aspiration towards authenticity, or to the feeling which Laing termed 'aletheia', a
being 'true to oneself.434
While their centrifugal desires to remain true to themselves and to their ideals
certainly distinguish the four protagonists from their families and immediate
contemporaries, they nonetheless account for only one aspect of their existential
positions. In essence, the focus of the four novels rests not on these separatist urges
but on the conflict which arises between them and the many opposing 'integrationist'
pressures which are at work on each protagonist. These forces aim to exert a
sufficiently strong centripetal pressure on the protagonists to counter-balance and,
where possible, out-weigh their centrifugal, separatist desires. The result is that if the
centrifugal desires, as we saw earlier, push the four of them towards committing
'infractions of social rules and social expectations', the centripetal, integrationist
forces aim to prevent these infractions, and, crucially, to prevent the protagonists'
separatist goals from ever being achieved. Before turning to these integrationist
forces, I wish first to outline the concept of 'ontological insecurity' which Laing
describes in The Divided Self as a means of structuring my evaluation of these
pressures and subsequently of examining the intense friction which is created by the
clash between the two mutually exclusive sets of forces.
Ontological insecurity
At the root of schizophrenia, according to Laing, lies 'ontological insecurity'. Laing
begins his explanation of this condition in The Divided Self by describing those who
retain a firm sense of ontological security.
434 See p. 26.
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A man may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real,
alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person. As
such, he can live out into the world and meet others: a world and
others experienced as equally real, alive, whole, and continuous.
Such a basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the
hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally
firm sense of his own and other people's reality and identity. (TDS,
39)
This 'presence in the world as a real, alive, whole continuous person' who is
characterised by the ability to retain a 'firm sense of one's own and other people's
reality and identity' is precisely the element which the schizophrenic lacks and which
provides the source of all his/her anxieties and dangers.
The individual in the ordinary circumstances of living may feel
more unreal than real; in a literal sense, more dead than alive;
precariously differentiated from the rest of the world, so that his
identity and autonomy are always in question. He may lack the
experience of his own temporal continuity. He may not possess an
over-riding sense of personal consistency or cohesiveness. He may
feel more insubstantial than substantial, and unable to assume that
the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, valuable. (TDS, 42)
In such a position, relatedness with other people can represent a potentially
unnavigable mine-field.
We can say that in the individual whose own being is secure in this
primary existential sense, relatedness with others is potentially
gratifying; whereas the ontologically insecure person is
preoccupied with preserving rather than gratifying himself: the
ordinary circumstances of living threaten his low threshold of
security. (TDS, 42)
The ontologically insecure individual's existence becomes characterised by a drive
not towards self-gratification, as classical psychoanalytic theories would suggest, but
only towards self-preservation. I want to argue in this chapter that the existences of
the four protagonists are structured in a remarkably similar way to that which R. D.
Laing describes in relation to the ontologically insecure individual. They too do not
'possess any over-riding sense of personal consistency or cohesiveness' (TDS, 42),
so riven are their existences by the mutually exclusive sets of separatist desires and
integrationist pressures at work on them. Two differences do arise, however, and
these differences are crucial to the development of my argument in this and
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subsequent chapters. Firstly, while the Laingian schizophrenic must constantly
'contrive ways of trying to [...] prevent himself from losing his self (TDS, 42-3) and
of preserving his/her identity, Louis, Julien, Renee and Claude must constantly
contrive ways of preventing themselves from losing their separatist desires, or from
seeing these desires being rendered null and void. Furthermore, while the
ontologically insecure individual's life is characterised by a drive towards self-
preservation rather than self-gratification, our four protagonists must similarly direct
their efforts towards the preservation of their separatist ideals and less towards the
gratification or realisation of these ideals. Secondly, the aetiology or symptoms
associated with Laing's descriptions of 'ontological insecurity' should not be seen as
being directly applicable to the lives of the four protagonists. Instead, they provide us
only with a parallel to the lives of the protagonists or with a framework within which
to analyse their existential positions. To see this framework in action, we need first to
turn to the potentially deadly threats which Laing argues assail those with a low
threshold of ontological security. Laing describes such threats and their possibly
devastating effects by outlining three fears which govern the everyday life of the
schizophrenic - engulfment, implosion and petrification. The first two of these fears
I will examine immediately, the third I will turn to in chapter two of part III.
By way of illustration of the fear of engulfment, Laing cites a revealing case drawn
from his own clinical experience.
An argument occurred between two patients in the course of a
session in an analytic group. Suddenly, one of the protagonists
broke off the argument to say, 'I can't go on. You are arguing in
order to have the pleasure of triumphing over me. At best you win
an argument. At worst you lose an argument. I am arguing in order
to preserve my existence'. (TDS, 43)
Laing thus defines engulfment as a state in which 'the individual dreads relatedness
as such, with anyone or anything or, indeed, even with himself, because his
uncertainty about the stability of his autonomy lays him open to the dread lest in any
relationship he will lose his autonomy and identity' (TDS, 44). Every relationship
thus Threatens the individual with loss of identity' (TDS, 44). In the period leading
up to their allegedly mad or irrational actions, the four protagonists also suffer from
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this fear of engulfment but with one crucial difference: they do not fear that their
entire 'autonomy and identity' will be washed away, as the schizophrenic does, but,
instead, that the 'autonomy and identity' of their separatist ideals will be engulfed if
they enter into too great a degree of relatedness with others. In short, they fear that
relatedness will prevent their ideals from ever being realised.
At this point it is constructive to note one particular phrase in Laing's description of
the fear of engulfment: 'any and every relationship threatens the individual with loss
of identity' (TDS, 45). This phrase is significant for the emphasis it places on the fact
that the ontologically insecure individual is not an entirely insubstantial being: s/he
has an essence which is under threat, an 'inner aliveness' (TDS, 45) which faces the
possibility of extinction because of the dangers relatedness holds. S/he does retain a
sense of selfhood, albeit one which must be protected and preserved by often
increasingly desperate means: 'the individual experiences himself as a man who is
only saving himself from drowning by the most constant, strenuous, desperate
activity' (TDS, 44). The implication of such a statement is that the ontologically
insecure individual does in fact retain a substantiality which is worth saving from
drowning. This inviolable if threatened aliveness at the centre of the ontologically
insecure individual's being can be equated with the core of authenticity which the
schizophrenic has been forced to abandon in the face of constant 'disconfirmatory'
behaviour and the resultant double binds in which s/he has become implicated, as
was described in part I.435 The existence of an 'inner aliveness' is further reflected in
Laing's famous argument also cited in part I: 'our "normal", "adjusted" state is too
often the abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our true potentialities, [...] many of us
are only too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt to false realities' (TDS, 12).
In claiming that the schizophrenic individual does indeed retain an independent sense
of self (or 'true potentialities' as in the last quotation) Laing would appear to diverge
from the Heideggerian notion of authenticity which we saw earlier in this chapter.
Heidegger argued that we have already 'fallen' from our state of authenticity as a
result of which fact inauthenticity is 'an inevitable feature of the human
435 See pp. 24-6.
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predicament'.436 Laing, on the other hand, would appear to hold out at least the
possibility of a return to a state of authenticity, to one's 'true potentialities', and, it is
this return which he posits as the ultimate goal of anti-psychiatric therapeutic
practice: 'the task in therapy', he argues, 'comes to be to make contact with the
original 'self of the individual which, or who, we must believe is still apossibility, if
not an actuality, and can still be nursed back to a feasible life' (TDS, 158-9).
I have placed some emphasis on the existence of this obscured core of substantiality
or authenticity because it assumes considerable importance when we turn to the
second fear by which the schizophrenic's life is wracked - that of implosion. This
fear centres on the schizophrenic's terror that 'the world [is] liable at any moment to
crash in and obliterate all identity as a gas will rush in and obliterate a vacuum'
(TDS, 45). The ontologically insecure individual thus views 'any 'contact' with
reality [...] as a dreadful threat because reality, as experienced from this position, is
necessarily implosive and [...] a threat to what identity the individual is able to
suppose himself to have' (TDS, 46). Contact with reality is thus a terrifying prospect,
transforming the outside world into a constantly persecuting enemy. Yet despite the
obviously frightening prospect held out by the risk of implosion, the schizophrenic
retains a highly ambivalent attitude towards this fear because he suffers from an
intense feeling of emptiness which s/he wishes to see filled. This sense of emptiness
should not, however, be seen as a negation of the view which has just been outlined
with regard to the core of inner aliveness animating the schizophrenic's existence.
The emptiness which Laing evokes here stems not from the non-existence of the
inner core but from its sense of impoverishment and under-nourishment in this
hostile and potentially implosive environment. Yet while, on the one hand, the
individual would like to see this impoverishment brought to an end and would like to
see the 'vacuum' filled, 'he dreads the possibility of this happening because he has
come to feel that all he can be is the awful nothingness of just this vacuum' (TDS,
45). The vicious circle in which the individual is trapped is thus one in which s/he
most desires what s/he most dreads.
436 Inwood, Heidegger, p. 47.
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As a result of these two fears - engulfment and implosion - and the underlying sense
of 'ontological insecurity', the schizophrenic is left in a state of constant anxiety,
unable to 'take the realness, aliveness, autonomy and identity of himself and others
for granted' (TDS, 42). S/he must consequently 'become absorbed in contriving
ways of trying to be real, of keeping himself or others alive, or preserving his
identity, in efforts, as he will often put it, to prevent him losing his self (TDS, 42-3).
In essence, the ontologically insecure individual must devote him/herself to fending
off a world which could potentially obliterate his/her entire identity if s/he does not
try constantly to defend his/her core of being. We will see later in part III that despite
the potentially engulfing nature of rclatcdncss with the world and despite the
schizophrenic's need to fend off this world, relatedness is paradoxically still required
for the schizophrenics's sense of self to be sustained. Before turning to this
paradoxical state of affairs, central to the Laingian ontology of schizophrenia, I shall
first examine the ways in which 'reality' poses a potentially devastating, engulfing
and imploding threat for our four protagonists through subjecting them to a range of
'integrationist' pressures which militate at all times against the separatist desires
outlined in the first section of this chapter.
Integrationist pressures
A parallel was drawn earlier between Louis Lambert and Moses: this analogy can be
extended if we remember that while Moses led the Children of Israel out of misery
and bondage in Egypt, he was not permitted to enter the Promised Land for having
doubted and disobeyed God while in the wilderness. Louis suffers an analogous fate
in the period preceding his 'collapse into insanity' as he, too, is a tainted prophet
with his Christ-like authenticity and integrity being compromised - albeit inevitably -
by his involvement with the things of this world. Louis's separatist, quasi-messianic
compulsions are counter-balanced by a series of integrationist forces which exert on
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him a strong centripetal pull in order to divert him from, or in Laingian terms, to
engulf his Promethean goals. This is the case in all four novels, each one a 'roman
d'apprentissage', as the protagonists traverse a series of institutions and locations
which each aims to obliterate the identity of their separatist desires and prevent such
goals from ever being realised, mirroring the way in which the ontologically insecure
schizophrenic's core of inner aliveness faces the prospect of engulfment by the
outside world. A highly evocative appraisal of an institution where such
integrationist forces are at their most concentrated can be found in the narrator's
account of Louis Lambert's years at the College de Vendome - 'a miniature
description ofHell'437 - and a place where Louis is expected to
eulrer dans le moule d'un college auquel chaque intelligence,
cliaque corps doit, malgre sa portee, malgre son temperament,
s'adapter a la regie comme l'or s'arrondit en pieces sous le coup du
balancier, Louis Lambert souffrit done par tous les points ou la
douleur a prise sur fame et sur la chair. (LL, 612, my italics)
Constantly forced to run the gauntlet of 'des rires moqueurs, des interrogations, des
impertinences' (LL, 604) at the hands of their class-mates, both he and the narrator
are locked in a constant 'etat de guerre' (LL, 613) with those around them. This war
rages not only between the two groups of school-children but also between Louis and
his school-teachers who, far from seeking to nurture their charge's intellectual gifts,
see his prodigious abilities only as a threat to the carefully controlled uniformity they
seek to impose. As a result, they burden him with endless disciplinary penalties, thus
depriving him of the time and room he requires in order to devote himself to his
Promethean ambitions. Louis's life at the College can be read as a literary
representation of the normalising, disciplinary techniques which Foucault outlines in
Surveiller et punir, techniques which '[ont] prise[s] sur le corps des autres, non pas
simplement pour qu'ils fassent ce qu'on desire, mais pour qu'ils operent comme on
veut'. The various techniques Foucault outlines - 'la repartition des individus dans
437
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438 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: La naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975),
p. 162.
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l'espace', 'la cloture', 'le quadrillage', 'les emplacement fonctionnels' and 'le
rang'439 - each have their individual counter-parts in Louis's life. For instance,
chaque eleve possedait line niche de six pieds carres, dont les
cloisons etaient garnies de barreaux par le haut, dont la porte a
claire-voie se fermait tous les soirs, et s'ouvrait tous les matins
sous les yeux du Pere charge d'assister a notre lever et a notre
coucher. (LL, 619)
Such niches, the narrator declares, 'nous servaient de prison' (LL, 619). The boys'
strict separation into spatial categories is replicated in the academic sphere where
they are 'hierarchiquement cases' (LL, 600) into four separate 'divisions' in which
they receive their education and in which every aspect of their lives is watched over
and controlled. The effect on Louis (and, by extension, his separatist ideals) of such
constant surveillance and of the required 'self-direction' is devastating.
II lui fallut prendre soin de sa baraque, de son pupitre, de ses
habits, de ses souliers; ne se laisser voler ni son encre, ni ses livres,
ni ses cahiers, ni ses plumes; enfin penser a ces mille details de
notre existence enfantine, dont s'occupaient avec tant de rectitude
ces esprits egoi'stes et niediocres auxquels appartiennent
infailliblement les prix d'excellence ou de bonne conduite; mais
que negligeait un enfant plein d'avenir, qui, sous le joug d'une
imagination divine, s'abandonnait avec amour au torrent de ses
pensees. (LL, 611)
It is just these 'pensees' and his 'imagination divine' - what we have identified with
his separatist desires - which become so threatened with engulfment and
annihiliation. The narrator suggests: 'attache sur un banc a la glebe de son pupitre,
frappe par la ferule, frappe par la maladie, affecte dans tous ses sens, presse par une
ceinture de maux, tout le contraignit d'abandonner son enveloppe aux mille
tyrannies du college' (LL, 613, my italics). Enormous tension necessarily builds up
between Louis's own separatist inclinations and the stultifying conveyor-belt ethos
of the College.
Accoutume au grand air, a l'independance d'une education laissee
au hasard, caresse par les tendres soins d'un vieillard qui le
cherissait, habitue a penser sous le soleil, il lui fut bien difficile de
se plier a la regie du college, de marcher dans le rang, de vivre




etaient silencieux, assis sur un banc de bois, chacun devant son
pupitre. Ses sens possedaient une perfection qui leur donnait une
exquise delicatesse, et tout souffrit chez lui de cette vie en
commun. (LL, 607, my italics)
Louis's separatist ideals are thus always under attack from the centripetal pressures
applied by this constantly persecuting enemy. The invidious position in which Louis
finds himself at the College parallels that of the Laingian schizophrenic: the latter
fears that the outside world will engulf his core of existence while the former fears
that the outside world, in this case in the form of the College, will douse the embers
of his separatist fire.
A second situation in which Louis finds it 'bien difficile de se plier a la regie' arises
when he follows that path so well trodden by Louis's 'arriviste' colleagues in the
'Comedie Humaine' by going up to Paris. Yet here, in common with Raphael de
Valentin in La Peau de Chagrin for example, Louis encounters as many barriers to
the realisation and exploration of his separatist, philosophical goals as he had done at
the College, and the threat that his separatist ideals will never be realised and will
instead be engulfed by a hostile environment remains as pressing as ever. Earlier in
this chapter, we saw Louis's conviction that 'une force invincible' was leading him
'vers une lumiere qui a brille de bonne heure dans les tenebres de ma vie morale'
(LL, 651). Yet a directly antithetical force counteracts that Promethean promise:
'quel nom donner a la puissance qui me lie les mains, qui me ferme la bouche, et
m'entraine en sens contraire a ma vocation?' (LL, 651) While the curbs placed on his
Promethean task in the College had been of a physical nature - he had, for example,
lacked a 'room of his own' - the restrictions and normalising influences he faces in
Paris are of an ideological and financial nature: 'ici [Paris] tout decourage le vol en
droite ligne d'un esprit qui tend a l'avenir' (LL, 648) and encourages instead slavish
adherence to the prevailing doxa. He comes to the same realisation as so many other
Balzacian heroes: 'ici [Paris] le point de depart de tout est l'argent' (LL, 647).
Deprived of such resources, his messianic mission is severely undermined for he
realises that: 'il faut de Pargent, meme pour se passer d'argent' (LL, 647). Resistance
to his separatist plans also comes in the form of that most invasive and potentially
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devastating of techniques - mockery: Ton s'y moque des essais d'abord infructueux
qui peuvent mener aux plus grands decouvertes, et Ton n'y estime pas cette etude
constante et profonde qui veut une longue concentration des forces' (LL, 648).
Whether as a pupil at the College de Vendome or as a student in Paris, Louis
encounters, at best, only philistinism and mediocrity, or, at worst, outright hostility
and opposition to his separatist ideals, all of which obstruct his path towards the
realisation of his Promethean goals.
A similar dynamic to that which we have just seen in relation to Louis Lambert
governs the life of Claude Lantier. Much like Louis Lambert, L 'CEuvre is structured
around a series of events and institutions which each contains the potential to engulf
and triumph over his desires for artistic revolution. As a child, for example, the
'intelligence superieure' (LO, 54) and 'ambition commune' which set him apart from
everyone in his home town except Sandoz and Dubuche are threatened with the
possibility of engulfment 'au milieu de la cohue brutale des abominables cancres qui
les battaient' (LO, 35); all three future artists find themselves being almost
overwhelmed there by the 'engourdissement invincible du milieu' (LO, 40); while
their artistic, poetic sensibilities are left desiccated and un-nourished. Claude's
artistic vigour is also sapped later in the novel at Bennecourt where he manages to
paint nothing for over a year after arriving and where he comes to realise that 'le
peintre en lui se degoutait de la contree, ne trouvant plus un seul motif qui
l'enflammat' (LO, 167). Eventually, he is even forced to conclude that 'il ne ferait
plus rien de bon dans ce pays de chien!' (LO, 167).
The most significant and most 'totalising' of all the integrationist pressures which
threaten to implode upon and engulf Claude's separatist desires, however, are
relating to the 'Ecole des Beaux-Arts' and the 'Salon'. Dubuche describes the
'chienne de vie' (LO, 51) a student learning his trade at the Ecole must endure:
cours de perspective, cours de geometrie descriptive, cours de
stereotomie, cours de construction, histoire de l'art, all! ils vous en
font noircir du papier, a prendre des notes... Et, tous les mois, un
concours d'architecture, tantot une simple esquisse, tantot un
projet. II n'y a point a s'amuser, si 1'on veut passer ses examens et
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decrocher les mentions necessaires, surtout lorsqu'on doit, en
dehors de ces besognes, trouver le temps de gagner son pain...
Moi,j'en creve.... (LO, 52)
All the students must undergo a strict process of homogenisation 'sous la ferule de
professeurs qui vous entrent de force dans la caboche leur vision a eux' (LO, 83).
Any student who dares to espouse revolutionary values similar to those held by
Claude will certainly fail to graduate until their separatist ambitions have been
defeated and until they have been engulfed by the rigid, reactionary vision their
educators propose. As one novelist of the period noted in relation to the Ecole's
'grand concours' entrance examination: 'les eleves qui s'y attardent finissent par
ressembler a certains aspirants bacheliers, plus soucieux du diplome que du vrai
savoir'.440 Those who succeed at the Ecole will no doubt find their work selected for
exhibition at the official Salon, works of art which the narrator tells us are 'trempes
ensemble au fond du meme cambouis de la convention. Une mediocrite uniforme
suintait des osuvres, la salissure boueuse du ton qui les caracterisait, dans cette bonne
tenue d'un art au sang pauvre et degenere' (LO, 131-2). Dumbing-down is the watch¬
word in this environment so hostile to Claude's ambitions, as Bongrand - the
spiritual father of the 'plein air' movement - laments when he scrutinises a painting
by Fagerolles which has won considerable critical and public acclaim:
tout le true consiste a lui voler son originalite et a raccommoder a
la sauce veule de I'Ecole des Beaux-Arts. Parfaitement! on prend
du moderne, on peint clair, mais on garde le dessin banal et correct,
la composition agreable de tout le monde, enfin la formule qu'on
enseigne la-bas, pour l'agrement des bourgeois. (LO, 1 85)
While Bongrand takes the uncompromising view that such work is artistic nonsense
worthy of being 'punie du bagne' (LO, 185), he nonetheless provides an important
insight into the way in which an artist may push back very gently the boundaries of
artistic innovation without alienating the philistine viewing public. Fagerolles had
learnt the value of this reflex at the first 'Salon des Refuses' where Claude's painting
En Plein Air had met with such derision. He symbolically keeps one eye on the
painting and another on the public:
440 Louis-Edmond Duranty, La Nouvellepeinture: A propos du groupe d'artistes qui expose
dans les galeries Durand-Ruel (1876) (Caen: L'Echoppe, 1988), p. 16.
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il examinait toujours la toile, il jetait des coups d'oeil sur le public.
Avec son flair de Parisien et sa conscience souple de gaillard
adroit, il se rendait compte du malentendu; et, vaguement, il sentait
deja ce qu'il faudrait pour que cette peinture fit la conquete de
tous, quelques tricheries peut-etre, des attenuations, un
arrangement du sujet, un adoucissement de la facture. L'influence
que Claude avait eue sur lui persistait: il en restait penetre, a jamais
marque. Seulement, il le trouvait arcliifou d'exposer une pareille
chose. N'etait-ce pas stupide de croire a 1'intelligence du public?
(LO, 129)
Several years later, when Fagerolles's 'Un Dejeuner' is exhibited at the Salon,
Claude notices how successful his one-time acolyte has been in watering down the
revolutionary promise they had once shared: 'il retrouvait son Plein air, dans ce
Dejeuner, la meme note blonde, la meme formule d'art, mais combien adoucie,
truquee, gatee, d'une elegance d'epiderme, arrangee avec une adresse infinie pour les
satisfactions basses du public' (LO, 286). Fagerolles's inauthentic art satisfies 'the
public norms of the 'they",441 and it is up to Claude to decide whether he wishes to
ape Fagerolles's courting of the 'they' or whether he wants instead to remain true to
the exigencies of his authentic, revolutionary ideals to 'tout voir, tout faire, tout
conquerir' (LO, 203). If he chooses to follow the former path, he will no doubt win
similarly extensive acclaim to that which Fagerolles enjoyed thanks to his acclaimed
'Dejeuner'. Claude cannot avoid overhearing their appreciative comments and
becomes intensely gloomy as a result.
Claude [...] ecoutait des mots, autour de lui. Enfin, en voila un qui
faisait de la vraie verite! II n'appuyait pas comme ces goujats de
l'ecole nouvelle, il savait tout mettre sans rien mettre. Ah! les
nuances, 1'art des sous-entendus, le respect du public, les suffrages
de la bonne compagnie! Et avec qa une finesse, un charme, un
esprit! (LO, 287)
Moreover, Claude realises that if he were to put up no resistance to the threatened
engulfment of his separatist desires, a hefty financial reward would ensue. Naudet,
the art dealer and his one-time friend, is after all nothing but 'un speculateur, un
boursier, qui se moquait radicalement de la bonne peinture' (LO, 185), yet one
441
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 334.
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knows how to market his product so that it will 'faire prime sur le marche bourgeois'
(LO, 185).
The situation in which Claude finds himself recalls that which Pierre Bourdieu
outlines in his study of L 'Education Sentimentale where he argues that Flaubert puts
in place Tes deux poles du champ du pouvoir [...] ou s'exercent des forces sociales,
attractions ou repulsions'.442 As a result,
Flaubert instaure les conditions d'une sorte d'experimentation
sociologique: cinq adolescents - dont le heros, Frederic
provisoirement rassembles par leur position commune d'etudiants,
seront lances dans cet espace, telles des particules dans un champ
de forces, et leurs trajectoires seront determinees par la relation
entre les forces du champ et leur propre inertie.443
Zola undertakes a similar type of sociological 'experiment' in L 'CEuvre by describing
the artistic field inhabited and, for a time, dominated by Claude. His experiment
centres on observing which pole Claude and his one-time close artistic colleagues
will be attracted to, which of them will remain loyal to their artistic, separatist
revolutionary ideals, and which of them will sign up to the steadily growing band of
'peintres moqueurs' (LO, 187) through succombing to the strong integrationist
pressures acting on them.
While the tales of Claude Lantier and Louis Lambert present in fairly equal measure
the integrationist and separatist forces which govern their lives, no such equilibrium
exists in relation to Le Rouge et le Noir and Renee Mauperin where the emphasis is
placed largely on the integrationist forces at work on both main protagonists. In a
similar manner to L 'GLuvre, Stendhal's novel recounts the journey undertaken by an
'arriviste' through a series of institutions which each aims to curtail and, better still,
nullify and engulf his difference. To borrow from Goffman's terminology, each of
these instituions aims to 'disculture' him.444 However, this 'disculturation' is directed
not towards his compatibility with the outside world, as was the case in relation to
442 Bourdieu, Les Regies de I'art, pp. 30-1.
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the asylum inmate, instead it is directed towards his twin ideals of authenticity and
Napoleonic pre-eminence. An immediate example emerges out of Julien's stay at the
Besanfon seminary where he realises that his fellow seminarists consider it to be 'un
peche splendide' (RN, 384) to come top of the class in any examination. In their
eyes, Julien is far too much the maverick: '// pensait, il jugeait par lui-meme, au lieu
de suivre aveuglement I'autorite et l'exemple' (RN, 386). In essence, Julien refuses
here to keep to the 'place' he has been allocated by his birth, yet he realises that such
'singularite' must be un-learned quickly and that he must follow the example of his
colleague Chazel 'qui [...] jette toujours dans ses compositions quelque balourdise
qui le fait releguer a la cinquantieme place' (RN, 387).
We have already seen in this section that Claude Lantier and Louis Lambert are
subject to a range of powerful disculturing forces in the various institutions they
encounter. A crucial difference, however, between their existential positions and that
of Julien Sorel turns on the fact that the normalising forces acting on Claude and
Louis remain principally external to them - for instance, Louis's teachers at the
College or the rigid conventions governing acceptance of one's work for exhibition
at the Paris Salon. Julien, on the other hand, has largely internalised the integrationist
forces which weigh down on him. As a result, he actively regulates and normalises
himself rather than wait to be regulated by others in a more passive sense, as was the
case in the last quotation relating to his examination technique at the seminary. A
further example arises out his realisation that 'partout' there is 'de la faussete' (RN,
362), at which point he decides that he too must follow this path if he wants to see
his ideals being achieved. Julien simply does not allow himself to act with
authenticity: 'il manqua a notre heros d'oser etre sincere [...] [il] n'osa plus rever
avec abandon' (RN, 305). The obvious question which arises here is why does Julien
refuse to allow himself to be 'sincere' or to dare to act in accordance with his
authentic capacities? One clue is provided by the insight into the interaction between
Julien's two sets of separatist desires which the following telling narratorial
intervention regarding Julien's relationship with Mme de Renal offers the reader:
an lieu d'etre attentif aux transports qu'il faisait naitre, et aux
remords qui en relevaient la vivacite, 1'idee du devoir ne cessa
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jamais d'etre presente a ses yeux. II craignait un remords affreux et
mi ridicule eternel s'il s'ecartait du modele ideal qu'il se proposait
de suivre. En 1111 mot, ce qui faisait de Julien un etre superieur fut
precisement ce qui l'empecha de gouter le bonheur qui se pla9ait
sous ses pas. C'est une jeune fille de seize ans, qui a des couleurs
cliarmantes, et qui, pour aller au bal, a la folie de mettre du rouge.
(RN, 298)
This extract is of considerable significance as it points to how Julien censors his urge
for authenticity - his 'couleurs charmantes' - for fear of ridicule or failure: in other
words, Julien undertakes a process of what could be called deliberate 'self-
inauthentication'. This holds particularly true at the Hotel de La Mole where his
drive for authenticity becomes almost entirely submerged by his ambitions which
take him in the direction of the Napoleonic 'rouge' and the clerical 'noir'. Gone are
the days when he would withdraw into deep contemplation in the hills above Vergy
to enter into deep contemplation. Instead, 'des qu'il pouvait disposer d'un instant, au
lieu de l'employer a lire comrne autrefois, il courait au manege et demandait les
chevaux les plus vicieux' (RN, 469). Perhaps most disturbingly of all, when Julien's
seduction of Mathilde de La Mole starts to go to plan, the narrator declares: 'excepte
pour les matieres de haute ambition, Julien etait devenu un autre lui-meme' (RN,
522). The aphorism by which he rules his life at this stage of the novel is no longer
'to thine own self be true', but instead 'chacun pour soi dans ce desert d'egoi'sme
qu'on appelle la vie' (RN, 524).
It is important to note, however, that Julien suppresses not only his quest for
authenticity but also his Napoleonic separatist agenda. Yet while he hides the former
to the point of their virtual extinction, he obscures the latter only from public view
and continues to pursue it ruthlessly in private. In view of the political allegiances of
the de Renal and de La Mole households, Julien rightly understands that his
Napoleon-inspired ambitions would be engulfed immediately were they ever to
emerge into the open: 'toute ma reputation [serait] tombee, aneantie en un moment!'
(RN, 273), he realises. As a result, when he lets slip to Mine de Renal something of
his admiration for Napoleon, he realises he must back-pedal quickly in the face of
her 'air froid et dedaigneux' (RN, 304) and claim instead 'que les mots qu'il venait
de repeter, il les avait entendus pendant son voyage chez son ami le marchand de
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bois. C'etait le raisonnement des impies' (RN, 304). Further evidence of Julien's
public, but not private, suppression of his admiration for Napoleon emerges in the
statement: 'personne ne put trahir l'ancienne passion de Julien pour Napoleon, il n'en
parlait qu'avec horreur' (RN, 248). Julien's hot-and-cold attitude towards the
Napoleonic legacy recalls one of Laing's patients who 'though sane outside has been
becoming progressively insane inside' (TDS, 147). Such a patient seemingly lives a
normal and successfully adjusted life but 'behind this sane faqade an interior
psychotic process may be going on secretly and silently' (TDS, 147). This person
would therefore 'play at being sane' (TDS, 148). In a parallel sense, Julien 'plays at
being sane', or, more precisely, plays at staying within the bounds of rationality and
novelistic 'vraisemblance' by denying in public the Napoleonic ambitions he pursues
so ruthlessly in private and by parroting what he (rightly) thinks others want to hear
from him.
Even though Julien cannot allow the Napoleonic branch of his separatist desires to
become known by others, he nonetheless continues to pursue them not only with a
relentless and silent vigour, particularly at the Hotel de La Mole, but also with a
success so stunning that he rises to the position of 'lieutenant de hussards',
resplendent in the title M le chevalier Julien Sorel de La Vernaye. Julien achieves
this level of success through turning to his advantage thoroughly integrationist or
self-normalising strategies. To see how this paradoxical situation of pursuing
separatist goals by integrationist means works in practice, it is useful to revisit the
Heideggerian analogy introduced earlier. It can be said that Julien's inauthentic
'Dasein' (or, to be more precise, his deliberately self-inauthenticated 'Dasein')
'understands itself from its ability to be that is determined by the success and failure,
the feasibility and unfeasibility of [his] commerce with things'.445 Charles Guignon
glosses these words thus: 'everyday existence is fragmented into a series of means-
ends strategies governed by the latest public attitudes about what constitutes
445 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, translated by Albert
Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 289.
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success'.446 One of the chief 'means-ends strategies' which Julien employs in order
to bring about the achievement of his Napoleonic goals is his studied manipulation of
language. We saw earlier in this chapter that Renee Mauperin preferred to avoid
speech because of the stultifying and pre-structuring effect it exerted over her life.
The reverse is true in the Hotel de La Mole where most speakers are only too keen to
insert themselves into the pre-structured symbolic order which language dictates to
them.
Pourvu qu'on ne plaisantat ni de Dieu, ni des pretres, ni du roi, ni
des gens en place, ni des artistes proteges par la cour, ni de tout ce
qui est etabli; pourvu qu'on ne dit du bien ni de Beranger, ni des
journaux de l'opposition, ni de Voltaire, ni de Rousseau, ni de tout
ce qui se permet un peu de franc-parler; pourvu surtout qu'on ne
parlat jamais politique, 011 pouvait librement raisonner de tout.
(RN, 457)
Conversation is reduced to a series of seemingly content-less or phatic utterances
because Tes jeunes gens, [...] ayant peur de parler de quelque chose qui fit
soupfonner une pensee, ou de trahir quelque lecture prohibee, se taisaient apres
quelques mots bien elegants sur Rossini et le temps qu'il faisait' (RN, 457). If ever
one needed a novelistic description of the 'echo chamber of incessant vacant
loquacity' which Steiner attributes to the Heideggerian notion of 'Gerede',447 then it
can surely be found in the Hotel de La Mole.
Despite detesting the 'ennui' and the 'asphyxie morale' (RN, 458) such interaction
engenders, Julien nonetheless recognises that he must base his rise through the ranks
of society largely on a mastery of the linguistic codes which govern each institution
he encounters - that is, on largely integrationist strategies.448 While Renee Mauperin
preferred to 'avaler sa langue' because she was aware of the stultifying effect speech
could have on her ideals, Julien is only too willing to recast his speech into more
446 Charles B. Guignon, 'Authenticity, Moral Values, Psychotherapy', in The Cambridge
Companion to Heidegger, edited by Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), pp. 215-39 (p. 227).
447 See p. 134.
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Jefferson, Reading Realism in Stendhal, pp. 93-1 12; and Prendgergast, The Order of
Mimesis, pp. 127-36.
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'convenables' codes as he thinks it will lead him closer to his goals ofNapoloeonic
success and glory. 'C'est le monde des mots qui cree le monde des choses',449 Lacan
writes, and for Julien, mastery of the former increases his control over the latter: he is
appointed as 'precepteur' to the de Renal children thanks to his prodigious ability to
recite the New Testament by heart; he seduces Mathilde de La Mole by disgorging a
few of his favourite, well-worn lines from La Nouvelle Helo'ise (RN, 541), phrases he
has already tried out to some effect on Amanda Binet (RN, 372); and finally, he
woos madame la marechale de Fervaques with a set of second-hand 'billets doux'
given to him by the Prince Korasoff (RN, 595-619). The significance of Julien's
mastery of the correct formula of words in this specific context is underlined by
Sandy Petrey who judiciously points out:
the most crucial single moment in Julien's ascendent career is his
decision to employ Korasoffs letters according to the
accompanying instructions. It is uniquely because of the letters that
Julien conquers Mathilde and uniquely because of the conquest
that he becomes the chevalier de la Vernaye.450
In the Stendhalian universe, mastery of the word confers on the speaker a 'un
pouvoir absolu, irremediable':451 it is the novel's integrationist force par excellence,
and one which Julien fully internalises. As Michel Crouzet writes: 'le langage est la
regie oil il faut se mettre et se perdre, ordre lointain et negateur du moi. [...]. Comme
toute institution, il humilie le moi et le trahif 452 Through a studied manipulation of
speech, Julien manages to negate and betray his capacity for authentic encounters
while at the same time both hiding from public view and still ruthlessly pursuing his
Napoleonic agenda. The words of the epigraph to part 1, chapter 22 of the novel - 'la
parole a ete donnee a Thomme pour cacher sa pensee' (RN, 344) - could hardly ring
truer.
449
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Turning to our fourth novel, one could easily be forgiven for thinking that few
integrationist forces assail Renee Mauperin. After all, it is Renee's fundamental core
of difference which forms the principal focus of the novel. As a result, it would be
easy to envisage her as a highly non-conformist individual whose separatist
tendencies are always given free rein. One nineteenth-century critic takes just such a
view: 'cherchez bien, apres avoir ferme le livre, dans vos souvenirs de romans, vous
ne lui trouverez pas de soeurs. Elle est fille unique';453 while another eulogises:
'aucun pli de convention n'a fausse sa [Renee's] svelte et vibrante nature'.454 Such
approaches are surely inaccurate, however, as they overlook the fact that Renee is
subject to a weighty set of integrationist forces even if these do not account for the
novel's principal focus. Renee is no alien figure who is entirely unlike her family or
friends even if her essential alterity still clearly distinguishes her from all others in
the novel. In reality, she simply must exhibit certain 'plis de convention' if she is to
survive on a day-to-day basis, a fact demonstrated by her obviously continuing to be
regarded as a prize asset on the marriage market. To exemplify the way in which
Renee shares many of the attributes and values common to the rest of her family,
gender and social class and the way in which she is as compliant with many of the
integrationist pressures acting on her as Julien is, I shall undertake a brief analysis of
the novel's opening chapter.
One critic has argued that this chapter fails to establish a sufficiently firm basis for
the development of the novel's subsequent action: 'la scene du bain campe un
personnage qu'on ne doit plus revoir [Reverchon]; le mariage qui s'appretait
s'evanouit avant d'avoir pu entrer dans l'oeuvre', complains Robert Ricatte, 'on est
loin des preambules de Balzac, si necessaires a 1'action'. 55 Ricatte ignores the fact,
however, that several of the novel's central themes - word-weariness, courtship
rituals, marriage refusals - are introduced in this chapter. Most significant of all is the
introduction of a fourth key trope when Renee complains of 'la scie d'etre
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obey if her behaviour is to be regarded as 'convenable': she must for instance 'pincer
le monosyllable tout le temps'; 'faire la grue'; 'rester a bavardichonner avec les
personnages de son sexe'; or 'peindre que des roses a raquarelle' (RM, 52-3). Renee
herewith points to the full syntax of behaviour out of which she must generate
suitable actions, and which, if contravened, will see range of sanctions and
reprimands swiftly imposed. She confides for instance: 'j'ai ete assez grondee pour
qa par maman!' (RM, 52); and admits that on the occasions when she has used oil
paints: 'qa desole ma famille' (RM, 53). Renee's self-normalising behaviour thus
surely contradicts Saint-Victor's argument that 'aucun pli de convention n'a fausse
sa [Renee's] svelte et vibrante nature'456 - after all, how would she ever have reached
this stage of her life and still remained a suitable bride-to-be without exhibiting at
least some 'plis de convention'? From this river scene, we learn that despite finding
conformity a 'scie', Renee still abides by what is expected of her and has largely
accepted and internalised the norms which others lay out for her: for example, she
still goes through the rituals of courtship even though she spurns her many suitors'
propositions; and she still acquiesces with the view that the only types of 'spectacle'
an unmarried woman should watch in Paris are those put on at the Opera-Comique
even if she would prefer to be reading or making her own music at her piano. From
this short analysis of chapter one, it is clear that Renee spends her life, in large part,
positioned well within the bounds of what is expected of her and of novelistic
'vraisemblance'. Yet this point tends to become obscured by the fact that, in terms of
its narrative time of around two to three years, the novel focuses primarily on the
few, brief manifestations of her core of difference. While Renee's separatist desires
may become apparent - albeit fleetingly - through her piano playing, her refusal to
marry, or her attitude towards language, she nonetheless recognises that when it
comes to her non-conformity, 'il ne faut pas que qa depasse une certaine petite
moyenne' (RM, 53). When she does exceed that 'moyenne', external forces bear
down on her to bring her back into line. Fler father, for example, has banned her from
playing Chopin's 'Funeral March' on the piano while her mother wishes to mould
her into the kind of woman who will marry one of the 'partis les plus convenables'
456
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(RM, 97) courting her attention in a similar way to how her sister Henriette married
'le premier homme « bien » qu'on lui avait presente, sans hesitation, sans trouble, du
premier mouvement' (RM, 157). One telling example of the integrationist sanctions
imposed on Renee can be found in the scene in which Renee and her mother are
preparing to go to an art exhibition:
Renee fut un peu etonnee de voir sa mere venir a sa toilette,
s'occuper d'elle, lui faire mettre son chapeau le plus frais. « C'est
que, vois-tu, maintenant, ces expositions, c'est si couru, lui dit
Mme Mauperin, en lui refaisant son noeud de chapeau, il faut que
tu sois mise comme tout le monde ». (RM, 155, my italics)
The phrase 'mise comme tout le monde' seems particularly significant in a symbolic
rather than a literal sense. Renee must be put or placed physically within the bounds
of the 'convenable' and must be subjected to what Foucault calls the 'sanction
normalisatrice'.457 Such 'codage instrumental du corps'458 leads to every detail of her
life being closely surveyed and checked upon, from the knot in her hat to the type of
paints she may use, as if in an illustration of Foucault's thesis on 'la societe
disciplinaire'.
Notre societe n'est pas celle du spectacle, mais de la surveillance;
sous la surface des images, on investit les corps en profondeur;
derriere la grande abstraction de l'echange, se poursuit le dressage
minutieux et concret des forces utiles [...]. La belle totalite de
I'individu n'est pas amputee, alteree par notre ordre social, mais
l'individu est soigneusement fabrique selon toute une tactique des
forces et des corps.459
The 'belle totalite' of Renee is thus 'soigneusement fabriquee' by others while, at the
same time, she takes an active role in her own self-fabrication or self-normalisation.
She is normalised by others such as her father and mother and directed towards
integration into the prevailing doxa but, crucially, like Julien Sorel, she also
normalises her own behaviour.
457






In this chapter we have seen that the lives of the four protagonists are structured
along similar lines to the life of the Laingian schizophrenic. All four hold separatist
values, the force of which push them centrifugally away from the centre towards a
position of subversive marginality. Indeed, their separatist desires are prone to the
same fears of engulfment and implosion which Laing attributes to the schizophrenic.
More precisely, they are each prey to the fear that their separatist ideals will be
engulfed by a threatening, normalising outside world which exerts on them a strong
centripetal force in an attempt to counter-act and nullify their difference. So strong
and pervasive are these opposing, centripetal pressures that the four protagonists'
separatist ideals would have little chance of survival and fulfilment in such a hostile
environment if they did not adopt a range of defence mechanisms which are similar
to those which Laing argues the schizophrenic employs as a means of fending off
his/her fears of engulfment and implosion. In the next chapter of part III, I take each
of these defence mechanisms - isolation, depersonalisation and disembodiment - and
demonstrate that in the period leading up to each of their 'mad' actions, the four
protagonists also employ these defence mechanisms as a means not of defending
their entire beings, as is the case for the schizophrenic, but of protecting and also
attempting to fulfil their separatist ambitions.
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PART III Chapter Two:
Defence of the Realm
lei tout decourage le vol en droite ligne d'un esprit
qui tend a I'avenir. (LL, 648)
You know you're walking around with a mask on, and you
desperately want to take it off and you can't because everybody
else thinks it's your face.460
460
Pat Barker, Regeneration (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 242.
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Isolation
Laing argues that 'the main manoeuvre used to preserve identity under pressure of
the dread of engulfment is isolation' (TDS, 44). This is the only position which can
provide 'a measure of safety' (TDS, 45) from the fears of engulfment and implosion
which relatedness to others necessarily incites. Turning first of all to Louis Lambert,
it is evident that Louis's isolation comes about both by default and by choice. When
in Paris, he is 'contraint de vivre sans cesse en lui-meme' (LL, 645), and is 'force de
[s]e replier sur [lui]-meme' (LL, 646) because he shares 'avec personne ses exquises
jouissances' (LL, 645): 'je n'y vois aucun homme aimer ce que j'aime, s'occuper de
ce qui m'occupe, s'etonner de ce qui m'etonne' (LL, 646), he laments. At the same
time, however, his isolation is also a partly self-imposed strategy which forms part of
a reaction against Te monde [qui] est impitoyable pour l'inventeur, pour tout homme
qui medite' (LL, 648). Consequently, he spends much of his life 'comme un
anachorete des premiers temps de l'Eglise' (LL, 645). This term 'anachorete'
assumes a particular significance if we bear in mind that the Anchorites withdrew
into the desert both to devote themselves to a deeper level of religious contemplation
and to escape from the persecution inflicted by Roman emperors. Like them, Louis
wishes to devote himself to the pursuit of his philosophical ambitions as well as,
crucially, to escape the persecution or potential engulfment of his separatist beliefs:
'a moi aussi, il me faut le desert' (LL, 657), he declares, because in Paris T'homme
eprouve une foule de besoins qui le rapetissent' (LL, 648). Isolation thus relieves
Louis of some of the persecuting but still tempting and potentially implosive forces
which he encounters in Paris: 'je ne me craindrais pas dans une grotte au desert, et je
me crains ici [Paris], Au desert, je serais avec moi-meme sans distraction' (LL, 648),
and thus fully able to devote himself to the pursuit and possibly eventual
achievement of his separatist ideals. Isolation is thus synonymous with a form of
liberation for Louis, albeit a freedom which is short-lived. We find a further example
of the liberating function of isolation at the College de Vendome where Louis and
the tale's narrator are put 'en prison' as punishment for several minor class-room
misdemeanours and thus find themselves cut off from their constantly mocking class¬
mates. 'In prison', they can both feel 'plus fibres que partout ailleurs' (LL, 619).
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Incarceration and liberation thus not only go hand in hand, but liberation seemingly
comes about only as a result of the isolation which incarceration precipitates.
In Zola's novel, Claude Lantier also withdraws into isolation, albeit in the company
of his partner Christine, largely as a consequence of his disastrous first showing at
the Salon. In Bennecourt, he believes he will be 'si loin des autres' (LO, 143) who
had mocked so scornfully his artistic efforts: 'saignant encore de son echec du Salon,
ayant le besoin de se reprendre, [Claude] aspirait a ce grand repos de la bonne nature;
et il aurait la-bas le vrai plein air, il travaillerait dans l'herbe jusqu'au cou, il
rapporterait des chefs d'oeuvre' (LO, 145). While Louis had hoped his withdrawal
into the 'desert' would facilitate the protection and pursuit of his Promethean
philosophical studies, Claude, as we can see from this last extract, expects this move
to Bennecourt will both ring-fence his ambitions to 'tout voir, tout faire, tout
conquerir' (LO, 203) from detrimental Parisian influences and open up a space in
which they can finally be realised. Indeed, for a time, Bennecourt exercises the
desired effect on him as he is able to paint 'avec une vision nouvelle, comme
eclaircie, d'une gaiete de tons chantante. Jamais encore il n'avait eu cette science des
reflets, cette sensation si juste des etres et des choses, baignant dans la clarte diffuse'
(LO, 155). What better place could there be, after all, for the leader of the 'ecole du
plein air' to work than in the 'plein air' of Bennecourt, a place unsullied by the
artistic and environmental contamination of Paris?
This dynamic whereby isolation provides protection and a space for potential self-
realisation is visible in Le Rouge et le Noir and Renee Mauperin, although only to a
more limited extent in both these novels because, as we saw in the last chapter, Julien
and Renee are complied with the integrationist forces surrounding them to a much
greater extent than Claude and Louis. In relation to Renee Mauperin, Renee retreats
into isolation only rarely in the chapters of the novel which precede her 'madness'
because of her extensive self-normalising behaviour. In subsequent chapters,
however, isolation becomes one of the essential characteristics of her existence.
These instances of isolation will therefore be examined in greater detail in the
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following chapter of part III. A few examples of Renee's isolationist tendencies do
nonetheless early on in the novel: for example, Renee is seen at her happiest and
most inspired when seated alone at her piano. Secondly, in rejecting the advances of
so many suitors, Renee maintains a position of isolation out of a wish to defend her
core of difference from engulfment by the waves of mind-numbing anonymity which
would almost inevitably wash over her were she to be married to a man like
Reverchon. Furthermore, her wish to spend as little time as possible in the company
of her contemporaries is underlined right from the novel's opening line when she
replies: 'j'y avale ma langue... Voila l'effet que me fait le monde, a moi' to
Reverchon's question 'vous n'aimez pas le monde, mademoiselle?' (RN, 51).461 We
saw in the previous chapter that this extract epitomizes Renee's unease with speech
and the 'deja-dit'; at the same time, however, her unwillingness to enter into the
speech community can also be seen a wish to withdraw into physical seclusion and
not merely linguistic isolation.
Turning to Le Rouge et le Noir, instances of Julien withdrawing into isolation in the
pre-shooting chapters of the novel are fewer in number than those we have seen in
relation to Louis Lambert or L'CEuvre. Yet they still occupy highly prominent
positions in the novel, and none more so than Mien's first entry onto the narrative
stage where we find him perched high above the machinery of his father's saw-mills
reading the book 'qu'il affectionnait le plus, le Memorial de Sainte-Helene'' (RN,
233). A little later he withdraws into isolation once again to read this Tivre inspire'
(RN, 265) which stokes up 'sa folle passion pour Napoleon' (RN, 265) and which
acts as his 'unique regie de sa conduite et objet de ses transports' (RN, 265).
Interestingly, isolation once again becomes explicity linked with liberation - 'il y
trouvait a la fois bonheur, extase et consolation dans les moments de decouragement'
(RN, 265) - as it enables him to 'retrempjer] son ame' and 'se fortifier' (RN, 265). A
further significant example of the liberatory potency of isolation arises shortly before
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A similar exchange occurs much later in the novel when Renee is visiting an exhibition in
the company of her mother and sister. 'Vous n'allez pas dans le monde, mademoiselle?
demanda Mme de Saint-Sauveur a Renee, assise aupres d'elle.
- Non, madame,ye ne I'aime pas, repondit assez sechement Mile Mauperin'. (RM, 160, my
italics)
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Julien's departure for the Besanpon seminary. Relieved for a few weeks of his
teaching responsibilities, Julien finds himself with unexpected time and space on his
hands.
Une chose etonnait Julien: les semaines solitaires passees a
Verrieres, dans la maison de M. de Renal, avaient ete pour lui une
epoque de bonheur. II n'avait rencontre le degout et les tristes
pensees qu'aux diners qu'on lui avait donnes; dans cette maison
solitaire, ne pouvait-il pas lire, ecrire, reflechir sans etre trouble? A
cliaque instant, il n'etait pas tire de ses reveries brillantes par la
cruelle necessite d'etudier les mouvements d'une ame basse, et
encore afin de la tromper par des demarches ou des mots
hypocrites. (RN, 362)
Isolation thus lifts some of the integrationist pressures off his shoulders and allows
him to 'voir clair dans son ame' (RN, 275). A further example of this important
recuperative effect of isolation can be found in his reaction to his initial seduction of
Mathilde.
II monta a cheval et chercha les endroits les plus solitaires d'une
des forets voisines de Paris. II etait bien plus etonne qu'heureux.
Le bonheur qui, de temps a autre, venait occuper son ame, etait
coinine celui d'un jeune sous-lieutenant qui, a la suite de quelque
action etonnante, vient d'etre nomme colonel d'emblee par le
general en chef; il se sentait porte a une immense hauteur. Tout ce
qui etait au-dessus de lui la veille etait a ses cotes maintenant ou
bien au-dessous. Peu a pen le bonheur de Julien augrnenta a
mesure qu'il s 'eloignait. (RM, 543, my italics)
By way of contrast, the narrator offers this telling insight into the view of isolation
which is held by those who do not share his separatist ideals.
Si les cinq ou six complaisants qui temoignaient une amitie si
paternelle a Julien eussent deserte l'hotel de La Mole, la marquise
eut ete exposee a de grands moments de solitude; et, aux yeux des
femmes de ce rang, la solitude est affreuse: c'est l'embleme de la
disgrace. (RN, 457)
The other item on Julien's separatist agenda - his capacity to reach an authentic form
of genuine mutual relatedness - also benefits from periods of isolation, particularly
in Vergy where Julien is, crucially, 'seul' and therefore 'loin des regards des
hommes' (RN, 264). This in turn enables him to 'se livr[er] au plaisir d'exister [...]
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heureux, libre' (RN, 264). It is there that 'pour la premiere fois de sa vie, il etait
entraine par le pouvoir de la beaute' (RN, 279). Most significantly, it is also there, in
a place where they are isolated from the petty political manoeuvrings of Verrieres,
that Julien's and Louise de Renal's mutual love is born, a love which contained the
potential to offer him a route towards the fulfilment of his yearning for authenticity:
'en un mot, rien n'eut manque au bonheur de notre heros, pas meme une sensibilite
brulante dans la femme qu'il venait d'enlever, s'il eut su en jouir' (RN, 299).462
It has become apparent in this section that isolation both protects the protagonists'
separatist ideals and offers them a space in which they could potentially be realised.
However, this situation only represents one part of the story for the four of them
because, at the same time, isolation also causes them considerable pain and suffering.
What makes for possibly the most starkly symbolic example in this respect can be
found in the scene in Le Rouge et le Noir where Julien is first introduced, his nose
pressed deep into the Memorial de Sainte-Helene. This self-imposed isolation not
only distracts him from fulfilling the role others have laid out for him, but it also
leads him into conflict and potentially mortal danger - 'il allait tomber douze ou
quinze pieds plus bas, au milieu des leviers de la machine en action, qui l'eussent
brise' (RN, 232) - a death which would have been inflicted, as if out of revenge, by
the very mechanism he had been neglecting to supervise. While the consequences of
isolation are perhaps less dramatically life-endangering elsewhere in the novels, they
still remain an important preoccupation for the four protagonists. Because Louis has
been pushed into isolation partly out of a lack of a kindred spirit with whom to share
'ses exquises jouissances' (LL, 645), he finds it an intensely painful position: 'force
462 Victor Brombert has written the best-known discussion of the motif of the prison cell as a
source of liberation and happiness. (The Romantic Prison: The French Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1978)). In his chapter on Stendhal, he points to the prominent
position occupied by this theme through La Chartreuse de Parme, even long before Fabrice
del Dongo comes to be incarcerated. In his discussion of Le Rouge et le Noir, however,
Brombert focuses only on the actual prison cell in which Julien is held after the shooting as
providing the only source of liberation and would thus seem to overlook the many other
instances of (admittedly temporary) liberation and isolation which foreshadow Julien's
eventual epiphany in his prison cell, such as those which have been outlined in this section.
We shall, of course, return to the significance of Julien's 'conversion' in the following
chapter.
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de me replier sur moi-meme, je me creuse et je souffre' (LL, 646). Given that
isolation provides Louis with a space and an opportunity to realise his ideals, it
seems reasonable to ask why it should also cause him such suffering. To respond to
this question, we need to turn again to The Divided Self and to Laing's descriptions
of the consequences of the schizophrenic's self-imposed isolation.
Laing writes that while relatedness with other people presents a fundamental threat to
the autonomy of the ontologically insecure individual, such a person finds himself in
the paradoxical position of also requiring relatedness in order to have any firm sense
of existence. Laing describes in the following terms the consequences endured by
one patient of a period of self-imposed isolation which lasted for several months: 'he
felt he was dying inside; he was becoming more and more empty, and observed a
progressive impoverishment of his life mode' (TDS, 53). To fend off such
impoverishment, this individual would then 'emerge into social life for a brief foray
in order to get a 'dose' of other people, but 'not an overdose'. He was like an
alcoholic who goes on sudden drinking orgies between dry spells, except that in his
case his addiction [...] was to other people' (TDS, 53). Laing maintains that the
schizophrenic is caught up in a double bind of not being able to sustain a sense of his
own being without the presence of others, and also not being able to sustain it with
the presence of others. By way of illustration, Laing describes the existence of two
opposing poles within the ontologically insecure individual's being: one of complete
isolation and one of complete merging of identity. Between these two poles the
schizophrenic oscillates violently:
he comes to live rather like those mechanical toys which have a
positive tropism that impels them towards a stimulus until they
reach a specific point, whereupon a built-in negative tropism
directs them away until the positive tropism takes over again, this
oscillation being repeated ad infinitum. (TDS, 53)
Of all the four novels, such a dynamic is most clearly visible in Louis Lambert,
particularly in the several lengthy letters which Louis sends from Paris to his uncle in
Blois.
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Je souffre obscurement. Ce resultat est aussi providentiel que peut
l'etre le sort de la fleur inconnue qui meurt au fond d'une foret
vierge sans que personne en sente les parfums ou en admire l'eclat.
De meme qu'elle exhale vainement ses odeurs dans la solitude,
j'enfante ici dans un grenier des idees sans qu'elles soient saisies.
(LL, 652)
Not only does Louis desperately want to share his discoveries with others, he finds
that without them being known and developed by others they may as well not exist:
without relatedness, his toils are largely in vain. The novel's narrator also suggests
that 'son coeur, sans doute constamment froisse dans ce gouffre d'egoi'sme, dut
toujours y souffrir; il n'y rencontra peut-etre ni amis pour le consoler, ni ennemis
pour donner du ton a sa vie' (LL, 645). What emerges from these last two quotations
is an awareness that, much like the Laingian schizophrenic, Louis requires
relatedness to others for his ideals to be realised as without it, they become
impoverished. He goes on to tell Pauline that he had spent his time in Paris
'desesperant d'etre jamais ecoute' (LL, 664). Yet in spite of the suffering which
isolation brings with it, Louis still dreads and flees relatedness because of the
engulfing effect it could have on his separatist ideals. In a significant parallel, then,
with the Laingian schizophrenic's inability to sustain his sense of being both with
and without the presence of others, that which represents the nemesis of Louis's
ideals - relatedness - also acts as the prerequisite to their realisation. We shall see
more of the devastating effect of this principle on Louis's life both later in this
chapter as well as in the following chapter. For the moment, however, it suffices to
make clear that in the period leading up to Louis's 'mad' and 'invraisemblables'
actions, he finds himself in the invidious position of being unable to survive both
with and without relatedness.
A further problematic aspect of relatedness concerns Louis's goal to 'determiner les
rapports reels qui peuvent exister entre l'homme et Dieu' (LL, 652). It is logical,
given such aims, that he should know and understand the current 'rapports' before
coming to any conclusions as to how such links might be improved. Similarly, if he
wants to bring about 'une societe [non pas] constitute comme la notre' (LL, 653), or
if, as Michel Lichtle purports, 'Louis ira chercher dans le desert les lois constitutives
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de l'humanite future, de la Jerusalem nouvelle',46'1 he needs to be fully conversant
with the ways of the 'old' Jerusalem before he can build a new one. The 'world'
around him thus exerts a strong attraction over him for what he can learn from and
about it - he is after all carrying out 'une longue et patiente etude [...] de cette
societe' (LL, 647). At the same time, this fecund source of learning shows him just
how repellent and fundamentally unattractive the world is, but also, crucially, how
potentially engulfing it can be. He fears, for example, that he could end up being
contaminated by the money-obsessed ideologies which dominate the existence of the
'they' in Paris: 'ici, l'homme eprouve une foule de besoins qui le rapetissent' (LL,
648), he worries. Recognising that he must 'embrasser tout ce rnonde' even if it is
only to Tetreindre pour le refaire' (LL, 655), Louis is stuck in the unenviable
position of wanting to transform the world around him thanks to his superior
philosophical insights and knowledge yet understanding at the same time that any
foray in that world or any display of his separatist goals could well lead to their
extinction through their being compromised by the ways of the world.
Another crucial manifestation of the double bind provoked by isolation and
relatedness arises out of Louis's relationship with Pauline. We have seen already that
Louis seeks out a position of isolation as a means of safeguarding the autonomy of
his separatist ideals. One might wonder then why Louis should develop 'un amour
sans bornes' (LL, 659) for Pauline de Villenoix given that such emotions necessarily
exert a highly detrimental effect on his separatist ideals. As the narrator declares
emphatically: 'cette passion fut un abinre oil le malheureux [Louis] jeta tout, abime
oil la pensee s'effraie de descendre, puisque la sienne, si flexible et si forte, s'y
perdit' (LL, 659). With this love for Pauline, Louis establishes a clear parallel with a
further aspect of Laingian theory in respect of isolation and relatedness: namely, that
love and understanding, and not merely overt hostility or agression, can provoke
engulfment. Laing writes: 'to be understood correctly is to be engulfed, to be
enclosed, swallowed up, drowned, eaten up, smothered, stifled in or by another
person's supposed all-embracing comprehension' (TDS, 45). Yet Louis goes one
463
Lichtle, 'Introduction', p. 577.
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step beyond the Laingian position as he appears to welcome this engulfment that
could ultimately be fatal to his separatist ideals: 'en vous voyant je n'imaginais
presque rien au-dela [...]. J'ai senti que ma vie n'etait plus en moi, mais en vous. II
n'est plus pour moi qu'une femme dans le monde, comme il n'est plus qu'une seule
pensee dans mon ame' (LL, 661). That love and understanding can lead to
engulfment finds clear illustration in Louis Lambert at only a late stage of the novel -
specifically at around the time of what we have been terming his 'mad' actions. For
that reason, I will examine the double-edged nature of the relationship between
Pauline and Louis in greater detail in the next chapter which deals with events
subsequent to the protagonists' 'mad' actions.
Turning to Zola's L 'CEuvre, Claude Lantier provides an informative case-study of the
suffering isolation necessarily involves. We have already seen that isolation is a
prerequisite to the completion of Claude's artistic revolution and that he moved to
Bennecourt both to safeguard his ideals from the marauding integrationist forces at
work on him in Paris and to carve out a space in which they might potentially be
realised. The question arises: why does life in Bennecourt become untenable for
Claude if the conditions necessary for artistic creation appear to be fulfilled there?
Why does he yearn to return to Paris? He had, after all, discovered many years earlier
that: 'Paris pourrissait tout, rendait tout a la terre qui, sans jamais se lasser, reparait la
mort'.464 Here, once again, Laing's argument regarding the simultaneous
indispensability and impossibility of relatedness holds true: despite Claude's fighting
talk about wanting to blow up the institutions of the Parisian artistic world, he still
desperately seeks recognition and approval from those same institutions. For
example, he continues to think of artistic achievement in terms of gaining public
acclaim at the Salon and therefore persists in submitting works to the jury even
though they are almost without exception ignominiously rejected. His reaction before
the public mockery of his 'Plein air' painting at the first Salon des Refuses is
particularly revealing in this regard. Despite being otherwise so scathing about the
artistic philistinism of the viewing public, when 'une masse enorme, grouillante,
464
Zola, Le Ventre de Paris, in Les Rougon-Macquart, I, p. 802.
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confuse, en tas, [...] s'ecrasait devant son tableau' (LO, 126), his distress becomes
all too obvious: 'un grand froid le glaqait. Son cceur s'etait arrete un moment, tant la
deception venait d'etre cruelle' (LO, 126). Claude thus simultaneously despises and
demands the approbation which Paris can accord. Further evidence as to why Claude
leaves Bennecourt for Paris can be found in a later extract: 'Paris l'appelait a
l'horizon, le Paris d'hiver qui s'allumait de nouveau. II y entendait le grand effort des
camarades, il y rentrait pour qu'on ne triomphat sans lui, pour redevenir le chef,
puisque pas un n'avait la force ni l'orgueil de l'etre' (LO, 168). Claude understands
all too well that the city of Paris and the all-consuming, all-engulfing relatedness he
encounters there has the potential to crush his artistic revolution; yet he also knows
that he must nonetheless still return there both because his artistic ideals are founded
on the re-modelling of the Parisian city-scape and because he demands to be the one
to lead the artistic insurgents to victory.465 A further clue as to why Claude's isolated
position in Bennecourt ends up becoming untenable and why he must return to Paris
lies in the second aspect of the Laingian view of isolation introduced in our
discussion of Louis Lambert: namely, that engulfment can be brought about not only
by hostile integrationist forces, but also by love and understanding. This is clearly
exemplified in Claude and Christine's life at Bennecourt which had initially assumed
idyllic proportions:
des joumees adorables se suivirent, des mois coulerent dans une
felicite monotone. [...] Le matin, ils s'oubliaient tres tard au lit,
malgre les rayons qui ensanglantaient les murs blanchis de la
cliambre, a travers les fentes des volets. Puis, apres le dejeuner,
c'etaient des flaneries sans fin, de grandes courses sur le plateau
plante de pommiers, par des chemins lierbus de campagne, des
promenades le long de la Seine. (LO, 146)
Yet this apparently paradisiacal bliss is far from propitious to Claude's work and
artistic ideals.
II commenfa une etude du coteau du Jeufosse, avec la Seine au
premier plan; mais, dans file ou il s'etait installe, Christine le
suivait, s'allongeait sur fherbe, pres de lui, les levres
465 For a detailed study of the central paradox of Claude's life which Bennecourt symbolises,
see the aptly titled work by Francine Huwart, 'Bennecourt: Paradis ou cimetiere des illusions
pour Claude Lantier' (Unpublished 'memoire de D. E. A.': Universite de Paris X -Nanterre,
1995).
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entr'ouvertes, les yeux noyes au fond du bleu; et elle etait si
desirable dans ces verdures, dans ce desert oil seules passaient les
voix murmurantes de l'eau, qu'il lachait sa palette a chaque
minute. (LO, 147, my italics)
In the same way that Louis Lambert's love for Pauline de Villenoix spells potential
disaster for his separatist ideals, the allure of Christine constantly serves to deflect
Claude from his seditious projects and thereby threatens his artistic ideals with
engulfment: 'c'etait elle qui l'enveloppait de cette haleine de flamme, ou
s'evanouissaient ses volontes d'artiste' (LO, 147). Love and understanding, even in
the seemingly blissful surroundings of Bennecourt, can also only consume Claude's
separatist desires. As a consequence, he has no option but to flee their cloistered life
at Bennecourt.466
The dynamic whereby 'to be understood correctly is to be engulfed, swallowed up,
drowned' (TDS, 45) is also clearly visible in relation to Le Rouge et le Noir. For
Julien, however, the sequestration which is so propitious to the pursuit of his ideals
of authenticity and beauty and which he enjoys so briefly in the company ofMme de
Renal at Vergy only stands in the way of his second, Napoleonic set of separatist
aspirations and the integrationist strategies he employs to bring these aspirations to
life. Therefore, even if 'pour la premiere fois de sa vie, il etait entraine par le pouvoir
de la beaute' (RN, 279) and even though his 'bonheur' is complete (RN, 299) when
cloistered away with Mme de Renal, he simply cannot allow himself to be 'sincere'
in this state of isolation in case his ambitions to 'faire les choses extraordinaires'
(RN, 287) end up becoming nullifed and engulfed. Julien thus transmutes his nascent
love for Mme de Renal into fears regarding the sustainability of his worldly,
Napoleon-inspired ambitions:
mon Dieu! etre heureux, etre aime, n'est-ce que ya? [...] Comme le
soldat qui revient de la parade, Julien fut attentivement occupe a
repasser tous les details de sa conduite. - N'ai-je manque a rien de
ce que je me dois a moi-meme? Ai-je bien joue mon rolel (RN,
299, my italics)
456 The dynamics of the relationship between Claude and Christine are, of course, crucial to
the novel's denouement and, as such, will be discussed further in the following chapter.
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As will become evident in the next section of this chapter, this form of role-playing
also assumes an enormous importance in all four novels.
Depersonalisation
The second defence mechanism which Laing argues a schizophrenic employs as a
means of fending off the constant fear of engulfment and implosion is
'depersonalisation'. In this section, I will explore the extent to which Laing's views
on this point find echo in the existential positions of the four protagonists. As with
his explanation of ontological insecurity, Laing begins his exposition of the process
of depersonalisation by examining first the role it plays in the lives of non-
schizophrenic individuals. He argues that this technique is in fact 'universally used as
a means of dealing with the other when he becomes too tiresome or disturbing. One
no longer allows oneself to be responsive to his feelings and may be prepared to
regard him and treat him as though he had no feelings' (TDS, 46). This universal
aspect to the technique means that in every-day life 'a partial depersonalisation of
others is [...] regarded as normal if not highly desirable' (TDS, 47). As such,
most relationships are based on some partial depersonalising
tendency in so far as one treats the other not in terms of any
awareness of who or what he might be in himself but as virtually
an android robot playing a role or part in a large machine in which
one too may be acting yet another part. (TDS, 47)
Laing argues that in everyday interaction, individuals prefer to 'cherish if not the
reality, at least the illusion that there is a limited sphere of living free from this
dehumanisation' (TDS, 47). Yet based on the evidence of his therapeutic experience,
Laing believes this to be one illusion which the ontologically insecure individual is
unable to sustain.
If one experiences the other as a free agent, one is open to the
possibility of experiencing oneself as an object of his experience
and thereby of feeling one's own subjectivity drained away. One is
threatened with the possibility of becoming no more than a thing in
the world of the other, without any life for oneself, without any
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being for oneself. In terms of such anxiety, the very act of
experiencing the other as a person is felt as virtually suicidal.
(TDS, 47)
Experience of the other can feel 'deadening and impoverishing [...] Any other is then
a threat to his 'self (his capacity to act autonomously) not by reason of anything he
or she may do or not do specifically, but by reason of his or her very existence'
(TDS, 47). How does the schizophrenic individual react to the potentially deadening
and impoverishing effect of relatedness with another? We have already seen in this
chapter that isolation is one option. To explain a second option, Laing gives the
example of one of his patients who was particularly prone to the fear of
depersonalisation: 'he turned the other person into a thing in his own eyes, thus
magically nullifying any danger to himself by secretly disarming the enemy' (TDS,
48). This individual lived in constant fear of being seen only as a thing by others and
would consequently attempt to deflect and return that potentially petrifying and
impoverishing gaze s/he so feared. Such a movement was indispensable to this
particular patient because:
by destroying, in his own eyes, the other person as a person, he
robbed the other of his power to crush him. By depleting him of his
personal aliveness, that is, by seeing him as a piece of machinery
rather than as a human being, he undercut the risk to himself of this
aliveness either swamping him, imploding into his own emptiness,
or turning him into a mere appendage. (TDS, 48)
To what extent are these techniques of depersonalisation recognisable in the four
novels? Claude Lantier surely makes for a text-book example when his
dehumanising artistic gaze falls on his wife Christine. In a reflex which has
understandably attracted the attention and ire of feminist critics, Christine 'perd toute
identite et humanite au profit de la femme peinte toujours plus souveraine dans
l'esprit et le coeur de Tartiste'.467 From her first entry into the novel, she is stripped
both physically of her clothes so she can act as Claude's model and symbolically of
her status as a woman.
467 Christine Raynier-Pauget, 'L'CEuvre: La femme faite modele', Les Cahiers Naturalistes,
73 (1999), 199-206 (p. 204).
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II [Claude] se mit a dessiner, d'un air profondement heureux. Tout
son trouble, sa curiosite charnelle, son desir combattu,
aboutissaient a cet emerveillement d'artiste, a cet enthousiasme
pour les beaux tons et les muscles bien emmanches. Deja, il avail
oublie la jeune fille, il etait dans le ravissement de la neige des
seins, eclairant l'ambre delicat des epaules. (LO, 19, my italics)
Romana Lowe points out that Christine in fact shares her destiny with Nana: both
a r o
exist 'to be merely a body'. It is a destiny in which Christine, 'dedaignee et trahie'
(LO, 346), ends up being sacrificed to Claude's artistic dreams and to his all-
consuming 'metier ou il la ravalait, un emploi de mannequin vivant, qu'il plantait la
et qu'il copiait, comme il aurait copie la cruche ou le chaudron d'une nature morte'
(LO, 240). This 'defaite de son corps' (LO, 243) which Christine must endure sees
her reduced 'a son role d'objet, beau de couleur' (LO, 242) and 'a un role de servante
[...] jetee a I'ecart' (LO, 344). If, then, the Laingian schizophrenic depersonalises
others as a means of forestalling the petrifying gaze which he fears being turned on
him/her, Claude, in a parallel sense, depersonalises his wife Christine in order to
protect his ideals of artistic innovation and revolution from the threat of engulfment
and petrification, and also to protect them from the possibility of never being
realised. Claude's technique of depersonalisation thus not only helps him to ring-
fence his ideals from nefarious outside influences, it also contributes significantly to
expediting their realisation. This is exemplified by the fact that Claude's masterpiece
En plein air, for which Christine posed as model on many occasions, comes to
exercise many years later the kind of seminal influence over the artistic field which
Claude could only have dreamt of, given the virulence of the scorn and mockery with
which it was initially received. Sandoz tells him:
Et regarde! Tu devrais etre fier, car c'est toi le veritable
triomphateur du Salon, cette annee. II n'y a pas que Fagerolles qui
te pille, tous maintenant t'imitent, tu les as revolutionnes depuis
ton Plein air, dont ils ont tant ri... Regarde, regarde, en voila
encore un de Plein air, en voila un autre, et ici, et la-bas, tous,
tous! (LO, 296)
Depersonalisation is thus one of the few techniques which Claude employs with any
degree of success.
",fi
Romana W. Lowe, The Fictional Female: Sacrificial Rituals and Spectacles ofWriting in
Baudelaire, Zola, and Cocteau (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 107.
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Feminist critics have perhaps been a little too quick to overlook the fact that this
depersonalised gaze is turned not merely towards Christine but also towards their son
Jacques whom Claude undoubtedly comes to view 'as a piece of machinery rather
than as a human being' (TDS, 48) in his dream of achieving his artistic ambitions. At
Bennecourt, for example, Claude admonishes Jacques for daring to move when he
should be sitting still and modelling for his father: Jacques must sit 'sage comme une
image'. Highly disturbingly, his father 'ne le couvait plus que de ses yeux d'artiste,
comme un motif a chef d'oeuvre' (LO, 154). Indeed it is only after his premature
death, when he is as fully and as literally 'depersonalised' as is possible, that Jacques
provides the most fecund but macabre inspiration for his father's imagination and,
indeed, satisfaction.
Bientot, il n'y eut plus la son fils glace, il n'y eut qu'un modele, un
sujet dont l'etrange interet le passionna. Ce dessin exagere de la
tete, ce ton de cire des chairs, ces yeux pareils a des trous sur le
vie, tout 1'excitait, le chauffait d'une flamme. II se reculait, se
complaisait, souriait vaguement a son oeuvre. (LO, 267)
Jacques's destiny, like that of his mother, is to become a depersonalised sacrifice on
the altar of his father's separatist ideals. As Dominique Jullien puts it: 'la mort du
petit Jacques prend dans ce contexte la valeur d'un sacrifice humaine a l'Idole. Dans
le cerveau rnalade de Claude Lantier, il n'y a pas de place pour deux "enfants", et
fun doit done ceder place a l'autre'.469
Depersonalisation as a technique for guarding and fostering one's separatist ideals
plays an equally significant role in Le Rouge et le Noir where Julien initially only
sees Mme de Renal only in starkly dehumanised terms. She is but 'un ennemi' (RN,
266), and a 'riche heritiere' (RN, 258) whose function is little more than to provide
him with fodder with which he can feed his voracious sense of Napoleonic 'devoir'
(RN, 265, 273 or 294). Julien's depersonalisation of Louise de Renal is so intense
that for much of the novel he fails to grasp the magnitude of the opportunity for love
469
Dominique Jullien, 'Le "Ventre" de Paris: Pour une pathologie du symbolisme dans
L 'CEuvre d'Emile Zola', French Forum, 17 (1992), 281-99 (p. 295).
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and authentic and genuine mutual relatedness on offer. The narrator makes this point
clear: 'au lieu d'etre attentif aux transports qu'il faisait naitre, et aux remords qui en
relevaient la vivacite, Tidee du devoir ne cessa jamais d'etre presente a ses yeux'
(RN, 298). Julien's affective myopia is soon emphasised again: 'en un mot, rien
n'eut manque au bonheur de notre heros, pas meme une sensibilite brulante dans la
femme qu'il venait d'enlever, s'il eut su en jouir' (RN, 299).
Julien repeats this process of depersonalisation at the Hotel de La Mole, only here
with an increased intensity. Mathilde de La Mole in particular becomes 'a piece of
machinery' (TDS, 48) in the complex mechanism he constructs to catapult himself to
what he thinks will be Napoleonic glory. Indeed, the dynamics of the relationship
between Julien and Mathilde are determined by the extent to which and the success
with which one party manages to depersonalise the other. For example, Mathilde
depersonalises Julien by having him live out her role-playing fantasies: reduced to a
bit-part role in her eyes, Julien can play Boniface de La Mole to her Marguerite de
Navarre (RN, 504); while elsewhere she likes to imagine him playing the role of
Danton (RN, 514-5) or even of the revolutionary Roland to her Mme Roland (RN,
354).
Triompher si completement d'un penchant si puissant la rendait
parfaitement heureuse. Ainsi ce petit monsieur comprendra, et une
fois pour toutes, qu'il n'a et n'aura jamais aucun empire sur moi.
Elle etait si heureuse, que reellement elle n'avait plus d'amour en
ce moment. (RN, 567)
It is this depersonalising 'mepris' stripping him of his 'singularite' which Julien can
tolerate least. When Mathilde claims 'j'ai horreur de m'etre livree au premier venu'
(RN, 546), Julien is so furious that 'il eut ete le plus heureux des hommes de pouvoir
la tuer' (RN, 547), such is the injury inflicted on his sense of honour by having been
reduced to the lowly depersonalised status of 'premier venu'. Throughout his time at
the Hotel de La Mole, Julien becomes most swollen with pride and happiness when
he succeeds, precisely like the schizophrenic, in diverting Mathilde's depersonalising
gaze back onto herself. When 'cette orgueilleuse' (RN, 615) is at his feet, he is 'ivre
de bonheur et du sentiment de sa puissance' (RN, 527). On such occasions, Mathilde
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correspondingly see-saws to feelings of intense despondency: 'la vanite de Mathilde
etait furieuse contre lui. [...] Je me suis donne un maltre\ se disait mademoiselle de
La Mole en proie au plus noir chagrin' (RN, 545, my italics). Her distress is thus
greatest when she realises that she has allowed herself to become a depersonalised
'slave' to Julien, her master.
The process by which Julien depersonalises both Louise de Renal and Mathilde de
La Mole comes across perhaps most clearly of all in the way that he views his
liaisons with them largely only in terms of 'devoir' (RN, 269 or 546). Yet this is a
duty only to himself and his personal sense of 'amour-propre' given that he relegates
both women to the status of dehumanised trophies in the private battle which he is
waging against M de Renal and, later, Mathilde's aristocratic suitors such as the
marquis de Croisenois. The two women are transformed in Julien's eyes into mere
stepping-stones which he believes will lead him to his ultimate goal of Napoleonic
pre-eminence. 'Aux armesV (RN, 526), he cries out when he decides it is his duty to
his sense of honour to seduce Mathilde de La Mole. As a result, he can gloat:
je triomphe du marquis [de Croisenois] en ce sens qu'il sera tres
faclie d'avoir un successeur, et plus faclie encore que ce successeur
soit moi. Avec quelle hauteur il me regardait liier soir au cafe
Tortoni, en affectant de ne pas me reconnaitre! avec quel air
mechant il me salua ensuite quand il ne put plus s'en dispenser!
(RN, 539-40)
From this analysis of Le Rouge et le Noir, it is clear that the degree of
depersonalisation to which Julien subjects those around him increases as the novel
progresses. As to why this might be the case, it is helpful to turn again to Laing's
work as he offers us a cogent explanation for this element of Julien's behaviour in a
later part of his discussion of the ontologically insecure individual's attitude towards
depersonalisation.
The more one attempts to preserve one's autonomy and identity by
nullifying the specific human individuality of the other, the more it
is felt to be necessary to continue to do so, because with each
denial of the other person's ontological status, one's own
ontological security is decreased, the threat to the self from the
other is potentiated and hence has to be even more desperately
negated. (TDS, 52)
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Laing's words would seem to ring true, once again, with regard to the existential
position of Julien Sorel.
We have seen so far in this section that Julien Sorel and Claude Lantier depersonalise
others around them as a means of protecting their separatist ideals from the threat of
engulfment, and even, where possible, as a means of reaching a position in which
they believe those ideals could ultimately be realised. We have also seen that this
mechanism replicates the Laingian schizophrenic's depersonalisation of others as a
means of protecting the autonomy of his existence. This specific mechanism does
not, however, seem to operate in Louis Lambert or Renee Mauperin. What can be
established, on the other hand, is that many secondary characters in all four novels -
thereby including Louis Lambert and Renee Mauperin - are presented narratorially as
already fully depersonalised or as 'pieces ofmachinery' (TDS, 48) which necessarily
lack any distinguishing characteristics. Louis Lambert's school-boy colleagues at the
College de Vendome provide a fine example in this respect as they are distinguished
from one other only by age and are otherwise grouped into homogenised 'sections
nominees les Minimes, les Petits, les Moyens et les Grands' (LL, 598). Their
teachers, too, are apparently bereft of individualising traits, and are referred to only
as 'les Peres' (LL, 599). In Renee Mauperin, Renee's suitors are presented as
depersonalised and devoid of individuality as we saw in the previous chapter -
Denoisel goes so far as to describe one representative such suitor as a mere
'mannequin de tailleur' (RM, 80). The same principle holds true in relation to several
members of Renee's family: Henri Mauperin, for example, is 'un jeune doctrinaire'
(RM, 103) who is 'medicore avec eclat' (RM, 107) - Ta froideur de la jeunesse [...]
marquait toute sa personne, il paraissait serieux et on le sentait glace' (RM, 103);
while Renee's sister Mme Davarande is likewise presented in depersonalised terms.
She is after all:
par excellence « la femme du monde ». [...] Donnant tout an
monde, Mme Davarande lui empruntait tout, ses idees, ses
jugements, ses manieres de charite, ses formules de cceur, ses
famous de sensibilite. Elle avait les opinions des femmes coiffees
chez Laure. Elle pensait ce qu'il etait distingue de penser, comme
elle mettait ce qu'il etait distingue de mettre. (RM, 157)
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Both Henri and Henriette (and the diminuitive and derivative form of her name
speaks volumes for the level of individuality she is accorded) actively participate in a
lengthy and ultimately successful process of self-depersonalisation; both seem only
too willing to act as 'an android robot playing a role or part in a large machine'
(TDS, 47). In Le Rouge et le Noir, Julien Sorel is surrounded by feature-less,
dehumanised 'ennemis' (RN, 382) and 'sales paysans' (RN, 195) in the Besan?on
seminary, while at the Hotel de La Mole he must endure the tedious, supercilious, but
always undifferentiated 'jeunes gens' (RN, 457). Finally, in Zola's L 'GEuvre,
Claude's detractors at the two Salons are presented as an amorphous 'masse
grouillante' (LO, 126). What seems clear, then, is that those protagonists who are
closely associated with the integrationist forces militating against the four main
characters' separatist desires are presented in starkly depersonalised terms.
Sometimes monstrous, sometimes banal beyond parody, they all the time retain the
potential to engulf and normalise the four principal protagonists' centrifugal,
separatist tendencies.
In this survey of the mechanisms of depersonalisation, we have so far seen three
aspects: the fear which depersonalisation engenders among our protagonists; their
consequent depersonalisation of others; and the narratorial presentation of other
'comparses' in a depersonalised light. There is one further and utterly crucial aspect
which has not been examined: namely, that in the goal of preserving one's sense of
ontological insecurity, the schizophrenic comes to precipitate the one fear he most
dreads. Laing maintains that 'it seems to be a general law that at some point those
very dangers most dreaded can themselves be encompassed to forestall their actual
occurrence' (TDS, 51). While such a strategy may appear paradoxical and even
potentially suicidal, it remains, in Laing's view, the most common and most effective
approach for a schizophrenic to adopt.
To forego one's autonomy becomes the means of secretly
safeguarding it; to play possum, to feign death, becomes a means
of preserving one's aliveness [...] To turn oneself into a stone
becomes a way of not being turned into a stone by someone else.
(TDS, 51)
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We see, admittedly, little evidence of this reflex in the chapters of L 'CEuvre which
precede Claude's suicide because Claude constantly refuses to water down his
artistic ideals at any stage of the novel. Nonetheless, we shall see in the following
chapter of part III that this strategy of 'turning oneself into a stone' becomes vitally
significant towards the very end of his life. In Le Rouge et le Noir, however, this
aspect of depersonalisation assumes considerable importance. Firstly, at the
Besanqon seminary, it is vital that Julien should restrict the most attention-grabbing
aspects of his ' singularity': 'il faut [...] surtout cacher ce que je sens' (RN, 377), he
realises. A similar but more rapid process of self-depersonalisation or 'de-
singularisation' is also called for at the Hotel de La Mole where Julien foregoes the
autonomy of his capacity for authenticity and also hides from public view his
Napoleonic desires as a means of protecting them both from the possibility of
engulfment. 'Comment tuer cette sensibilite si humiliante?' (RN, 471), he asks
himself, only too aware that such emotions are ultimately incompatible with the 'bon
ton' and restraint which is expected of him in Parisian salon society. In a similar
vein, he acquiesces with the marquis's suggestion that when he wears 'un habit bleu',
his employer will consider him to be 'le fils cadet de mon ami le due de Chaulnes'
(RN, 482). In this regard, Victor Brombert argues in his canonical study of the
Stendhalian novel that Julien's process of self-depersonalisation should be seen as a
form of controlled dissemblance which is vital to the reader's appreciation of Le
Rouge et le Noir.
Almost prophetically, Stendhal seems to have diagnosed the
despotism of a totalitarian world and the dilemmas of the
oppressed spirit that chooses to "agree" in order to be able to think
differently. The problem, as modern intellectuals have found out
the bitter way, is how to maintain a private conscience and
heretical views under oppressive regimes. Controlled dissembling
may not be the noblest or most heroic weapon, but its artful
practice can be made to serve noble resistance and secret liberty.470
Yet Julien becomes so adept at this 'controlled dissemblance' or this 'de-
singularisation' that he appears to convince himself that this self-depersonalised role
is in fact the only possible role or route he can adopt during his 'voyage
470 Victor Brombert, Stendhal: Fiction and the Themes of Freedom (New York: Random
House, 1968), p. 89.
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d'apprentissage'. Indeed, it seems that his capacity for authenticity has become
largely redundant and irrelevant by the time he is promoted to the rank of 'lieutenant
de hussards' thanks to the string-pulling influence of the marquis de La Mole.
Moreover, Julien can surely hardly be furthering his Napoleonic ambitions by
becoming an officer in an army loyal to the king and by marrying into one of the
richest aristocratic families in Paris. To return to Brombert's words above, one
wonders just how much 'noble resistance' Julien really is putting up at this point,
how much 'secret liberty' he really does succeed in conserving, and how much his
integrationist strategies have in fact ended up taking up his life and choking off the
flames of his separatist fires.
In Renee Mauperin, this 'self-normalising' aspect to depersonalisation also takes on
great significance if we remember that Renee foregoes much of her own autonomy -
or, more precisely, the autonomy of her separatist desires - through self-directing
herself towards the integrationist goals which, in part at least, others have laid out for
her. Laing's description of this self-depersonalising reflex therefore goes some way
towards explaining why Renee should normalise herself in the manner which we saw
in the previous chapter: she does so in order to anticipate and thwart the normalising
and necessarily depersonalising and destructive gaze which she fears others will
direct at her and at her separatist tendencies. She must forego the autonomy or
pursuit of her separatist ideals because if she were to attempt to achieve them, they
could easily end up being fully engulfed or 'turned into stone' by her hostile family
and contemporaries. As Laing points out: 'the self dreads to become alive and real
because it fears that in so doing the risk of annihilation is immediately potentiated'
(TDS, 112).
By way of conclusion to this examination of the process of depersonalisation, we
could turn to the pithy description proposed by Laing towards the end of The Divided
Self of the basic defence mechanism which the schizophrenic employs in order to
defend his core of inner aliveness and which entraps him/her within another double
bind. Laing's description is one which has enormous resonance with the existential
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position of Renee Mauperin as well with that of the other three protagonists in the
period leading up to their seemingly irrational acts, and it is one which merely
requires the substitution of the phrase 'their separatist desires' for the word 'being'.
The basic defence mechanism 'can be stated in its most general form as: the denial of
being as a means of preserving being' (TDS, 150).
Disembodiment
Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that the existence of an ontologically
insecure individual is characterised by a lack of 'an over-riding sense of personal
consistency or cohesiveness' (TDS, 42). Such a lack of corporeal consistency is
central to the third method of defence with which the schizophrenic attempts to fend
off the fears of engulfment and implosion. Laing argues that as a general rule the
ontologically insecure 'come to experience themselves as primarily split into a mind
and a body. Usually they feel most closely identified with the 'mind" (TDS, 65). In
the final section of this chapter, I want to examine the relevance of this feeling of
'disembodiment' to the pre-turning point chapters of each novel.
As was the case when he began his description of the state of ontological insecurity
by first outlining the opposing state of ontological security, Laing opens his
exploration of the mechanisms of the process of disembodiment by first examining
the individual's sense of'embodiment'.
Everyone, even the most unembodied person, experiences himself
as inextricably bound up with or in his body. In ordinary
circumstances, to the extent that one feels one's body to be alive,
real, and substantial, one feels oneself alive, real, and substantial.
Most people feel they began when their bodies began and that they
will end when their bodies die. (TDS, 66)
As a result of feeling embodied, one
has a sense of being flesh and blood and bones, of being
biologically alive and real: he knows himself to be substantial [...].
He is implicated in bodily desire, and the gratifications and
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frustrations of the body. The individual thus has as his starting-
point an experience of his body as a base from which he can be a
person with other human beings. (TDS, 67)
Such certainties do not necessarily hold true, however, for an ontologically insecure
person. Such an individual
experiences his self as being more or less divorced or detached
from his body. The body is felt more as one object among other
objects in the world than as the core of the individual's own being.
Instead of being the core of his true self, the body is felt as the core
of a false self which a detached, disembodied, 'inner', 'true' self
looks on at with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may
be. (TDS, 69)
This disembodied true self assumes the function of little more than an onlooker,
watching all the body does and refusing to engage directly in any action. 'Its
functions come to be observation, control, and criticism vis-a-vis what the body is
experiencing and doing, and those operations which are usually spoken of as purely
'mental" (TDS, 69). The ring-fenced true self enters into little or no relatedness with
others because the job of 'managing' reality and communicating with the outside
world has been delegated to a front-man, a 'personality' or a 'false self system'
which is primarily identified with the body. This false self system is all that is seen
by others and can consequently, but mistakenly, be adjudged to represent the entirety
of that individual's being. As a result, the ontologically insecure individual who finds
himself in a disembodied position may appear to others to be acting normally
whereas in fact he is only 'maintaining his outward semblance of normality by
progressively more and more abnormal and desperate means' (TDS, 138): for
example, by taking refuge in lengthy bouts of isolation or in depersonalising others
around him. The false self thus performs an act, but one with which his true self can
never permit itself to become identified. It is an act on which 'no footprints or
fingerprints of the 'self shall have been left' (TDS, 89) for the simple reason that 'if
the [ontologically insecure individual] were what his act was, then he would be
helpless and at the mercy of any passer-by' (TDS, 88). In other words, without the
retaining dam which the false self represents, the true self would face total
engulfment.
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In his discussion of disembodiment, Laing emphasises that these techniques of
disembodiment are not restricted to schizoid individuals. For example, 'prisoners in
concentration camps tried to feel that way, for the camp offered no possible way out
either spatially or at the end of a period of time. The only way out was by a psychical
withdrawal 'into' one's self and 'out of the body' (TDS, 78). For schizoid
individuals, however, there is one decisive difference: 'the splitting is not simply a
temporary reaction to a specific situation of great danger, which is reversible when
the danger is past. It is, on the contrary, a basic orientation to life' (TDS, 79). This
sense of disembodiment as a 'basic orientation to life' is well illustrated by the words
of one patient encountered by Laing, who, when set upon by armed attackers, saw
the assault as entirely pointless. After all:
he had no money on him. They could get nothing from him. 'They
could only beat me up but they could not do me any real harm'.
That is, any damage to his body could not really hurt him. [...] In
such a situation he felt much less afraid than the ordinary person,
because from his position he had nothing to lose that essentially
belonged to him. (TDS, 68)
All that was essential to this man - his core of 'inner aliveness' or his authentic, true
self - had already been protected from all possible harm by the buffer zone which his
body acts as. He could experience reality only at one remove because of the
existence of this intermediary false self which the true self would increasingly look
on as both a foreign being and an indispensable protective shield. To further
characterise the relationship between the true and false selves, Laing draws once
again on the concepts put forward by Martin Buber in relation to the possibility of an
authentic relationship between God and man. Laing writes: 'there is a quasi-it-it
interaction instead of an I-Thou relationship' (TDS, 82) between the true and false
selves.471 We saw in the part I review of the founding principles of anti-psychiatric
therapy that such a 'quasi-it-it interaction' had initially been triggered off by a
family's or society's 'disconfirmatory' behaviour which actively disconfirmed the
individual's true self or sense of authenticity and promoted in its stead a false self




whose existence provokes feelings of shame and guilt. This 'it-it relationship', a
source of guilt and shame though it may be, nonetheless becomes crucial to the
schizophrenic's survival as it offers the true self a safe haven in which it may be
protected from the potentially engulfing and devastating ravages of the outside
world: 'he will never [have] to give himself away to others' (TDS, 71). 'He' and all
that is essential to him has become inviolable.
In the examination of the other defence mechanisms which the ontologically insecure
individual turns to, we saw that the processes of isolation and depersonalisation not
only protect his sense of being and identity from engulfment and implosion, but they
also act as a potential vehicle for self-realisation. So it is, too, with the defence
mechanism of disembodiment as Laing argues that it both erects a protective shield
around the unembodied true self and facilitates the realisation of the ideals of 'inner
honesty, freedom, omnipotence and creativity' (TDS, 89) - and note here that the
italics are Laing's. To explain how this situation may come about, it should be
remembered that because the 'true self has become separated from the outside
world, 'it is never revealed directly in the individual's expressions and actions, nor
does it experience anything spontaneously or immediately' (TDS, 80). While the
individual's exchanges with other people are therefore 'fraught with pretence,
equivocation [and] hypocrisy' (TDS, 83), the schizophrenic individual seeks by
contrast 'to achieve a relationship with himself that is scrupulously sincere, honest,
frank' (TDS, 83). An inner honesty is thus both cherished and realised in the
unobservable, unalienable sanctuary which disembodiment has established. The
consequence is thus that the true self is able to sustain the phantasy of being
'omnipotent and completely free' (TDS, 84). In the final pages of this chapter, I will
address the important fact that this omnipotence may only be experienced in the form
of a phantasy and that 'the more this phantastic omnipotence and freedom are
indulged, the more weak, helpless, and fettered it becomes in actuality' (TDS, 84).
For the moment, however, I wish to focus on the fact that as a result of the process of
disembodiment 'the [disembodied, true] self is able to enjoy a sense of freedom'
472 See pp. 24-6.
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(TDS, 86) which it has no other means of experiencing: 'quite clearly, authentic
versions of freedom, power, and creativity can be achieved and lived out' (TDS, 89).
The schizophrenic thus believes that disembodiment offers him/her a chance to be
'true-to-him/herself and that it could un-do some of the 'disconfirmatory' knots in
which s/he has become bound up. Laing argues: 'without reference to the objective
element it [the true self] can be all things to itself - it has unconditioned freedom,
power, creativity' (TDS, 89). Later in The Divided Self, Laing reformulates this view
as follows: 'there is a constant dread and resentment at being turned into someone
else's thing, of being penetrated by him, and a sense of being in someone else's
power and control. Freedom then consists in being inaccessible' (TDS, 113). I want
to turn now to Loins Lambert and explore some of the points of convergence and
divergence between the aspects of Laingian concept of disembodiment which we
seen so far, on the one hand, and, on the other, the life of Louis Lambert in the
portion of the novel which precedes his castration and collapse into insanity.
Laing's description of the co-existence of a false and true self would appear to have
no direct parallel within Louis's life. If ever there were an individual whose self is
not subject to the kind of fundamental split which Laing describes, it is surely Louis
Lambert. His entire existence is given over to the pursuit of his separatist goals while
all the time integrationist forces external to him attempt to block the achievement of
these same goals. Louis does not therefore normalise his own behaviour nor does he
project a false self which covers up the inviolable true self in the way that Laing
describes in relation to the schizophrenic. Does this state of affairs invalidate our
Laingian analysis of Louis Lambert? I believe not given that Laingian theory and
Louis's life converge again around Louis's attempt to cut off from his body the
pursuit of his separatist ideals in a parallel sense to that which Laing attributes to the
disembodying schizophrenic. More importantly, the outcome of this disembodied
state is the same for Louis as it is for the schizophrenic: both view disembodiment
and the inaccessibility it provides, firstly, as a safe haven either for their authentic
core of being as in the case of the ontologically insecure individual or for his
separatist ideals as in the case of Louis Lambert, and, secondly, as a route towards
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freedom and Promethean omnipotence. How is the process of disembodiment
reflected in Louis Lambert in the pre-turning point chapters of the novel? An interest
in separating his 'vie interieure' from his outer body has been a constant theme of
Louis's life. As children, for example, he and the narrator would enjoy acting out this
suppression of the physical, taking their games almost to the point of sado¬
masochism:473
nous nous passionnames pour la catalepsie, et, avec l'ardeur que
les enfants mettent dans leurs entreprises, nous essayames de
supporter la douleur en pensant a autre chose. [...] Je montais sur
l'estomac de Lambert, et m'y tenais plusieurs minutes sans lui
causer la plus legere douleur. (LL, 678)
Furthermore, Louis tells the tale's narrator that his gift of re-modelling nature is
predicated on an ability to withdraw from his physical presence into his innermost
being.
Quand je le veux [...], je tire un voile sur mes yeux. Soudain je
rentre en moi-meme, et j'y trouve une chambre noire oil les
accidents de la nature viennent se reproduire sous une forme plus
pure que la forme sous laquelle ils sont d'abord apparus a mes sens
exterieurs. (LL, 593)
There emerge several further important instances of his ability to soar into the ether
while his physical body remains grounded within the walls of the College: he is 'cet
aigle qui voulait le monde pour pature' but who 'se trouvait entre quatre murailles
etroites et sales' (LL, 614). Entrapment within the physical bounds of the school does
not, however, prevent his imagination from taking flight, as exemplified by the effect
which reading has on him:
souvent [...], j'ai accompli de delicieux voyages, embarque sur un
mot dans les abimes du passe, comme l'insecte qui pose sur
quelque brin d'herbe flotte au gre d'un fleuve. Parti de la Grece,
j'arrivais a Rome et traversais l'etendue des ages modernes. (LL,
591)
This ability to re-create within his mind entire geographical and historical scenes is
astonishing:
473 This point regarding the sado-masochistic overtones to Louis's process of disembodiment
is investigated by Robert Smadja in his Corps et roman, p. 39.
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en lisant le recit de la bataille d'Austerlitz, [...] j'en ai vu tous les
incidents. Les volees de canon, les cris des combattants
retentissaient a mes oreilles et m'agitaient les entrailles; je sentais
la poudre, j'entendais le bruit des chevaux et la voix des homines;
j'admirais la plaine oil se heurtaient des nations armees, comrae si
j'eusse ete sur la hauteur du Santon. (LL, 593-4)
Louis's imaginative powers are so impressive that the narrator is in a position to
inform us:
quand il employait ainsi toutes ses forces dans une lecture, il
perdait en que/que sorte la conscience de sa vie physique [my
italics], et n'existait plus que par le jeu tout-puissant de ses organes
interieurs dont la portee s'etait demesurement etendue: il laissait,
suivant son expression, I'espace derriere lui. (LL, 594)
Both Louis and the narrator are capable of achieving this separation from the
physical body: 'notre vie etait done toute vegetative en apparence' (LL, 616). The
two are regularly chastised by their teachers on this very point: 'vous ne faites rien,
Lambert!' (LL, 608) is an allegation hurled regularly at Louis by 'les Peres'. Yet 'ce:
Vous ne faites rien, etait un coup d'epingle qui blessait au coeur' (LL, 608) given that
Louis is instead absorbed in a much deeper level of contemplation. The narrator
informs us that in the very widest sense he and Louis 'existions par le coeur et par le
cerveau. Les sentiments, les pensees etaient les seuls evenements de notre vie
scolaire' (LL, 616).
The intensity of Louis's investment in a disembodied spirituality is exemplified in
one highly significant scenario in which Louis and the narrator undertake an
afternoon walk through the Vendome countryside around the College.
Quand nous fumes arrives sur la colline d'oii nous pouvions
contempler et le chateau assis a mi-cote, et la vallee tortueuse oil
brille la riviere [...], Louis Lambert me dit: « Mais j'ai vu cela
cette nuit en revel » II reconnut et le bouquet d'arbres sous lequel
nous etions, et la disposition des feuillages, la couleur des eaux, les
tourelles du chateau, les accidents, les lointains, enfin tous les
details du site qu'il apercevait pour la premiere fois. [...] Je lui
demandai s'il n'etait pas venu a Rochambeau pendant son enfance,
ma question le frappa; mais, apres avoir consulte ses souvenirs, il
me repondit negativement. (LL, 620-1)
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In trying to work out how he could possibly have seen this landscape without ever
having visited it before, Louis posits the theory that he must be a 'homo duplex' (LL,
622).
Si le paysage n'est pas venu vers moi, ce qui serait absurde a
penser, j'y suis done venu. Si j'etais ici pendant que je dormais
dans mon alcove, ce fait ne constitue-t-il pas une separation
complete entre mon corps et mon etre interieur? [...] Ces faits se
sont accoinplis par la puissance d'une faculte qui met en ceuvre un
second etre a qui mon corps sert d'enveloppe, puisque j'etais dans
mon alcove et voyais le paysage. (LL, 621, my italics)
Louis's body thus performs the function of an envelope to his disembodied 'etre
interieur' paralleling the way in which, in Laing's view, the schizophrenic's
disembodied true self is enveloped and shielded by the embodied false self.
We have seen so far the co-existence within Louis of a strong interior, separatist
domain alongside the outer physical, embodied world. What of the productive
aspects of this co-existence which Laing argues for? To what extent does his denial
of the external body expedite the realisation of the ideals which are associated with
his 'vie interieure'? Is there a causal link between his process of disembodiment and
his ability to realise his separatist goals of discovering Tes lois constitutives de
1'humanite future, de la Jerusalem nouvelle',474 paralleling Laing's description of a
causal link between the schizophrenic's movement towards disembodiment and his
ability to realise 'authentic versions of freedom, power and creativity' (TDS, 89)? It
would appear, initially at least, that there is indeed a link, as is evidenced by Louis's
travails at the College. He may well feel 'plein de mepris pour les etudes presque
inutiles auxquelles nous etions condamnes', but as a direct result he comes to follow
'sa route aerienne, completement detache des choses qui nous entouraient' (LL, 615).
Similarly, we read that: 'dompte par les malheurs du college, [...] [Louis] se
contempla interieurement' (LL, 644). The most significant example of this causal
link, however, can be found in one particular description of Louis's every-day school
life.
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Attache sur un banc a la glebe de son pupitre, frappe par la ferule,
frappe par la maladie, affecte dans tous ses sens, presse par une
ceinture de maux, tout le contraignit d'abandonner son enveloppe
aux mille tyrannies du college. Semblable aux martyrs qui
souriaient au milieu des supplices, il se refugia dans les cieux que
lui entr'ouvrait sapensee. (LL, 612-3, my italics)
The more engulfing the torturous outside world becomes, the more detached from his
physical body his separatist goals become, and the more deeply he burrows into his
core of inner aliveness as a means of furthering his separatist goals. The state of
disembodiment does, then, seem to contribute to Louis moving towards a realisation
of his ideals of messianic pre-eminence which would otherwise have been unfulfilled
were he to have remained in a fully embodied state, thus providing a further parallel
between Laing's theories and the novels in question. Are there any further examples
in the other three novels of this type of disembodiment which we have witnessed in
relation to Louis Lambert and the resultant attempt to move towards the fulfilment of
separatist goals?
Turning to Le Rouge et le Noir, first of all, one salient example emerges in the pre-
shooting chapter of the novel entitled 'Une loge aux bouffes'. In a conversation
between Julien and Mathilde, we read: 'ah! se disait-il en ecoutant le son des vaines
paroles que prononpait sa bouche, comme il eut fait un bruit etranger' (RN, 616-7).
In this example, a form of disembodiment is clearly observable as Julien's physical
being is seemingly capable of producing sounds independently of the rest of him.
This instance aside, however, there seems to be little evidence of the type of physical
disembodiment which we saw was an important leitmotif of Louis Lambert. This is
not merely the case in Le Rouge et le Noir but also in L 'GLuvre and Renee Mauperin.
Does this dearth of examples relating to disembodiment therefore mean that Laingian
theory diverges too widely from the trajectory of these three novels for our anti-
psychiatric analysis to remain tenable? I would argue not for in the same way that
there were divergences and convergences between Laingian theory and Loins
Lambert there are also certain elements of Laing's descriptions of disembodiment
which correspond more closely than others to the existential positions of Julien,
Renee and Claude. While there may be little evidence of a programme of
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disembodiment undergone by these three protagonists on a literal level, or at least a
desire for it as in Louis's case, the processes which Laing outlines are nonetheless
replicated on a figurative level. What have so far been termed Julien, Renee and
Claude's 'separatist desires' may be identified with Laing's concept of the 'true self.
Similarly, the integrationist forces to which all three are subjected arguably
correspond with what Laing terms the schizophrenic's 'false self systems'. While we
therefore cannot posit a literal equivalence between, on the one hand, the false self
systems and the integrationist forces and, on the other, the separatist desires and the
true self, the descriptions which Laing gives of the interaction between the true and
false self systems find considerable resonance in the interaction between the three
protagonists' integrationist and separatist desires.
As a first example, the characteristics and outcomes of the schizophrenic's process of
disembodiment, as described by Laing, are clearly visible in the chapters of Renee
Mauperin which precede her untimely demise. We saw earlier that Renee is largely
compliant with the integrationist forces which aim to nullify her separatist alterity
and, furthermore, that her behaviour remains largely within the bounds of
'vraisemblance' even if this fact does not form the novel's principal focus. It can
therefore be argued that Renee projects to others a false self which acts as her front-
(wo)man, managing her contact with her family and contemporaries in a parallel
manner to the ontologically insecure individual's manipulation of the false self.
Whereas this projection of a false self takes place in a more literal sense in relation to
the schizophrenic, it is replicated on a figurative level with regard to Renee, relating
more to the values and ideals which she holds than to her wider existence than to her
body specifically. Her self-normalising behaviour has the effect of digging a
protective moat around the sanctuary of her separatist ideals, cutting them off and
guarding them from maurauding integrationist forces antithetical to their existence
and realisation. This procedure therefore parallels the way in which the
schizophrenic projects a false, embodied self in order to ring-fence his disembodied
core of inner aliveness off from an engulfing environment.
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Julien Sorel, like Renee, also normalises his behaviour ('il se de-singularise', we saw
earlier in this chapter) as a means of complying with many of the integrationist
forces at work on him, a procedure which is particularly evident with regard to his
manipulation of speech. The false self Mien projects in, for example, the Hotel de
La Mole is indeed all that is seen by others: certainly, many assume it represents the
entirety of his being. Laing's specific point that the schizophrenic who is caught in
this position is 'maintaining his outward semblance of normality by progressively
more and more abnormal and desperate means' (TDS, 138) echoes resonantly with
Julien's position in light of the increasing degrees of depersonalisation to which
Julien subjects others as he rises through the social strata of nineteenth-century
France, as we have seen in this chapter. No fingerprints of the twin elements of
Julien's separatist ideals - his capacity for authenticity and his Napoleonic ambitions
- can be found on the false self which others see at the Hotel de La Mole, so
carefully has he hidden them from public view. As Laing argues, this splitting into
true and false selves is an entirely necessary reflex as it allows Julien's separatist
goals to occupy an inviolable position and provides them with protection from an
environment which deems intolerable any manifestations of 'singularite' and the
'imprevu'.
We have seen so far, then, that the way in which the schizophrenic's process of
disembodiment and false self projection protects the authentic core of inner aliveness
from its fears of engulfment and implosion finds a close counter-part in Renee and
Julien's self-normalising behaviour. Do, however, these protagonists also achieve the
same goals of'inner honesty, freedom, omnipotence and creativity' (TDS, 89) which
the schizophrenic apparently realises as a result of his/her process of disembodiment?
To answer this question fully, it is necessary to return briefly to Laing's description
of the outcomes of disembodiment in order to discover why the realisation of these
goals is enormously problematic and ultimately unsustainable. Laing writes: 'without
reference to the objective element, it [the true self] can be all things to itself — it has
unconditioned freedom, power, creativity' (TDS, 89). Crucially, however, the true
self can only be 'omnipotent and free only in phantasy'' (TDS, 84, my italics). There
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is no sense in which disembodiment leads to the actual achievement of an
omnipotence and control which can be observed and verified by others. While this
statement may seem self-evident, its consequences are worth bearing in mind. Laing
writes:
its freedom and its omnipotence [i.e. that of the 'true self] are
exercised in a vacuum and its creativity is only the capacity to
produce phantoms. The inner honesty, freedom, omnipotence, and
creativity which the 'inner' self cherishes as its ideals, are
cancelled, therefore, by a coexisting tortured sense of the lack of
any real freedom, of utter impotence and sterility. (TDS, 89)
Laing's words in this last extract can surely be read as a remarkably apt summary of
the 'impotence and sterility' which characterise Claude's artistic efforts throughout
the novel. While Claude is like Louis in not being subject to the same self-
normalising forces which figure highly in the lives of Renee and Julien, he
nonetheless shares their fate in the sense that throughout his life his 'creativity is
only the capacity to produce phantoms' (TDS, 89). In other words, his creativity is
only the capacity to produce incomplete and often publicly derided works of art. So
total is Claude's lack of real freedom and his sterility and inability to translate into
pictorial reality his separatist ideals that in fact he ends up being reduced to the
humiliation of producing the most commerical and most 'integrationist' art forms of
all: 'il en arriva au dernier degre de la rnisere, il travailla « au numero »: des petits
marchands infimes, qui vendent sur les ponts et qui expedient chez les sauvages, lui
acheterent tant par toile, deux francs, trois francs, selon la dimension reglementaire'
(LO, 249). What is perhaps most significant about this form of artistic prostitution to
which he is reduced is the devastating effect it understandably has on his still
jealously guarded artistic ideals: he is rendered 'incapable d'une seance serieuse,
regardant son grand tableau en detresse, avec des yeux de damne, sans y toucher
d'une semaine parfois, comme s'il s'etait senti les mains encrassees et dechues'.
(LO, 249). From this extract, it is clear, then, that the more Claude is forced to
produce such art, the more unlikely he is to ever realise his separatist goals. In a
further direct parallel to the situation of the Laingian schizophrenic, then, the more
Claude indulges the phantasy of his omnipotent ability to 'tout voir, tout faire, tout
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conquerir' (LO, 201), the more he damages that same dream and prevents it from
ever becoming actualised on canvas.
This point also assumes considerable significance in relation to Louis Lambert. We
have just seen that Louis desires to move towards a literal form of disembodiment in
order to help him achieve his separatist goals in much the same way that the
schizophrenic undertakes his/her process of disembodiment in order to achieve the
goals of 'inner honesty, freedom, omnipotence and creativity' (TDS, 89). Yet, Laing
argues that the schizophrenic's creativity is 'only the capacity to produce phantoms'
(TDS, 89). So it is too with Louis as he cannot actually achieve his Promethean goals
of discovering Tes lois constitutives de l'humanite future, de la Jerusalem
nouvelle'475 via a process of disembodiment. This is because he also requires
relatedness to others if he wants to see them being realised, as we saw earlier in this
chapter, yet this relatedness necessarily implies embodiment which in turn acts as an
impediment to his ideals. Louis's move towards disembodiment therefore leads,
much like Claude's, only to 'a lack of real freedom, [and] utter impotence and
sterility' (TDS, 89). The more he attempts to disembody himself and the more he
avoids relatedness, then, the more he ends up blocking the realisation of his separatist
desires.
This double bind which we have explored here in relation to Claude and Louis's
pursuit of their separatist ideals has some resonance in the lives of Julien and Renee
even if it is not replicated in precisely the same manner. This is due to the fact that
they, unlike Claude and Louis, subject themselves to a lengthy process of self-
normalisation. Nonetheless, the outcomes of their 'de-singularisation' are remarkably
similar to the difficult position which Claude and Louis find themselves in, even if
the route by which they arrived there is somewhat different. To see how this is case,
it is useful to touch on one further aspect of Laing's description of the process of
disembodiment. Laing argues that if, as we have seen, the creativity which
disembodiment facilitates 'is only the capacity to produce phantoms' (TDS, 89), then
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it is evident that the true and false selves operate largely independently of one
another. In other words, for the schizophrenic: 'his false self does not serve as a
vehicle for the fulfilment or gratification of the [true] self (TDS, 96) - and, again, it
should be noted that the emphasis in this extract is Laing's. If the false self does not
provide gratification for the true self, what then is its function? Laing responds that
the false self is felt as largely autonomous and finally becomes fully compliant with
the demands and ambitions placed on the individual by others, or at least with the
demands and ambitions the individual believes others are placing on him/her. For the
schizoid, the false self s goal 'consists in becoming what the other person wants or
expects one to become while only being one's 'self in imagination or in games in
front of a mirror' (TDS, 98-9). These points seem particularly pertinent to the early
life of Renee Mauperin as her self-normalising behaviour, which we have so far
identified with the false self system, also does not act as a source of fulfilment or
gratification for her separatist ideals. On the contrary, her self-normalising behaviour
runs directly counter to these ideals, and, indeed, stands in the way of their
realisation. Renee spends most of her time being compliant with the demands and
ambitions placed on her by her family despite finding it all 'une scie' (RM, 52): be it
when she goes through the charade of being introduced to potential future husbands
or in behaving with the decorum and restraint which her mother expects of her. In a
similar fashion to how schizophrenics can only be their "self in imagination or in
games in front of a mirror' (TDS, 98-9), Renee can only allow her separatist ideals to
come to the fore on a few limited and fleeting occasions when seated at the piano, for
instance, or when she retreats into silence. Julien, too, is only standing in the way of
the achievement of his separatist ideals of authenticity by continuing with the
projection of his false self system at the Hotel de La Mole. Similarly, his separatist
ambition to become a figure of Napoleonic stature are hardly furthered by his
integrationist strategies of becoming an officer in an army loyal to the king, of
marrying into a wealth, aristocratic family, and of taking on the 'particule' de La
Vernaye.
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From the preceding analysis in this chapter, it emerges that Julien, Claude, Louis and
Renee are caught in a double bind: one in which their separatist ideals are prevented
from being achieved by the very same actions and defence mechanisms which were
designed to protect them in the first place. Laing's statement: 'what was designed in
the first instance as a guard or barrier to prevent disruptive impingement on the self
can become the walls of a prison from which the self cannot escape' (TDS, 138)
could act as a perceptive analysis of the double bind situation in which all four
protagonists are caught up: their separatist ideals are also trapped inside the very
walls which were designed to protect them. Of similar interest is the consequence of
this double bind, as described by Laing. The vicious circle in which the schizoid
individual is trapped is one in which the true self cuts itself off from all contact with
the outside world as a means of indulging in its fantasies of omnipotence and
freedom. However, the omnipotence and control which the true self believes it is
exercising prove to be no more than fantasy as they cannot extend into any sphere
beyond the interiorised. disembodied self shut off from the outside world. This much
we have seen already in this chapter. Laing goes on to say, however, that 'the more
this fantastic omnipotence and freedom is indulged, the more weak, helpless, and
fettered it becomes in actuality' (TDS, 84). In effect, because the fantasies indulged
in by the schizoid individual receive no sustenance from reality, or are never
"embodied in reality' or 'enriched by injections of 'reality', the true self becomes
even more empty and volatilised' (TDS, 85). The dangerous consequence of the
double bind in which the schizophrenic is entangled means that eventually even the
true self may start to lose its own solidity. 'Its omnipotence is based on impotence.
Its freedom operates in a vacuum. Its activity is without life. The self becomes
desiccated and dead' (TDS, 141). It is the very same risk which all four protagonists
run in the period which precedes their irrational actions: the very defence
mechanisms they rely upon to protect their separatist ideals not only prevent these
ideals from being realised at that moment, but also constantly defer the day when
their ideals will ever be realised. Consequently, a Laingian interpretation of the four
protagonists' lives would suggest that their separatist ideals also risk becoming
'desiccated and dead' (TDS, 141) in the period which precedes their 'madness'.
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Because it is increasingly unlikely that their separatist ideals will ever reach a point
of realisation, it is possible that they will in fact eventually wither and die.
In conclusion, then, we have seen in this chapter that all four protagonists employ a
series of defence mechanisms - isolation, depersonalisation and disembodiment - as
a means of dealing with the mutually exclusive sets of separatist and integrationist
forces at work in their lives. These mechanisms are similar to those which the
Laingian schizophrenic relies upon to protect his/her core sense of being. Yet the
mechanisms which the protagonists employ do not in fact lead to a more stable
modus vivendi because they do not bring the realisation of their separatist ideals any
closer nor do they lessen to any significant degree the burden of the integrationist
forces weighing on them. Indeed, the mechanisms they reply upon contribute to
deferring the day when their ideals could eventually be realised. The existential
positions which the four protagonists occupy as they near the point of committing
their allegedly 'mad' action are thus neatly summed up by Laing's description of the
double bind which he argues lies at the root of psychosis. In order to forestall the fear
that 'any impingement [of reality] will be total, implosive, penetrative, fragmenting,
and engulfing' (TDS, 83), the schizoid individual 'is prepared to write off everything
he is, except his 'self. But the tragic paradox is that the more the self is defended in
this way, the more it is destroyed' (TDS, 77). Psychosis therefore arises out of the
fact that
it is not possible to go on living indefinitely in a sane way if one
tries to be a man disconnected from all others and uncoupled even
from a large part of one's own being. [...] Without the 'self ever
being qualified by the other, committed to the 'objective' element,
and without being lived in a dialectical relationship with others, the
'self is not able to preserve what precarious identity or aliveness it
may already possess. (TDS, 139)
The protagonists' predicament is similarly alarming: in the period leading up to the
turning-point of each novel, they find themselves in a paradoxical situation in which
their separatist ideals have no hope of realisation and are not 'qualified by the other',
or at least not for a sufficiently substantial period of time. They are ensnared in a
double bind which sees the achievement of their separatist ideals being blocked and
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in fact undermined by the very mechanisms of isolation, depersonalisation and
disembodiment which had been brought into play as a means of protecting these
ideals. In the final chapter of part III, I therefore wish to examine how the four
protagonists disrupt and break out of this punishing double bind and this unliveable
situation by committing their 'mad' actions.
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PART ill Chapter Three:
Privileged Territories
Mais ceci est-il une prison? Est-ce la ce que j'ai tant redoute? Au
lieu d'apercevoir a chaque pas des desagrements et des
motifs d'aigreur, notre heros se laissait charmer
par les douceurs de la prison.476
L'idee, chez I'homme, se renforce et grandit de tout
ce qu'il ne donne pas a la femme.477
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Death of the 'true self'
Although we saw at the end of the last chapter that the four protagonists are caught
up in a difficult double bind, it could alternatively be argued that in the period which
immediately precedes their allegedly mad actions all is seemingly going well for
three of the four protagonists. In Le Rouge et le Noir, for example, just before he
reads Mme de Renal's damning letter, Julien finds himself in a position of limbo
awaiting the marquis de La Mole's decision over his marriage to Mathilde who
several weeks earlier had impatiently broken the news of their affair to her
astonished father. The marquis has already gifted Julien and his daughter extensive
and profitable lands in Languedoc as well as the title de La Vernaye so that Mathilde
may be 'sauvee de ce nom de Sorel' (RN, 639). If all goes to plan, Julien could soon
find himself a member of one of the richest and most glittering aristocratic families
in Paris. He seems to have succeeded in his wish to triumph over his aristocratic
"betters': 'j'ai su me faire aimer de ce monstre d'orgueil, ajoutait-il en regardant
Mathilde; son pere ne peut vivre sans elle, et elle sans moi' (RN, 639). Of greatest
significance of all to Julien is the fact that the marquis has had him parachuted into
the position of lieutenant in the fifteenth hussars regiment which, importantly for his
self-esteem, is T'un des plus brillants de l'armee' (RN, 641). Julien's wish to become
a figure of Napoleonic stature is well on its way to being fulfilled - indeed, 'sa joie
fut sans bornes' (RN, 639) upon learning of his sudden elevation. Tellingly, the first
detail which is provided in relation to Julien's nascent army career relates to that
archetypal Napoleonic image - a horse: 'M. le chevalier de La Vernaye montait le
plus beau cheval de l'Alsace qui lui avait coute six mille francs' (RN, 641). Julien's
fascination with the glittering badges of his success is reiterated in the following
passage:
Julien etait ivre d'ambition et non pas de vanite; toutefois il
donnait une grand part de son attention a l'apparence exterieure.
Ses chevaux, ses uniformes, les livrees de ses gens etaient tenus
avec une correction qui aurait fait lionneur a la ponctualite d'un
grand seigneur anglais. (RN, 642)
It would seem that at the time of reading Mme de Renal's letter Julien has joined the
ranks of those whom Mathilde had berated at the ball in the Hotel de Retz for failing
to display the type of decoration 'qui ne s'achete pas' (RN, 489). (The fact that Julien
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had had to buy the equestrian symbol of his Napoleonic status seems particularly
ironic in this light). On that occasion Mathilde had justifiably remarked: 'un titre de
baron, de vicomte, cela s'achete; une croix, cela se donne; mon frere vient de l'avoir,
qu'a-t-il fait? Un grade, cela s'obtient. Dix ans de garnison, ou un parent ministre de
la guerre, et Ton est chef d'escadron comme Norberf (RN, 490). As Sandy Petrey
explains in his Austinian reading of the novel: 'the titles, honors and decorations she
sees strike her as so many shams; none signifies anything except itself, none actually
represents reality, each is glaringly performative'.478 It is to just such a world which
Julien now belongs.
Turning to Zola's L'CEuvre, the prospects for Claude's future also look rather good,
for once, as he has seemingly abjured his artistic obsessions. Having previously
devoted his entire life to his canvas 'maitresses' (LO, 347), he is shaken from his
stupor by Christine's imprecations to see the unpleasant reality of his indecipherable
final painting: 'reveille-toi, ouvre les yeux, rentre dans l'existence' (LO, 347), she
begs him. In response, Claude takes a step back and is able to look at his work
afresh.
II s'eveillait enfin de son reve, et la Femme, vue ainsi d'en bas,
avec quelques pas de recul, l'emplissait de stupeur. Qui done
venait de peindre cette idole d'une religion inconnue? Qui l'avait
faite de metaux, de marbres et de gemmes, epanouissait la rose
mystique de son sexe, entre les colonnes precieuses des cuisses,
sous la voute sacree du ventre? Etait-ce lui qui, sans le savoir, etait
l'ouvrier de ce symbole du desir insatiable, de cette image extra-
humaine de la chair, devenue de for et du diamant entre ses doigts,
dans son vain effort d'en faire de la vie? (LO, 347)
Horrified, Claude slowly realises that his Promethean artistic ambitions to 'faire de la
vie' had ultimately been unachievable:
[il] compren[ait] bien que la realite elle-meme ne lui etait plus
possible, au bout de sa longue lutte pour la vaincre et la repetrir
plus reelle, de ses mains d'homme. [...] Est-ce done impossible de
creer? Nos mains n'ont-elles done pas la puissance de creer des
etres? (LO, 347-8)
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Not only does he see that his ambitions could never have been fulfilled, but he also
realises that they contained the potential to lead him into a dangerous abyss: 'beant, il
avait peur de son oeuvre, tremblant de ce brusque saut dans l'au-dela' (LO, 347).
Claude steps back from the brink and walks into the arms of Christine. 'II brula avec
elle, se refugia en elle [...]. « Eh bien! Sauve-moi!' (LO, 350), he implores her. This
she seems to manage as she cries out: 'enfin! tu es a moi! il n'y a plus que moi,
1'autre est bien morte!' (LO, 350). With Christine's painted rival now humbled,
Claude can experience happiness and be taken 'loin de sa misere, oubliant, renaissant
a une vie de felicite' (LO, 350). Forsaking his separatist ideals in this way promises
him not just a life of 'bonheur', but of 'felicite'. The religious overtones to this term
seem crucial as they signify that Claude will experience, in the words of Senancour,
'un bonheur qui parait complet, et qui s'annonce permanent'.479 A new life is thus
opening up for Claude: he is being re-born in an almost evangelical sense, converted
by the Christ-like figure of Christine. The result of this re-birth is that he decides: 'je
brulerai mes tableaux, je ne travaillerai plus' (LO, 350), and also that Christine and
he can end up experiencing a night of passion like no other they have known during
in their relationship.
Christine et Claude, a tatons avaient roule en travers du lit. Ce fut
une rage, jamais ils n'avaient connu un emportement pareil, meme
aux premiers jours de leur liaison. Tout ce passe leur remontait au
coeur, mais dans un renouveau aigu qui les grisait d'une ivresse
delirante. L'obscurite flambait autour d'eux, ils s'en allaient sur
des ailes de flamme, tres haut, hors du monde, a grands coups
reguliers, continus, toujours plus haut. [...] Ils repartirent, dans le
vertige de leur chevauchee a travers les etoiles. Leurs ravissements
recommenpaient, trois fois il leur sembla qu'ils volaient de la terre
au bout du ciel. Quel grand bonheur! comment n'avait-il pas songe
a se guerir dans ce bonheur certain? Et elle se donnait encore, et il
vivrait heureux, sauve, n'est-ce pas? maintenant qu'il avait cette
ivresse. (LO, 350-1, my italics)
The role played by love and by a female partner is similarly crucial in Balzac's Louis
Lambert. From the letters which Lambert sends Pauline de Villenoix in the period
leading up to their marriage and his attempted self-castration, it seems fair to say that
479
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his 'amour sans homes' (LL, 659) for Pauline has transformed his life. 'J'avais trop
souffert', is how he describes his life before meeting Pauline. His soul had been
'brisee par des travaux inutiles, consumee par des craintes qui me font douter de moi,
rongee par des desespoirs qui m'ont souvent persuade de mourir' (LL, 663). Now,
instead, 'le bonheur' reigns in his life.
Pauline, le regard par lequel vous m'avez annonce le bonheur a
tout a coup rechauffe ma vie et change mes miseres en felicites.
[...] Mon amour s'est trouve grand tout a coup. Mon ame etait un
vaste pays auquel manquaient les bienfaits du soleil, et votre regard
y a jete soudain la lumiere. (LL, 664)
Much like in the final stages of Christine's relationship with Claude, Pauline exerts a
quasi-messianic power over Louis, acting as the light onto his world and enabling
him to access, like Claude has apparently done, a life of 'felicite'. Most important of
all perhaps is the decisive shift which Pauline has brought about in relation to
Louis's pursuit of his separatist ideals. Previously he had experienced the world
around him 'comme une prison' (LL, 664).
Mes idees ne pouvaient done passer que sous la protection d'un
homme assez hardi pour monter sur les tretaux de la Presse, et
parler d'une voix haute aux niais qu'il meprise. Cette intrepidite
me manquait. J'allais, brise par les arrets de cette foule,
desesperant d'etre jamais ecoute par elle. (LL, 664)
Whereas, as we saw in the previous chapter, Louis used to view relatedness with
others as both an obstacle on his path towards the realisation of his separatist goals as
well as their catalyst, he sees it now - in its form of a reciprocated love for Pauline -
as only likely to expedite those goals.
Ma volonte de fer peut tout. Je suis aime! Arme de cette pensee, un
homme ne doit-il pas faire tout lier devant lui? [...] Vous avez
reveille mille vertus endormies dans mon etre: la patience, la
resignation, toutes les forces du cceur, toutes les puissances de
fame. [...] Maintenant tout a un sens, pour moi, dans cette vie.
(LL, 665)
A further sign of the ecstatic happiness which love has confered on Louis centres on
the extent to which he is looking forward to having sexual relations with Pauline
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once they are married: 'quoi! nos sentiments si purs, si profonds, prendront les
formes delicieuses des mille caresses que j'ai revees. Ton petit pied se dechaussera
pour moi, tu seras toute a moi! Ce bonheur me tue, il m'accable' (LL, 673). He
awaits expectantly the pleasure allied to 'la possession d'une femme aimee' (LL,
674) and to 'ce baiser sans duree, denouement de tous [s]es desirs' (LL, 674). He
continues:
sache-le, ma Pauline, je suis reste pendant des heures entieres dans
line stupeur causee par la violence de mes souhaits passionnes,
restant perdu dans le sentiment d'une caresse comme dans un
gouffre sans fond. En ces moments, ma vie entiere, mes pensees,
mes forces, se fondent, s'unissent dans ce que je nomme un desir,
faute de mots pour exprimer un delire sans nom! (LL, 674-5)
Among the last words he writes to Pauline before his attempted self-castration are
'demain, notre amour se saura done!' (LL, 675)
If future prospects arguably look bright for Julien, Claude and Louis in the portions
of the novels which immediately precede their first 'mad' actions, the situation seems
rather different for Renee. It could, admittedly, be argued that Renee ought to be at
her happiest at this stage of her life as her brother Henri is on the verge ofmarrying
the daughter of a wealthy businessman. This venture will bring him considerable
financial advantage: 'elle aura un million de dot', Mme Bourjot, the mother of his
future bride tells him, 'et vous aurez, quand nous n'y serons plus, de quatre a cinq
millions...' (RM, 153). By association, the Mauperin family stands to harvest
extensive social kudos in the eyes of their friends and counterparts as a result of
Henri's savvy matrimonial manoeuvring. One would then expect Renee to be elated
in the period which precedes her first 'mad' action of informing the last remaining
holder of the de Villacourt title of her brother's intention to usurp his 'particule'. Yet
this is not the case as she has set herself firmly against the marriage: 'vous ne pouvez
pourtant pas epouser sa fille! s'ecria-t-elle' (RM, 167), when she and her brother first
discuss the issue. 'Ne fais pas ce mariage, je t'en supplie... si tu m'aimes, si tu nous
aimes tous... Oh! Je t'en supplie!' (RM, 167). Why does she so object to her
brother's plans? If we return briefly to our analysis of Renee's separatist ideals, we
find that honour and probity were the two values which she placed above all others.
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This marriage, she believes, can only bring dishonour on the Mauperin family both
because of the liaison which Henri has been pursuing with his future bride's mother
and because he will have to take on a 'particule' in order to be deemed sufficiently
worthy by his future father-in-law to marry Mile Bourjot. 'Je suis a tes genoux, tu
vois bien', Renee tells her brother, 'et puis, 5a porte malheur de quitter le nom de son
pere... C'est notre sang, ce nom-la, Henri... Notre brave pere' (RM, 167). Her ideals
are becoming tarnished through being associated with her brother, and the
integrationist pressures to which she has been subject are now encroaching more
uncomfortably closely on her personal territory than ever before. Tellingly, in a
discussion of a man who has, in Renee's words, 'fait une lachete' (RM, 174), she
declares:
tu sais bien,je suis une passionnee, moi, comme tu dis... [...] Mais
je suis bien bonne, c'est vrai! Ce n'est pas nous, ce monsieur,
n'est-ce pas? Ah! Si c'etait quelqu'un des miens qui fit quelque
chose comme get, une chose contre I'honneur, une chose...»
Elle s 'arreta brusquement [...]. (RM, 176, my italics)
Renee stops so suddenly here because she realises that, of course, 'un des siens' - her
brother Henri - is indeed committing what in her eyes is a similarly dishonourable
'lachete'. She thus finds herself gradually losing her place on the moral high ground
from which she used to be able to speak without reserve. Even her father, who up
until this point in the novel had been something of a kindred spirit for Renee as the
piano incident had confirmed,480 'avait fini par ceder a l'eblouissement que fait
l'argent' (RM, 187). The narrator goes on:
ce grand honnete homme, pur, severe, rigide, incorruptible, avait
Iaisse pen a peu cette grande fortune des Bourjot entrer dans sa
pensee, revenir dans ses reves, parler et toucher a ses instincts
ddiomme pratique, de vieillard, de pere de famille, d'industriel. II
etait seduit et desarme. (RM, 187)
This slippage in her father's views leaves Renee feeling 'ennuyee, reveuse, triste'
(RM, 187). She is now more isolated than ever in holding her separatist ideals as all
those around her, including her normally incorruptible and trustworthy father, are




dishonour and materialism to which she objects and has thus far remained largely
immune. It is in this respect that the links between Renee's position and that of the
other three protagonists become clearer. While Renee may not share Julien, Claude
and Louis's elation in the days and hours before their allegedly irrational actions, she
nonetheless finds herself in a very similar position to theirs. What we have been
terming her separatist ideals are on the verge on being engulfed by the hostile,
money-obsessed, bourgeois environment in which she has to live. Engulfment of
what Laing would term her 'true self is now an increasingly likely possibility. The
other three protagonists also find themselves in a position where their separatist
tendencies are coming under increasingly heavy attack and where the values
associated with their 'true selves' are quite possibly on the verge of extinction due to
the encroachment of increasingly powerful or irresistible integrationist forces. We
have just seen this to be the case in relation to Renee, but how can this represent the
position of the other three protagonists?
Claude Lantier in L'GEuvre provides perhaps the most straightforward example in
this regard. Christine may well have saved her husband from the most disastrous
excesses of his art (indeed, at this point of the novel, he seems to believe so too), but
viewed from another perspective, she has also succeeded in almost snuffing out the
aspirational embers of his separatist artistic fires. This fact comes across clearly in
some of the phrases which appear in the lengthy argument in which Claude finally
recognises the monstrous nature of Christine's painted rival: 'deja, elle l'avait
reprise, [...] elle semblait vouloir le faire sien' (LO, 349); 'elle l'amollissait et le
conqueraif (LO, 349); 'elle le serrait a l'etouffer, c'etait elle qui le possedaif (LO,
351); and 'elle le liait d'une cuisse, [...] conime pour s'assurer qu'il ne lui
echapperait plus' (LO, 351). Symbolically, these phrases point to the dominance
which Christine exerts over her husband at this point of the novel and, in Laingian
terms, to the way in which his separatist ideals have now apparently become fully
engulfed. Whereas previously Christine had provided the sole means by which
Claude could hope to see his separatist values and artistic ideals realised through her
acting as his depersonalised model, she has now 'switched sides' and allied herself to
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the already impressive array of integrationist forces which throughout the novel had
aimed to divert Claude off his separatist path. Degas's words - 'la femme a ete creee
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pour empecher l'homme de faire de trop belles choses' - could hardly be more apt
with respect to Claude and Christine as Claude now finds himself defeated and
possessed by a woman who is opposed to his Promethean ideals because of the
damage they had been inflicting on their relationship. As such, the ideals which were
identified with the true self and which had striven towards a canvas re-modelling of
reality are left with no possible means of realisation, and, indeed, have been crushed.
The integrationist pressures which have constantly weighed down on his artistic
goals have now become so strong but crucially also so irresistible that Claude no
longer even attempts to defend himself against their onslaught: 'cette fois, il fut
vaincu' (LO, 350).
This defeat of the true self and its ideals is reflected in the collapse of the defence
mechanisms which Claude had previously relied upon to provide his true self and
separatist, artistic ideals with a safe haven and a possible means of realisation.
During this time - that is, in the period immediately prior to his reconciliation with
his wife -, Claude had withdrawn into a position of almost complete physical
isolation, his painted mistress providing him with his only comfort and company,
while his depersonalised wife Christine was left feeling 'jalouse, [...] dedaignee et
trahie' (LO, 346). He had been pursuing his separatist ideals with such vigour that he
can now see in retrospect that his true self had become largely disembodied from his
physical outer shell: he does, after all, ask 'qui done venait de peindre cette idole
d'une religion inconnue?' (LO, 347) when he sees the monstrous reality of his
'Femme nue\ as if refering to another artist. Furthermore, he had been having no
sexual relations with Christine for several months because of the detrimental,
engulfing effect this form of relatedness was having on his ideals.
Cette virilite qu'il lui refusait, il la reservait et la donnait a la rivale
preferee. Elle [Christine] savait bien pourquoi il la delaissait ainsi.
Souvent d'abord, quand il avait le lendemain un gros travail, et
qu'elle se serrait contre lui en se couchant, il lui disait que non, que
481
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9a le fatiguerait trop; ensuite, il avait pretendu qu'au sortir de ses
bras, il en avait pour trois jours a se remettre, le cerveau ebranle,
incapable de rien faire de bon; et la rupture s'etait ainsi peu a peu
produite, une semaine en attendant Pachevement d'un tableau, puis
un mois pour ne pas deranger la mise en train d'un autre, puis des
dates reculees encore, des occasions negligees, la deshabitude
lente, l'oubli final. Au fond, el le retrouvait la theorie repetee cent
fois devant elle: le genie devait etre chaste, il fallait ne coucher
qu'avec son ceuvre. (LO, 346-7, my italics)
Yet the sexual intercourse which follows their reconciliation has the effect of
breaking down all the defence mechanisms with which he had hoped to both protect
and further the values of the true self. Claude switches off the depersonalising gaze
he had for so long directed at Christine, and appears to become fully 're-embodied':
'il s'abandonna, dans 1'attendrissement de cette passion infinie. C'etait une immense
tristesse, un evanouissement du monde entier oil se fondait son etre'' (LO, 349, my
italics).
The process of 're-embodiment' as a result of sexual intercourse which we witness
here in relation to Claude Lantier can also be attributed to Louis Lambert who
realises that in marrying Pauline de Villenoix his 'contemplations vont devenir des
realites' (LL, 675). Our Laingian analysis has already demonstrated that Louis both
desires and fears relatedness with others because it simultaneously facilitates and
prevents the realisation of his separatist ideals. This interpretation would also
maintain that, by extension, sexual intercourse with Pauline will lead to the
engulfment of his separatist desires and to the triumph of the integrationist pressures
associated with the false self system in much the same way as happens with Claude
Lantier. Two scenes from earlier in the novel help to back up this Laingian
hypothesis. The first is an incident in which Louis catches sight of a beautiful young
woman one evening in the Theatre-Franyais' in Paris. Given that Louis's life had
apparently been largely devoid of any erotic drive up until that point:
la vue de cette fenune, jeune et belle, bien mise, decolletee peut-
etre, et accompagnee d'un amant pour lequel sa figure s'animait de
toutes les graces de l'amour, produisit sur fame et sur les sens de
Lambert un effet si cruel qu'il fut oblige de sortir de la salle. (LL,
645)
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This unexpected confrontation with sexual desire provokes Louis into a fit of intense
jealousy:
S'il n'eut profite des dernieres lueurs de sa raison, qui, dans le
premier moment de cette brulante passion, ne s'eteignit pas
completement, peut-etre aurait-il succombe au desir presque
invincible qu'il ressentit alors de tuer le jeune homme auquel
s'adressaient les regards de cette femme. (LL, 645)
The entire experience shakes Louis to the core, and he realises that the dangers allied
to erotic desire could undermine his Promethean ambitions: 'je ne me craindrais pas
dans une grotte au desert, et je me crains ici', he tells his uncle in a letter from Paris,
'au desert, je serais avec moi-meme sans distraction; ici, Thomme eprouve une foule
de besoins qui le rapetissent' (LL, 648). The second scene which teaches Louis of the
detrimental effect which sexual relations could have on his Promethean ambitions
can be found in his reading of Swedenborgian philosophy which brings home to him
the importance of subjugating Taction corporelle' in favour of his 'vie
intellectuelle'. He has learnt that 'il y aurait en nous deux creatures distinctes' (LL,
616) and also that Tange serait l'individu chez lequel 1'etre interieur reussit a
triompher de l'etre exterieur' (LL, 617). It is the individual's duty, then, to 'nourrir
Texquise nature de Tange qui est en lui' (LL, 617), according to Swedenborg.
However, a salutory warning is sounded:
si, faute d'avoir une vue translucide de sa destinee, il [un homme]
fait predominer Taction corporelle au lieu de corroborer sa vie
intellectuelle, toutes ses forces passent dans le jeu de ses sens
exterieurs, et Tange perit lentement par cette materialisation des
deux natures. (LL, 617)
Sexual relations with Pauline thus run the risk of killing off Louis's 'angelic'
potential, but it is a risk which, at this point of the novel at least, Louis seems
prepared to take.482 Indeed, he seems to be convinced that all his separatist desires
will in fact be fulfilled: 'ma volonte de fer peut tout. Je suis aimel' (LL, 645), he
declares.
482 For full studies of Balzac's reading of Swedenborg, see J. van der Elst, 'Autour du «
Livre mystique »: Balzac et Swedenborg', Revue de litterature comparee, 10 (1930), 88-123;
K. - E. Sjoden, 'Balzac et Swedenborg', Cahiers de I'Association Internationale des Etudes
frangaises, 15 (1963), 295-307.
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In relation to Le Rouge et le Noir, the triumph of Julien's false self system over his
separatist urge towards authenticity reaches its climax in his statement: 'mon rornan
est flni, et a moi seul tout le merite' (RN, 639). A career path which he believes will
lead him to Napoleonic glory has now been cemented into place, and his life has
taken on entirely fictional proportions with the encumbering (if correct) details of his
past life as the derided and penniless son of a provincial carpenter having now been
replaced by a purchased 'particule'. Mien is a changed man from the callow,
youthful no-body we saw in Verrieres and Vergy: he is now 'froid et hautain' (RN,
641) even towards the abbe Pirard. To his army colleagues he shows only 'son air
impassible, ses yeux severes et presque mechants, sa paleur [et] son inalterable sang¬
froid' (RN, 641), and none of the insouciant sincerity which had characterised his
days at Vergy in the company of Mme de Renal. All he can think of is how best to
embellish the 'integrationist' fictions of his life which will bring closer the day when,
he believes, his Napoleonic ambitions will be fully realised.
A peine lieutenant, par faveur et depuis deux jours, il calculait deja
que, pour commander en chef a trente ans, an plus tard, comme
tous les grands generaux, il fallait a vingt-trois etre plus que
lieutenant. II ne pensait qu'a la gloire et a son fils. (RN, 642)
The days of what Laing would have termed 'authentic disclosure' at Vergy could
hardly be further from his mind, it would seem, and his separatist urge towards
authenticity is now seemingly dead and buried. Julien's situation is slightly more
complex than that of the other three protagonists given that his separatist ideals
consist of two separate elements, and even if his drive towards authentic mutual
relatedness has stalled, his Napoleon-inspired separatist desires are in fact being
sated at this stage of the novel. Nonetheless, it remains an indisputable fact that the
integrationist forces allied to the false self system are without doubt in the
ascendency, as is the case in relation to the other protagonists, given that Julien has
relied on thoroughly integrationist strategies to worm his way into the homes (and
hearts and beds) of his alleged superiors, and, as a result, further his Napoleonic
ambitions.
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We have seen so far that in the period which immediately precedes their 'mad' acts
the four protagonists have either already experienced the total engulfment of their
separatist ideals or else face the imminent prospect of such engulfment. It is this
point which remains crucial to the 'comprehensible transition' which I wish to argue
exists between their existential positions before and after their allegedly 'mad' acts.
The schizophrenic, in Laing's view, 'dreads relatedness as such, with anyone or
anything or, indeed, even with himself, because his uncertainty about the stability of
his autonomy lays him open to the dread lest in any relationship he will lose his
autonomy and identity' (TDS, 44). In a parallel sense, the four protagonists find that
the dangers allied to relatedness have indeed become reality, that their defence
mechanisms have been violated, and that the 'autonomy and identity' of their
separatist ideals has been either sacrificed, lost or severely damaged as a
consequence of relatedness with others. In the following section of this chapter, I
want to examine how the four protagonists react to this engulfment of their true
selves, turning firstly to Le Rouge et le Noir.
Death of the 'false self'
At the very moment of his life when Julien is 'au milieu des transports de l'ambition
la plus effrenee' (RN, 642) and when his ambitions for Napoleonic pre-eminence are
beginning to be achieved, news reaches him of the catastrophe which Mme de
Renal's denunciation has unleashed. Mme de Renal has confirmed to the marquis his
suspicions about Julien's past - 'je ne sais pas encore ce que c'est que Julien' (RN,
639), he had worried just before the arrival of the infamous letter - and has alerted
him to the truth about Julien's life being constructed upon whatever integrationist
strategies he feels are most likely to help him 'faire fortune' (RN, 259) and 'faire les
choses extraordinaires' (RN, 287). Madame de Renal exposes the persona or the
false self which he had so successfully projected to other people as one which is
founded on T'hypocrisie la plus consommee' (RN, 643) and 'aucun principe de
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religion' (RN, 644), and as one which aims solely to help him 'se faire un etat et [...]
devenir quelque chose' (RN, 643). 'Tout est perdu!' (RN, 642), Mathilde had
shrieked in the letter she sends Julien warning of her father's wrath. Yet, as we saw
in part II, all is not in fact lost for Julien.483 He would, after all, have had relatively
little difficulty in rebutting Mme de Renal's allegations, and so the set-back which
his career has suffered as a result of her letter is far from an irreversible one. What
has in fact been 'perdu', however, is not so much other people's image of Julien and
his future career prospects but, rather, his own image of himself. It is Julien's self-
image which has been irreparably damaged by Mme de Renal's allegations: 'quel
pere voudrait donner sa fille cherie a un tel homme!' (RN, 644), he exclaims in
disgust. Julien recognises that the individual described in Mme de Renal's letter is
indeed a vile and despicable specimen and refers to him as if describing a man other
than himself. The paradox is, of course, that given Julien's co-existing true and false
selves, it is as if he really is referring to someone other than himself. In Laingian
terms, Julien's 'true self - that is, his twin drives for authenticity and Napoleonic
pre-eminence - has become almost fully disembodied and detached from the false
self system which has been acting as its front-man in the period immediately
preceding the shooting. By this stage of the novel, the process of disembodiment has
assumed such considerable proportions that Julien is able to look upon the individual
described in Mme de Renal's letter as a foreign being, or, more precisely, as a being
foreign to and separate from the true self. The false self which he has projected to
others in, for example, the Hotel de La Mole bears 'no footprints or fingerprints'
(TDS, 89) of the true self which yearns both to experience afresh the 'unite de soi,
hors de 1'existence sociale'484 characteristic of Julien and Madame de Renal's time in
Vergy and to see his Napoleonic ambitions realised. It is this very point which Julien
finally recognises as a result of Mme de Renal's letter; he sees that he is trapped
within the double bind discussed at the end of the last chapter: namely, that his false
self is not in fact serving as a vehicle for the fulfillment or gratification of his true
self, and that the integrationist strategies by which he has been attempting to further
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in the way of them ever being achieved. Julien has had his eyes opened to the reality
of the double bind in which his separatist ideals are caught. The explosive contents of
Mme de Renal's letter thus have the effect of tearing apart the image he had of
himself as likely to bring about the realisation of his separatist goals via integrationist
means. His false self is thus killed off in this collapse of his self-image, a collapse
which has been precipitated by Mme de Renal's letter. It is at this point that Mien's
desires for authenticity and Napoleonic pre-eminence - his 'true self in Laingian
terms - face the prospect of total engulfment and annihilation by an environment
which has constantly been opposed to their realisation, now that they have been
robbed of their integrationist shield. At the same time, his separatist desires are left in
the invidious position of also having no possibility of seeing their full potential
realised as they have now been robbed of what they had mistakenly believed would
be their catalyst and means of realisation.
That Julien's physical husk has seemingly ceased to function now that the false self
has effectively been killed off can be seen in the difficulties he experiences in
carrying out physical actions in the moments leading up to the shooting scene. For
example, his ability to communicate (which as we saw in part III chapter one
represented Julien's most successful integrationist ruse) has been severely impaired:
'il ne put ecrire a Mathilde comme il en avait le projet, sa main ne formait sur le
papier que les traits illisibles' (RN, 644). Similarly, when he enters the gunsmith's
shop to buy the necessary weapons, 'Julien eut beaucoup de peine a lui [l'armurier
du pays] faire comprendre qu'il voulait une paire de pistolets' (RN, 644). Most
telling of all is the sentence which comes immediately before the point when Julien
fires on Mme de Renal: 'je ne le puis, se disait-il a lui-meme [Julien], physiquement,
je ne le puis' (RN, 644, my italics). While his spirit is certainly willing to pull the
trigger, his flesh is all too weak as all that Julien has previously identified with his
outer physical skin - his false self system or his integrationist strategies - has been
fatally undermined by Mme de Renal's denunciation and the subsequent collapse of
his self-image.
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What, then, is the response of the 'true self to its potentially fatal unmasking as a
result of the death of the false self? Logically, it is to attack the entity which
precipitated the removal of its protective shield and its one hope of eventual
realisation: that is, to attack Mme de Renal. It is therefore entirely consequent that
Julien should try to kill Louise de Renal, and, moreover, that he should do so
immediately after his true self has been robbed of its protective shield and its only, if
flawed, possible means of realisation. A Laing-inspired interpretation thus runs
counter to George Orwell's argument that the shooting is 'a particularly meaningless
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outrage and has only been put in because Julien has to die to in the limelight' as
well as to Michel Crouzet's argument that:
les plus grands moments [de ia vie de Julien], ses plus graves
decisions sont dus a des transes (qui peuvent etre rationnelles), a
des instants d'eblouissement, de « folie », d'« energie », ou de
lucidite aveuglee, qui se detaclient, sans cause et sans fin, de la
trame de sa vie.486
A Laingian analysis of the shooting scene would propose instead that Julien's actions
are in fact fully concomitant with and, more importantly, provoked by the events
within 'la trame de sa vie'. Julien is surely not 'au-dela des categories, des categories
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morales et des categories psychologiques', as Crouzet would have it. Instead, the
shooting represents the final desperate act of his true self which has been laid bare
and exposed to a hostile world. In part one, we saw that anti-psychiatrists regard a
schizophrenic patient's behaviour as symptomatic of an existential crisis: the
individual's unusual behaviour, they argue, represents 'a special sort of strategy that
a person invents in order to live in an unliveable situation' (PE, 95). In a parallel
sense, Julien's 'madness' in shooting Mme de Renal is symptomatic of the major
existential crisis in his own life, one which is based on the ultimately impossible co¬
existence of two sets ofmutually exclusive desires, and one which has been triggered
off by Mme de Renal's allegations. The shooting represents Julien's 'special sort of
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strategy', albeit a desperate one, for living in a world which has suddenly been made
unliveable for him through having had his true self forcibly 'outed' into an engulfing
and implosive environment where it has no hope of seeing its values and ideals
realised. In summary, then, Julien's shooting can be seen as his 'special sort of
strategy' to help him cope with suddenly finding himself'in a position of checkmate'
(PE, 95).
This Laingian interpretation also proposes a response to the question as to why Julien
should attack Mine de Renal and not, for instance, the marquis de La Mole (who has
after all banned any future contact between Julien and his daughter and wants to see
him exiled to America) or Valenod (who is an obvious target if one believes Julien's
shooting to be motivated by considerations of class warfare). Mme de Renal is the
only other protagonist of the novel to have shared Julien's yearning for authenticity.
Throughout the novel, she has been portrayed as a flawless, incomparable vehicle for
the key Stendhalian attribute 'le naturef: 'elle avait un air de simplicity, et de la
jeunesse dans la demarche', the narrator eulogises, 'ni la coquetterie, ni l'affectation
n'avaient jamais approche de ce coeur' (RN, 229). A little later, the narrator
continues: 'aucune hypocrisie ne venait alterer la purete de cette arne naive, egaree
par une passion qu'elle n'avait jamais eprouvee' (RN, 279). Moreover, as we have
seen, Mme de Renal is the one person with whom Julien has experienced fleeting
moments of authentic mutual relatedness or what Buber and Laing would term an 'I-
You form of relatedness'. Upon reading Mme de Renal's letter, Julien believes that
the only available route towards the fulfillment of his desire for authenticity has now
been blocked off because Louise, he mistakenly thinks, has 'switched sides' under
the malign influence of the Church and joined the ranks of the true self s enemy
which sacrifices one's metaphysical capacity for authenticity and Te pouvoir de la
beaute' (RN, 279) on the integrationist altar of conformity, assimilation and
corruption.
A further reason why Mme de Renal should be the target of his bullets relates to how
this shooting can be interpreted as an attempted suicide. Thomas Freeman proposes a
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pithy summary of the central strategy adopted by the Laingian schizophrenic: 'the
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schizophrenic feels he has killed his self in order to avoid being killed". It would
seem that Julien is engaged in a very similar venture, because at the moment of
shooting Mme de Renal, his true self has been robbed of its protective shield and of
what it perceived to be its medium for eventual realisation. With these essentials
removed, the true self is thus left exposed and vulnerable, unable to survive in this
hostile environment and unlikely to achieve its goals. Engulfment is almost certain
with the result that Julien anticipates and thwarts the imminent engulfment and
snuffing out of the aspirational embers of his true self by putting an end to its
existence himself. He sees that his separatist ambitions are not going to be realised
and that he must kill them off before they are killed off for him. However, given the
actual target for the bullets, it appears that the true self attempts to kill not itself but
instead displaces the suicide attempt onto the person most similar to itself - that is
Mme de Renal, the one individual who, as we have seen, has never strayed from her
adherence to authenticity and 'le naturel', unlike Julien. The murder attempt thus
represents the apogee of the process of total disembodiment and total self-
depersonalisation which had characterised Julien's existence before the shooting.
Laing argues that for the schizophrenic, 'to turn oneself into a stone becomes a way
of not being turned into a stone by someone else' (TDS, 51). This would seem to be
the case here too in relation to the twin elements of Julien's true self: he turns them
into a stone, or de-animates them, before they can be turned into a stone by someone
else. This 'suicide' hypothesis is reinforced by Julien's later refusals to put up a
credible defence against his attempted murder charges or to take up one of the many
opportunities open to him to escape from his Besangon prison cell (RN, 650, 653,
693). It is also further bolstered by his actions during his trial in which he effectively
signs his own death warrant by giving an impassioned speech in which he rails
against the social injustices he believes to have been perpetrated by the bourgeoisie.
To have been acquitted of the charges laid against him, Julien would have had to
accept that he owed his life to the bourgeoisie which he so disdains and which stands
directly opposed to both his sets of separatist values. As Richard B. Grant has
lxs Thomas Freeman, 'Review of The Divided Self by R. D. Laing', British Journal of
Medical Psychology, 34 (1961), 79-80 (p. 79).
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argued: 'in accepting acquittal from this society, he would show tacit approval of its
values and conventions',489 values and conventions which he can no longer relate to
since the demolition of his false self.
If Julien's 'mad' act of shooting Mme de Renal represents the final desperate act of
the true self laid bare to a hostile environment, the factors which motivate Louis,
Claude and Renee are arguably of a similar nature. With regard to L 'CEuvre,
Claude's suicide represents his strategy to cope with a world now made unliveable
by the collapse of the mechanisms with which he had hoped to both protect and
further his artistic ideals. Near the beginning of his final argument with Christine,
Claude had asked the question 'mais puis-je vivre encore, si le travail ne veut plus de
moi?' (LO, 349). The initial answer to this question would seem to have been that he
can: 'il vivrait heureux, sauve, n'est-ce pas? maintenant qu'il avait cette ivresse?'
(LO, 351). A life of felicity and prosperity was supposed to How from this defeat of
his separatist desires. Indeed, the processes of depersonalisation and disembodiment
to which he had given himself over with such vigour had seemingly been reversed in
a reflex which saw Christine substitute her body for his: 'je te rechaufferai contre ma
gorge, je lierai mes jambes aux tiennes, je nouerai mes bras a tes reins, je serai ton
souffle, ton sang, ta chair...' (LO, 350, my italics). He had, almost by default,
become re-embodied. Moreover, he desperately implores Christine to 're-
personalise' him as this, he believes, will save him from his own artistic excesses:
endors-moi, aneantis-moi, que je devienne ta chose, assez esclave,
assez petit, pour me loger sous tes pieds, dans tes pantoufles... Ah!
descendre la, ne vivre que de ton odeur, t'obeir comme un chien,
manger, t'avoir et dormir, si je pouvais, si je pouvais! (LO, 350)
This scenario in which Claude has been 're-embodied' and 'un-depersonalised'
proves to be unsustainable, however, as shortly afterwards, once Christine has fallen
asleep, 'ses [Claude] pensees etaient revenues, toutes, debordantes, torturantes,
creusant son visage' (LO, 351). Claude is haunted by the ghost of his ideals which
now lie dead, and it is at this point that a process of what could be termed 're-
489 Richard B. Grant, 'The Death of Julien Sorel', Esprit Createur, 2 (1962), 26-30 (p. 27).
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disembodiment' and 're-depersonalisation' begins. This time, however, he carries the
process through to the point of total disembodiment and total self-depersonalisation:
that is, to the point of suicide. In a pithy example of how he has re-depersonalised
Christine, he complains of 'cette cuisse de femme, allongee sur lui' (LO, 351, my
italics) which he feels 'prenait une lourdeur de plomb, il en souffrait comme d'un
supplice' (LO, 351). This word 'supplice' emphasises the physical aspects of the
process of 're-disembodiment', one which involves enormous pain and which sees
his body being symbolically broken up: 'il en souffrait comme [...] d'une meule dont
on lui broyait les genoux' (LO, 351). He must 're-depersonalise' and sacrifice
Christine; he must withdraw from all physical or sexual contact: as Zola wrote in the
novel's 'ebauche', he must 'immoler [Christine] a sa passion d'art'.490 Why he must
do so is neatly explained by Laing when he writes that one of the schizophrenic's
greatest fears is that of being depersonalised by others. As we saw earlier, the
schizophrenic thus attempts to defend him/herself by turning that de-personalising
gaze around and re-directing it back on to the other person: 'the very act of
experiencing the other as a person is felt as virtually suicidal' (TDS, 47), Laing
writes. Claude had successfully depersonalised Christine for a lengthy period of the
novel prior to their reconciliation. Now, however, that Christine has become 'un-de-
personalised' and now that Claude's earlier movement towards disembodiment has
been reversed, his separatist ideals face total engulfment. His experiencing Christine
as a person (or as an 'un-depersonalised' being) is felt as virtually suicidal, and his
only option is to take to its extreme point a process of total 're-disembodiment' and
total 're-depersonalisation' which results from the knowledge that he has no hope of
seeing his artistic ideals become reality. Like Julien, only this time in a literal sense,
suicide is the only strategy open to Claude in a world which he now finds entirely
unliveable. He too, much like the Laingian schizophrenic, finds himself'in a position
of checkmate' (PE, 95) once his separatist ideals have been crushed by Christine and
by the almost irresistible integrationist pressures she has come to represent at this
stage of the novel.
490
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As was discussed in part II, the 'mad' and 'invraisemblable' status of Claude's
suicide is in part dependent on its timing. It was asked: why should Claude commit
suicide immediately after experiencing a re-birth, around the time he feels furthest
away from 'sa misere, oubliant, renaissant a une vie de felicite' (LO, 350)?491 A
Laingian response to this question would propose that the opportunity to 'se guerir'
(LO, 350) equates to a re-birth as a person shorn of artistic ideals or of his 'true self
and left finally at the mercy of society's normalising techniques. It is logical
therefore that Claude should commit suicide at this point, at the very time when he
realises his separatist ideals are now dead. A Laingian analysis would therefore assert
the 'context-sensible' nature of Claude's suicide. It is neither 'mad' nor
'invraisemblable' as it arises out of a deep existential crisis which revolves around an
inescapable paradox: namely, that his inner truth or his 'true self may only be
externalised through relatedness, physicality and sexuality, states which in
themselves are directly antithetical to the true self. Yet when Claude reaches a
situation in which the states of physicality and sexuality engulf and overpower the
true self, only disembodiment (or in this case 're-disembodiment') can 'save' the
truth, only 're-disembodiment' can accord the values of the true self some status or
existence. It may well be an unpotentiated or virtual existence, but it is a form of
existence nonetheless. To save the truth, Claude must die.
If Claude finds that death through suicide is his only possible option when faced with
the prospect of a life mediated by physicality and sexuality and one shorn of his
artistic ideals, Louis Lambert must make a similar choice. He, too, realises he must
die in order to save the truth. In the previous chapter, we saw the fundamental
paradox which is inherent to Louis's interaction with other people - that is,
relatedness acts as a barrier to the realisation of his ideals as well as their catalyst.
Given the imminence of his wedding day, Louis is fast approaching the point where
the delicate balancing act he has been performing of trying to reconcile two
irreconcilable opposing forces is going to be fundamentally disturbed. Louis had
previously lived in the hope that his true self and all that is identified with it could
491 See p. 91.
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somehow be projected through his body and that he would be able to reach the sexual
'denouement de tous [s]es desirs' (LL, 674) without having to compromise his
Promethean ambitions. Yet a Laingian analysis would suggest that the closer this
'denouement' comes, the closer the day also comes when his true self will be
engulfed by relatedness. It is for this very reason that the timing of Louis's 'mad'
actions is so crucial, as it is in relation to Julien's and Claude's actions, even though
it is seemingly a point ignored by most Balzacian critics, as we saw in part II.492
Louis's uncle tells the narrator after all that 'la veille de son mariage, il [Louis] est
devenu fou' (LL, 676, my italics). Certain elements of this 'folie' are particularly
instructive as regards the 'death' of the false self which is identified with Louis's
physical body and which he had hoped would one day act as a medium for the
realisation of the true self s goals: 'il etait reste pendant cinquante-neuf heures
immobile, les yeux fixes, sans manger ni parler' (LL, 677, my italics). From this
example, it appears that Louis's body has seemingly ceased to function. Furthermore,
once this initial two-and-a-half day 'acces' has passed, Louis 'se crut impuissant'
(LL, 679). The word 'impuissant' points not only to his sexual incapacitation but also
to a wider collapse of his entire physical being, one which causes him to slide into
'une melancolie que rien ne put dissiper' (LL, 679). In this melancholic state, Louis
sees that the balancing act he has been performing of both desiring and fleeing
relatedness - symbolised here by the sexual act - is no longer sustainable. He realises
that he must choose definitively between, on the one hand, the pursuit of his
separatist ideals and, on the other, the pursuit of Pauline and his sexual desires: there
is simply a structural incompatibility between the two spheres which means he can
have only one and not the other. A Laingian interpretation thus confirms the
narrator's hypothesis: 'peut-etre a-t-il vu dans les plaisirs de son mariage un obstacle
a la perfection de ses sens interieurs et a son vol a travers les Mondes Spirituels' (LL,
680). The result is that Louis chooses to attempt 'l'operation a laquelle Origene crut
devoir son talent' (LL, 679) not merely to deny himself the 'baiser sans duree' which
represents the 'denouement de tous [s]es desirs' (LL, 674) but also, and more
significantly, to symbolically kill off his entire physical being as a means of
492 See pp. 69 and 94.
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preventing his true self or his separatist ideals from being subsumed by the
relatedness which the sexual act would bring with it. Louis, like Julien and Claude
therefore, enacts a form of suicide of the true self in order to prevent it from being
engulfed by relatedness with others in a remarkably similar way to that which Laing
attributes to the schizophrenic who, in Freeman's words quoted earlier, 'has killed
his self in order to avoid being killed'. The symbolic death of Louis's physical body,
or his false self, finds further evidence in the descriptions which the narrator gives of
Louis's physical state some time after his first 'acces'. His body can barely function
as he is unable to tolerate light, for example; he shares a resemblance 'avec les bustes
qui represented les grands hommes du siecle de Louis XIV' (LL, 682), so drained is
his physical being of all potency and vitality; and his senses have collapsed as his
eyes can no longer see or blink and his ears no longer hear. As Pauline rightly says:
'il a reussi a se degager de son corps, et nous aperqoit sous une autre forme' (LL,
683). Louis has brought to its climax the process of disembodiment, which he had
previously pursued only to a limited degree, now that he has renounced the
possibility of achieving the twin but ultimately contradictory aims of being a fully
sexualised individual and pursuing his separatist ideals.
Do such considerations have any relevance to Renee Mauperinl It would appear that
they do. We have already seen that Renee finds her separatist ideals are becoming
increasingly isolated and undermined as various family members 'switch sides' and
fall under the alluring spell of the integrationist temptations around them. Her
environment is gradually being made more and more unliveable, and she finds
herself moving towards 'a position of checkmate' (PE, 95) as she now has no-one
with whom to share her separatist ideals and has even less of a opportunity than ever
of seeing them achieved. Informing the rightful holder of the de Villacourt title of her
brother's intentions is thus fully concomitant with the principles of honour and
probity which, as we saw earlier in part III, are the hallmarks of these ideals. Her
initial mad act of incriminating her brother can thus be seen as an action which is
motivated not just by her adherence to the true self s ideals but also by the mounting
difficulties they experience in surviving in an increasingly intolerable environment,
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thus providing a parallel to the way in which the schizophrenic's unusual behaviour
represents Tissue que le libre organisme [...] invente pour vivre une situation
invivable'.493
The second element to Renee's 'mad' behaviour - the way in which she apparently
wills herself to death, making no effort to fight off the advancing death throes - can
be explained in a similar manner. We saw in the previous chapter that there were
seemingly no examples in the early chapters of Renee Mauperin of the type of literal
form of disembodiment which Laing attributes to the schizophrenic. However, in
scenes subsequent to her first 'mad' action of incriminating her brother, instances of
disembodiment do, however, emerge. Renee kills off her outer physical being in
order to protect the sanctity of her inner true self from the rapidly encroaching
integrationist forces in a similar fashion to that which we have seen in relation to the
other protagonists and to the Laingian schizophrenic. As the narrator reveals: 'peu a
peu elle se laissait s'echapper et s'ecouler d'elle la conscience de son etre physique,
le sentiment et la fatigue de vivre' (RM, 243). She thus takes to its extreme point a
process of'disembodiment':
une gene, un malaise vague, se repandant de la par tout son etre et
la remplissant d'enervement, lui otait toute energie vitale, brisait en
elle toute volonte de mouvement et la tenait ecrasee, inclinee, sans
forces pour sortir et se relever d'elle-meme. (RM, 234)
Similarly, the process of self-depersonalisation reaches its apogee as Renee nears her
death:
chaque jour, M. Mauperin cherchait dans sa fille quelque chose
qu'il ne trouvait plus et qui n'etait plus en elle: ses yeux, son
sourire, ses gestes, son pas, sa robe pleine et fiere de ses vingt ans,
toute cette jeunesse de jeune fille qui volait autour d'elle, et qui
vous effleurait en passant, tout cela se voilait, s'evanouissait,
disparaissait comme si la physionomie de la vie se retirait d'elle.
[...] II semblait a M. Mauperin que ce n'etait deja plus sa fille.
(RM, 236-7, my italics)
She, too, again like the Laingian schizophrenic, turns herself into a stone as a way of
not being turned into a stone by other people. She commits a form of suicide of the
493
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true self much like that which we have seen in relation to Claude, Julien and Louis as
she aims to prevent her true self from being killed off by relatedness with corrupted
and corruptible others. It is hardly surprising, then, that critics such as Robert Ricatte
have been unable to find many similarities between the manner of Renee's death and
the symptoms attributed to a 'maladie de coeur' by nineteenth-century medical
experts,4 4 as we saw in part II. A Laingian analysis would therefore contend that her
death has in fact very little to do with any feelings of grief or shame she may have
experienced over the role she played in her brother's untimely death. Instead, it
would propose that her death has rather more to do with the drastic measures of
absolute (self-)depersonalisation and disembodiment which she takes as a means of
sealing off her true self from the ever more threatening possibility of engulfment by
the marauding and corrupting integrationist forces which have assailed her all her
life.
So far in this chapter, we have seen two stages in the four protagonists'
'comprehensible transition' (TDS, 17) between their behaviour before and after each
novel's de-motivated or ambiguously motivated turning-point. This 'comprehensible
transition' mirrors that which Laing believed was characteristic of the
schizophrenic's shift from 'the sane schizoid way of being-in-the-world to a
psychotic way of being-in-the-world' (TDS, 17). These first two stages in the
protagonists' transition represent 'the special sort[s] of strategies] which [they]
invent in order to live in an unliveable situation' (PE, 95). Their lives have been
made unliveable through their having been propelled into an environment in which
the values and aspirations associated with their true selves have either been
unmasked and killed off or else face imminent engulfment. In the next section,
however, we will see that these strategies which are formed to deal with 'this
position of checkmate' in fact allow the four protagonists to move towards a
temporary realisation of the separatist goals which they initially believed to have
been blocked off for good by the defeat of their true selves. Moreover, this brief
achievement of their Promethean ambitions imbues them with strong messianic
494 See p. 110.
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characteristics which in turn suggest close similarities with the objectives which anti-
psychiatrists set for their therapeutic practice, but goals which, as we saw in part I,
they found themselves unable to achieve in clinical practice. In order to examine one
such move towards a 'privileged territory' and a messianic status, 1 will turn first to
Le Rouge et le Noir.
'Hierophants of the sacred'
When Julien is in the prison cell, his state ofmind is vastly different from that which
we saw in the pre-shooting chapters of the novel. He enjoys a previously
unexperienced personal tranquillity - 'son ame etait calme' (RN, 650) - which leads
him to view his up-coming trial as little more than 'de legers embarras, des
ceremonies ennuyeuses auxquelles il serait temps de songer le jour meme' (RN,
650). Death has lost its sting in his eyes (RN, 650) and his previously all-consuming
Napoleonic goals now seem irrelevant: 'il considerait toutes choses sous un nouvel
aspect. II n'avait plus d'ambition. II pensait rarement a mademoiselle de La Mole'
(RN, 650). Mathilde, on the other hand, devotes her life to securing his acquittal and
release. Yet in so doing, she manages to increase her distance from Julien as her
constant grand-standing and back-room dealing only reminds Julien of the inherent
superiority ofMme de Renal.
Julien se trouvait peu digne de taut de devouement, a vrai dire il
etait fatigue d'heroTsme. C'eut ete a une tendresse simple, naive et
presque timide, qu'il se fut trouve sensible, tandis qu'au contraire,
il fallait toujours 1 'idee d'un public et des autres a l'ame hautaine
de Mathilde. (RN, 663)
Any such thoughts of 'des autres' are anathema to Julien. He begs Mathilde:
laissez-moi ma vie ideale. Vos petites tracasseries, vos details de la
vie reelle, plus ou moins froissants pour moi, me tireraient du ciel.
On meurt comme on peut: moi je ne veux penser a la moit qu'a ma
maniere. Que m'importent les autres? Mes relations avec les autres
vont etre tranchees brusquement. (RN, 667)
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He would even rather be alone than be in the company of Mathilde: 'dans le fait, je
suis plus heureux seul que quand cette fille si belle partage ma solitude' (RN, 667);
indeed, his one complaint in his prison cell is that he cannot lock the door from the
inside. Julien therefore takes to its extreme the third mechanism of defence which
Laing attributes to the ontologically insecure individual - isolation - having already
taken the techniques of self-depersonalisation and disembodiment to their limits, as
we saw earlier in this chapter. The only person who can break through this desire for
solitude is Mme de Renal with whom he is 'eperdument amoureux' (RN, 664): 'ses
remords l'occupaient beaucoup et lui presentaient souvent Timage de madame de
Renal, surtout pendant le silence des nuits' (RN, 650). The little time they snatch
together is devoted to 'une reverie profonde': both are lost in Te pays des idees' (RN,
668), locked together in communion at their time at Vergy. Indeed if one phrase can
sum up Julien's existence in his prison cell, it is that 'sa pensee etait a Vergy' (RN,
668). His desires to become a Napoleonic super-hero have faded: Tambition etait
morte en son cceur' (RN, 664), the narrator tells us before going on to say that 'il
vivait d'amour' (RN, 695) for Mme de Renal but not for Mathilde, much to the
latter's chagrin. Julien comes to live for the moment: 'il vivait presque sans songer a
Tavenir' (RN, 695). Elsewhere the narrator goes on:
il trouvait un bonheur singulier quand, laisse absolument seul et
sans crainte d'etre interrompu, il pouvait se livrer tout entier au
souvenir des journees heureuses qu'il avait passees jadis a
Verrieres ou a Vergy. Les moindres incidents de ces temps trop
rapidement envoles avaient pour lui une fraicheur et un charme
irresistibles. Jamais il ne pensait a ses succes de Paris; il en etait
ennuye. (RN, 664)
Julien himself gives a testimony to Mme de Renal of his regrets at having passed up
the opportunity for happiness which he recognises now he had within his grasp. He
realises: 'j'aurais pu etre si heureux pendant nos promenades dans les bois de Vergy'
(RN, 695). Yet at that time, 'une ambition fougueuse entrainait mon ame dans les
pays imaginaires. Au lieu de serrer contre mon coeur ce bras charmant qui etait si
pres de mes levres, Tavenir m'enlevait a toi' (RN, 695). Instead, he tells her that he
became embroiled in 'innombrables combats que j'aurais a soutenir pour batir une
fortune colossale....' (RN, 695), and with the ever indispensable benefit of hindsight,
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he can tell Mme de Renal of his relief at having forsaken his Napoleonic ambitions
and the flawed integrationist ruses he had relied upon to bring them to life: 'je serais
mort sans connaitre le bonheur, si vous n'etiez venue me voir dans cette prison' (RN,
695).
Now that Julien has experienced 'le bonheur', as he admits here, he has rejected
definitively the integrationist forces which have been at work on him all his life and
with which he has always been so complied. That these forces have been largely
overcome is exemplified by Julien's partial avoidance of speech and his inability to
communicate the strength of his emotions within the necessarily restrictive confines
of speech, an inability which Mme de Renal seems, quite contentedly, to share. 'Ses
sanglots l'etouffaient; elle ne pouvait parler' (RN, 682, my italics); and elsewhere,
'elle s'appuya sur Julien, qui etait a ses genoux, et longtemps ils pleurerent en
silence' (RN, 682, my italics). We saw earlier Michel Crouzet's statement that
language is 'un ordre lointain et negateur du moi, [...] [il] humilie le moi et le
trahit'.495 It is this betrayal and denial of his true self that Julien must put right. 'Le
langage est en moi un etranger, un non-moi [...] qui me confisque a moi-meme et me
donne a autre chose'.496 A rejection of this 'etranger' and of this integrationist
strategy par excellence which was Julien's manipulation of speech thus acts as a
prerequisite for access to this 'privileged territory'. He consequently tells Mathilde:
'from this time forth, I never will speak word. On ne me verra ni parler ni ecrire'
(RN, 647). Similarly, that the values of the 'true self seem to have triumphed can be
seen in the fact that the process of 'disculturation'497 to which Julien is subject in his
prison cell has little real effect on him. He receives a series of visitors from his father
to Mathilde to the grand-standing priest who wants him to repent of his sins, each of
whom attempts to subject him to the integrationist pressures which he had largely
complied with and internalised previously. Each of these visitors, however, fails to
divert him from his separatist path now that he has become largely impervious to
such normalising techniques. Throughout his period in the cell, the values of the 'true
495
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self hold firm, and it is his memories of Vergy and the presence of Mme de Renal
which sustain and console him as death approaches. Indeed the last thoughts to
reportedly go through his mind before being guillotined are his recollections of the
moments of authentic 'bonheur' which he had managed to experience with Madame
de Renal.
Jamais cette tete n'avait ete aussi poetique qu'au moment oil elle
allait tomber. Les plus doux moments qu'il avait trouves jadis dans
les bois de Vergy revenaient en foule a sa pensee et avec line
extreme energie. Tout se passa simplement, convenablement, et de
sa part sans aucune affectation. (RN, 697)
Julien can finally die 'sans affectation' as his integrationist strategies and his
ambitions for Napoleonic glory are now long since dead. It is only then that Julien
can finally feel 'fort et resolu comme l'homme qui voit clair dans son ame' (RN,
693).
That the prison cell provides Julien with access to a 'privileged territory' and that
incarceration becomes synonymous with liberation stands as a common-place of
Stendhal criticism: Victor Brombert, for example, writes that 'the feared prison
becomes the happy prison, symbolising self-containment and spiritual self-
sufficiency. [Julien] experiences, much like Fabrice in La Chartreuse de Parme, an
unexpected at-homeness in jail'.498 Shoshana Felman also stresses that 'la prison
delimite des lors cet espace marginal, espace autre - qui, du fait meme de son
exclusion, s'etablit hors des frontieres de l'ordre bourgeois et transcende la realite, et
ou Fame, exilee du reel, peut enfin respirer, s'epanouir librement'.499 What has not
been commented on, however, is the proximity of the characteristics of this territory
to the goals of anti-psychiatric practice. As we saw in part I, Laing's therapeutic goal
was to help restore the schizophrenic individual to a position of 'aletheia'. This he
described as the state of being 'true to oneself, and of being 'without secrecy, that
which discloses itself without a veil'.500 In his prison cell, Julien achieves this very
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goal and sheds the veil represented by his Napoleonic ambitions and the
integrationist pressures he had colluded with for so long in order to fulfill these
ambitions. As a result of shedding this veil, Julien and Louise reach in the prison cell
a position ofwhat Laing would term 'genuine mutual relatedness', a state which they
had first experienced briefly at Vergy. This relationship is one predicated on 'the
original bond of I and You' (TDS, 19). This much is clear when one compares the
details of their relationship, as we have just seen them, with the characteristics of an
I-You bond as outlined originally by Buber. Tamar Kron's summary of these
characteristics was cited earlier, but it bears repetition here because of its brevity.
1-You relationships are spontaneous, direct and authentic. They
occur in the reality of the here-and-now. They are the 'between',
the meeting between an authentic open I and a unique separate
Other. There is no ulterior motive for the meeting, no objective
other than the meeting itself.501
This 'I-You' bond contrasts with the second form of relatedness which Buber
outlines - an I-It bond - and which characterises Julien and Mathilde's interaction at
this point of the novel. Kron describes such an I-lt relationship as one in which the
'relations are partial as the other is only an object for the I to use and categorise. The
other is not perceived as a separate, independent being, but as a passive something
either to possess or analyse'.502 Such a description echoes the facts that, firstly, 'il
fallait toujours l'idee d'un public et des autres a Lame hautaine de Mathilde' (RN,
663), and, secondly, Julien views her constant manoeuvring as a bothersome if
ultimately inconsequential distraction. By contrast, Julien and Louise appear to have
effected a shift from an Lit to an I-You form of relatedness; they have established
inside the prison walls the type of authentic encounter which Laing and his
colleagues held up as the aim of their psychotherapeutic practice but which they were
ultimately unable to put into clinical practice at, for example, the Kingsley Hall
therapeutic community. How do Julien and Louise manage this? It is because Julien
has finally 'un-learned the false selves' which he had projected at the Besanpon
seminary or the Hotel de La Mole, for example, in order to further his separatist
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goals (even if, as we saw earlier in this chapter, these false selves were in fact only
standing in the way of the fulfilment of his separatist desires). Mien's achievement
in Mr-learning his false selves' seems remarkably similar to the way in which anti-
psychiatrists aimed to help their patients divest themselves of their false selves and
un-do the knots and double binds in which they had become entangled thanks to
disconfirnratory forms of interaction in family and society. Now that Mien's false
selves have been demolished and stripped away, he has, in effect, gone through a
process of 'positive disintegration'504 of his self. This, as we saw in part I, was
considered by those in the anti-psychiatric vanguard to be a prerequisite to the
'dissolution of the normal ego, that false self competently adjusted to our alienated
social reality' (PE, 119), a process which would be facilitated by non-
institutionalised, non-invasive therapeutic techniques. In essence, Mien has
undergone an 'existential rebirth' and experienced a voyage of a 'metanoic'505
character similar to the one which Laing hoped Kingsley Hall residents would
experience, one which would lead to 'a new quality of thought that is beyond
everyday thought'.506 This we can see clearly in the narrator's statement made very
early on during Mien's stay in the Besanqon prison cell: 'il [Mien] considerait
toutes choses sous un nouvel aspect' (RN, 650).
This new quality of thought is vitally important to both anti-psychiatric therapy and
to Le Rouge et le Noir. In relation to the latter, it has two important and inter-linked
aspects. The first is that it allows Mien to look afresh at the world and recognise that
it is founded on sleaze and insincerity. 'J'aime la verite... Ou est-elle?... Partout
hypocrisie, ou du moins charlatanisme, meme chez les plus vertueux, merne chez les
plus grands; et ses levres prirent l'expression du degout... Non, l'homme ne peut pas
se fier a l'homme' (RN, 690). The established church and organised religion, too, are
the objects of his allegations of sanctimony: 'ou est la verite? Dans la religion... Oui,
ajouta-t-il avec le sourire amer du plus extreme mepris, dans la bouche des Maslon,
des Frilair, des Castanede...' (RN, 691, my italics). It is not only Mien's religious
504 See p. 38.
505 See p. 41.
506 See pp. 41.
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contemporaries who are castigated by Julien as even the Church's founding fathers
do not escape censure: 'ou est la verite? [...] Peut-etre dans le vrai christianisme,
dont les pretres ne seraient pas plus payes que les apotres ne font ete? ... Mais saint
Paul fut paye par le plaisir de commander, de parler, de faire parler de soi...' (RN,
691). Napoleon, once Mien's idol, also now appears in a different light,
demonstrating just how much Mien's priorities have been re-ordered as a result of
his miraculous 'metanoic' conversion. 'Madame de *** faisant une quete pour ses
pauvres orphelins, me disait que tel prince venait de donner dix louis; mensonge.
Mais que dis-je? Napoleon a Sainte-Helene!... Pur charlatanisme, proclamation en
faveur du roi de Rome' (RN, 691).
The second aspect to the new quality of thought which Julien's 'metanoic' voyage or
'existential re-birth' brings about as a direct, if unplanned, result of his 'mad'
behaviour is that he becomes endowed with a Christ-like omniscience. This
messianic status is remarkably similar to the state of prophetic or divine wisdom
which Laing and his anti-psychiatrist colleagues believed their disturbed patients
could be able to access as a result of their existential crises. Both in Le Rouge et le
Noir and in the anti-psychiatric theories of R. D. Laing, we find reference to
individuals who successfully divest themselves of their collective identities. In
Laing's words 'the "normal", "adjusted" state is too often the abdication of ecstasy'
(TDS, 12). Both Julien Sorel and the Laingian schizophrenic patient are able to move
beyond the 'pseudo-sanity' which represents 'the betrayal of [their] true
potentialities' (TDS, 12) and access a messianic sphere in which they become 'the
servant of the divine and no longer its betrayer' (PE, 119). Admittedly, Laing's
techniques for aiding his patients to reach this 'gateway to Promethean
CA7 #
discoveries' were fiercely disputed by his colleagues in the psychiatric
establishment, and, more importantly, seemed to work out better on paper than in
clincial reality, as we saw in part I. The fact remains, however, that Julien Sorel
appears to realise - albeit briefly - in a fictional context the goals of anti-psychiatric
therapy which Laing arguably largely failed to achieve in practice. As such, Laing's
507 See p. 38.
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most famous and most cited declaration - 'madness need not all be breakdown, [...]
it may also be breakthrough' (PE, 110) - would seem to have considerable resonance
within the final stages of the life of Julien Sorel, as is demonstrated by the many
messianic characteristics which Julien assumes in the final chapters of the novel and
which many Stendhal critics have pointed to. Roger Pearson, for example, describes
r rvo
Julien's 'voyage d'apprentissage' as his own personal 'via dolorosa'; Hans Boll-
Johansen sees the incident in which Julien shares a drink with two fellow prison
inmates as an 'allusion evidente aux deux larrons de la Bible';5 9 while Richard B.
Grant points to the fact that '[Julien's] head is spirited away by Mathilde, a fact
unknown to his escort'.510 Grant is also at pains to make the judicious point,
however, that in spite of all the surface similarites between the lives of Julien and
Jesus, 'even more obvious is that there are innumberable differences [...], both
formal and substantive. To take but one example, there is only one woman who goes
to the cave, not two as in the Bible, and Mathilde de La Mole can in no way be
assumed to resemble them'.5" What remains unarguable, however, is that Julien
certainly takes on god-like characteristics in the eyes ofMine de Renal who sees him
as a messianic figure worthy of her adoration: 'des que je te vois, tous les devoirs
disparaissent, je ne suis plus qu'amour pour toi, ou plutot, le mot amour est trop
faible. Je sens pour toi ce que je devrais sentir uniquement pour Dieu: un melange de
respect, d'amour, d'obeissance' (RN, 683). The cult of Julien is such that he inspires
his followers to fanaticism as is evidenced both by the crowds who attend his trial in
such numbers and are so moved by his words and also by this statement from Mme
de Renal: 'en verite, je ne sais pas ce que tu m'inspires. Tu me dirais de donner un
coup de couteau au geolier, que le crime serait commis avant que j'y eusse songe'
(RN, 683).
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Do the conclusions which we have reached here regarding Julien's messianic status
and his anticipation of anti-psychiatric objectives have any relevance to the other
three novels? It would appear that they do when we turn, first, to Renee Mauperin.
We saw in part II that the 'invraisemblance' which surrounds Renee's death relates
not merely to why she should incriminate her brother or to why she should die at any
early age but also, most significantly of all, to the overtly beatified manner of her
death and to the apparent transfiguration she undergoes on her death-bed. She is
characterised, for example, by 'une beaute d'extase et de supreme delivrance', (RM,
259) and 'la paix d'un ravissement' (RM, 259): she dies, in Cabanes's words 'une
mort edifiante'.512 What, then, is significant about the manner of her death is the fact
that she has reached a privileged territory in which she is able to see her separatist
ideals finally realised, or, in Laingian terms, in which her true self s ideals of 'inner
honesty, freedom, omnipotence and creativity' (TDS, 89) can be ultimately fulfilled.
How has she done this? It would appear that this privileged territory has been
accessed thanks to the processes of full disembodiment, depersonalisation and
isolation which she undertakes in parallel to killing off her physical, outer false self.
We have already seen examples of Renee's reliance on the mechanisms of
disembodiment and (self-)depersonalisation. For these procedures to be effective,
however, and for there to have been no counter-acting, centripetal integrationist
pressures acting on her, Renee has had to foresake relatedness almost entirely and
withdraw into as extreme a form of isolation as she can manage. Accordingly, she
insists towards the end of the novel on moving to the family's isolated estate at
Morimond, a place whose buildings include a deserted, tumble-down monastery and
whose name is derived from the phrase 'mort-au-monde' (RM, 59). She, too, quite
simply wishes to be 'morte-au-monde'. As Peter J. Edwards describes in his study of
urban / provincial topography in the Goncourts' novels, 'la ville est avant tout un
centre de pouvoir: un pouvoir qui s'exerce ineluctablement sur la vie des
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personnages avec ou sans leurs concours'. It is in 'la ville' (in Renee's case, Paris)
that the integrationist forces at work on Renee are not only at their most intense but
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are also at their most 'ineluctable'. Morimond, by contrast, acts as a 'non-lieu' which
defies referentiality, 'un lieu de pure idealite' where 'le personnage [peut] se realiser
sans opposition'51 - that is, where Renee can realise her separatist goals without
opposition from the array of normalising forces to which she has been constantly
subjected. It was at Morimond as a child that Renee had known her happiest days,
and it was there that she had initially been associated with imagery of the divine: she
was a 'petit ange' (RM, 62) in the adoring eyes of her father as the two of them
indulged in 'des betises divines' (RM, 62), joined in a Rousseau-esque communion
with nature: 'il [M Mauperin] ressentait d'ineffables douceurs a entendre son enfant,
penetree de tout ce bruit dans lequel il marchait, chercher des sons, murmurer,
begayer, comme pour repondre aux oiseaux et parler au ciel qui chantaif (RM, 62).
Morimond, and the isolation she experiences there, when taken together with her
depersonalisation and disembodiment, allow Renee to be 'morte-au-monde'. As
such, Morimond provides Renee with an invaluable opportunity to move towards the
realisation of her separatist ideals.
That Renee is 'mort-au-monde' can also be seen in the significant development
undergone at this stage of the novel by the aesthetic of silence which has
characterised her entire life. As we saw in relation to Julien Sorel, a rejection of
speech goes hand in hand with a rejection of the self-normalising techniques which
so charactersed Renee's earlier life. As such, it is a prerequisite to her accessing a
privileged territory in which she may move towards a realisation of her ideals. What
is perhaps most interesting about the textual inscription of silence at this stage of
Renee Mauperin is not so much the way in which Renee's silence is 'told' (after all,
how can Renee 'say' she is being silent?), but the way in which it is 'shown', as her
withdrawal from speech is conveyed most substantially on the narratological level.
For example, the narrative towards the end of the novel becomes considerably more
elliptical and impressionistic with the final thirty chapters of the novel (out of a total
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of 65) taking up a little under 25% of the novel as compared with the first thirty
chapters which account for over 60%. An extreme example of this textual
compression is to be found in the novel's fifty-seventh chapter which comes only a
few pages before Renee's death and which reads in its entirety:
Comme elle regardait par sa fenetre, elle [Renee] vit une fois une
femme s'asseoir dans la poussiere au milieu de la rue du village,
entre une pierre et une orniere, et demailloter son petit enfant.
L'enfant sur le ventre, le liaut du corps dans l'ombre, remuait ses
petites jambes, croisait ses pieds, gigottait dans le soleil: le soleil le
fouettait amoureusement comme il fouette les nudites d'enfant.
Des rayons qui le caressaient et le chatouillaient, semblaient lui
jeter aux talons les roses d'une corbeille de Fete-Dieu... La mere et
l'enfant partis, Renee regardait encore. (RM, 246)
Reading this chapter, one is left with the impression that the entire novel is withering
away and silencing itself, paralleling Renee's own physical withering and self-
silencing, given that the narrator refrains from providing the kind of all-explaining,
all-knowing interventions which so characterise the early part of the novel.5 5 Such
silencing of the omniscient narrator in the guise of an increasingly pointillist writing
style also serves to create a strong sense of solidarity between the narrator and
Renee's fate.
We have seen so far that Renee is now largely 'morte-au-monde' thanks to her
having taken to their extreme the processes of isolation, disembodiment and
depersonalisation. A Laingian interpretation of the manner of her death would thus
suggest that she takes on divine attributes on her death-bed because she, like Julien,
has successfully divested herself of the collective identites and false self systems she
had projected earlier in the novel as a means of coping with the integrationist
pressures being applied to her. She, too, has undergone a form of existential rebirth
and a 'metanoic voyage' which endows her with 'une beaute d'extase et de
delivrance' (RM, 259). Such messianic qualities inspire cowering and worshipful
admiration from those present: 'son pere, sa mere, son ami etaient tombes a genoux'
(RM, 259). In effect, she becomes a conduit for the divine or, in anti-psychiatric
terms, 'a hierophant of the sacred': 'ses yeux grands ouverts, tournes en haut,
515
See, for example, chapters 2, 5 (especially pp. 84-6), 6 (pp. 91-4), 8, 12 (pp. 121-3) or 20.
244
paraissaient s'emplir d'infini, son regard, peu a peu, prenait la fixite des choses
eternelles. De tous ses traits se levait comrne une aspiration bienheureuse' (RM,
259). Elsewhere, we read: 'elle etait a derni detachee de son etre, et toute prete a se
dissiper dans la divine douceur des choses' (RM, 243), and that 'ce qui Eenveloppait
d'ombre l'enveloppait aussi de paix' (RM, 239). Interestingly, in response to the
narrator's statement: 'elle se mit a [...] parler de tous les bons cotes de la souffrance'
(RM, 231), Jean-Louis Cabanes writes: 'filtree par Linstance narrative qui
s'interpose entre le lecteur et le personnage, la parole de Renee semble ainsi venir
d'outretombe tout en enongant des verites intemporelles\ It is, then, only as a
result of her 'madness' and of her allegedly 'mad' actions that she has been able to
embark on this 'healing voyage' and leave behind her 'pseudo-sanity' of paying lip-
service to the integrationist pressures at work on her. As a consequence of her
'madness', she can access a quasi-messianic status and have revealed to her new
insights which are blocked off to the rest of humanity
Louis Lambert also undertakes a 'healing voyage' as a result of his 'madness' similar
to that which he have just witnessed in relation to Julien and Renee. He, too, is
endowed with overt messianic characteristics as a result of having taken as far as
possible the processes of disembodiment, depersonalisation and isolation. The
narrator goes on a 'pelerinage' (LL, 680) to visit him and then describes the effect
which Louis's few words have on him: his words 'semblaient accuser un bonheur
divin' (LL, 683). Louis can bear witness to others of an 'incomplete revelation d'un
monde inconnu' (LL, 683) given that 'sans cesse, il voltige a travers les espaces de la
pensee' (LL, 684). When Louis speaks, he has an almost evangelical effect on his
listeners: 'sa phrase retentit dans nos ames comme quelque magnifique sonnerie
d'eglise au milieu d'une nuit profonde' (LL, 683). Louis's 'madness' has led to what
Laing would describe as 'the dissolution of the normal ego' and also, crucially, to
'the emergence of the 'inner' archetypal mediator of divine power' (PE, 119). His
existential rebirth has facilitated 'the eventual re-establishment of a new kind of ego-
functioning, the ego now being the servant of the divine, no longer its betrayer' (PE,
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119). As Pauline explains: 'quand il parle, il exprime les choses merveilleuses' (LL,
683), or in the words of one critic: 'Louis Lambert, the hero, transcends the bitter
limitations of the human comedy'.517 He has indeed become a 'hierophant of the
sacred' and has progressed onto the higher plane of sanity which anti-psychiatrists
believed their patients would be able to access given a supportive therapeutic
environment, a higher plane beyond the 'pseudo-sanity' of everyday life and one
which he feels no real need to return from. As Pauline tells the narrator: 'peut-etre un
jour Louis reviendra-t-il a cette vie dans laquelle nous vegetons; mais s'il respire Pair
des cieux avant les temps oil il nous sera permis d'y exister, pourquoi souhaiterons-
nous de le revoir parmi nous?' (LL, 684)
Does Claude Lantier fall into this same category, one in which he undergoes a
process of 'positive disintegration'? One might initially think not given that the novel
ends on a note of such wretched despair at Claude's graveside. As Bongrand and
Sandoz put the problem:
- [...] Si nous ne tenions pas si fort a nos peaux, nous ferions tons
comme lui [Claude]... N'est-ce pas?
- Ma foi, oui. Puisque nous ne pouvons rien creer, puisque nous ne
sommes que des reproducteurs debiles, autant vaudrait-il nous
casser la tete tout de suite (LO, 363).
Yet even if the perspective of the narrator appears to support their nihilistic view, it
is not necessarily one which is shared by Claude as he appears to obey quite
willingly 'la voix haute' (LO, 352) which calls him back towards his art and towards
his death now that he knows he will never be able to realise his artistic ideals. In so
doing, Claude too accesses 'a new quality of thought', which, much like in the case
of Julien Sorel and the other protagonists, allows him to see the reality of the world
around him for what it really is: 'il se decida, c'etait fini, il souffrait trop, il ne
pouvait plus vivre, puisque tout mentait et qu 'il n 'y avait rien de bon' (LO, 351, my
italics). He, like Renee, can finally throw off the integrationist shackles which just a
few moments before had become all-powerful in the guise of Christine. 'II avait
rompu la chaine enfin, il etait libre. Un troisieme appel le fit se hater, il passa dans la
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piece voisine, en disant: « Oui, oui, j'y vais! » (LO, 352). He obeys his calling and
becomes a martyr to the divinity which his Promethean ideals represent.
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Conclusion to Part III
In part III, we have undertaken a Laingian analysis of the four protagonists'
behaviour and of their arguably 'invraisemblables' and irrational actions. This
analysis has suggested, firstly, that there is in fact, in Laing's words, 'a
comprehensible transition' (TDS, 17) between the protagonists' behaviour in the
early stages of each novel and that towards the end of the novel, and, secondly, that
their allegedly 'mad' actions should not in reality be seen as out-of-place and can
instead be viewed as 'context-sensible'. This 'comprehensible transition' centres on
an uneasy co-existence between two mutually exclusive sets of separatist desires and
integrationist pressures within each of the protagonists, a co-existence which, as we
in chapters two and three of part III, eventually becomes unsustainable. All four
protagonists reach a point where they realise that their separatist ideals are about to
be engulfed by the hostile, normalising environment around them, and, consequently,
that these goals will never be realised. At this point, all four protagonists commit a
form of suicide of their true selves or of their separatist ideals in order to prevent
their true selves from being entirely subsumed or destroyed. All four abide by the
key principle Laing attributes to the schizophrenic - that is, they turn themselves into
stone to prevent themselves from being turned into stone by others. As a result of
their 'suicide', however, they gain access to a higher sphere of existence which
endows them with quasi-messianic characteristics and which would seem to suggest
that they have in fact managed to realise, albeit briefly and in a limited space, both
the goals of their true selves as well as the aims of anti-psychiatric therapy which
Laing and his colleagues failed to achieve in clinical practice.
This Laingian analysis of the four novels would furthermore suggest that some
critics' interpretations of the protagonists' lives, examined in part II chapter two, are
somewhat wide of the mark. For example, a Laing-inspired examination of Louis
Lambert would argue that Louis should not be seen at the end of his life as a tragic
figure or an incapacitated failure, as many psychiatrists and critics have suggested.MS
Instead, it concords with Balzac's own view that with Louis Lambert he aimed to
5,8 See pp.71 and 95.
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portray 'les grandes conceptions de l'extase humaine echauffee par le souffle
divin';519 and also with the small number of critics who propose a positive
assessment of Louis's final state such as Arthur Holmberg who believes that the
novel represents 'the triumph of man's spirit to transcend the confines of physical
S90
reality'. Moreover, it bolsters, firstly, those critics who celebrate rather than
denigrate or ignore the role of Pauline de Villenoix in Louis's destiny,521 and,
S99
secondly, those like Barberis who situate Louis's denial of the body within his
'profond besoin de verite, d'authenticite',523 a need which remains unsated in the
world around him. Yet a Laingian approach surely enables us to go beyond the work
of these critics as it provides an insight into the specific psychological processes
which underlie and precipitate this need to escape and transcend the limitations of the
human condition.
Regarding Le Rouge et le Noir, we saw that a Laingian interpretation rejects the view
that Julien's attempt on the life ofMme de Renal is by its essence inexplicable or the
result of an involuntary state of hypnosis or extreme paranoia.524 It also suggests that
interpretations of the shooting which focus on notions of social class and revenge525
or on Julien's relations with father or mother figures526 have certain limitations. It
proposes instead that Julien's behaviour is motivated more by the complex interplay
between his ambitions and the methods he has been using to bring about these
ambitions. It situates his murder attempt within the dramatic collapse of his self-
image as a figure of Napoleonic stature and potential and within the realisation that
he has become the type of vile despicable hypocrite which he had always so
despised. Of all the critical approaches reviewed in part II, it would seem to be that
put forward by Leo Bersani which our anti-psychiatric interpretation lies most
closely to. Bersani wrote:
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Julien is fit to be neither a revolutionary nor a parvenu because his
social ambitions include very little interest in society; instead, he
wants to be powerful enough to do without society. Julien sees
Napoleon not as the man who changed society, but rather as a
historical metaphor for his own dream of a secure solitude in which
people will no longer be able to hurt him.527
It is just this dream 'of a secure solitude' which Julien is eventually able to realise,
not because of his status as a quasi-Napoleonic revolutionary, but precisely because
he comes to sacrifice his ambitions to 'faire fortune' and 'faire les choses
extraordinaires'.
Our Laingian examination of Renee Mauperin contributes much to the field of
Goncourt criticism because relatively little critical attention has been focused on the
novel to date. It also gives some backing to the second of the two critical schools of
thought relating Renee's behaviour: namely, that which focuses on the 'productive'
528
aspects of her death and the messianic status she assumes on her death-bed. It thus
rejects the views put forward by, firstly, Frangois Fosca, for example, that the guilt
and shame she feels over the role she played in her brother's death are to blame for
COQ
her untimely demise through precipitating a fatal 'maladie de coeur', and,
secondly, Robert Ricatte who believes that the novel is fatally flawed because it fails
to remain faithful to the medical theories of the day. In relation to the final scenes of
the novel, for example, he writes: 'le passage est d'un grand effet, mais il est irritant
quand on a lu les agonies reelles de Bouillaud'.530 Medical realism, a Laingian critic
would argue, is only of secondary importance to the end of the novel when compared
with the transcendent state of divine beauty that Renee is able to access as a result of
having forsaken the impossible task of trying to remain true to herself and to her
absolute values in a world characterised by corruption and mediocrity. In essence,
Renee has become a martyr to the divinity of authenticity in a 'mad' and
dishonourable world.
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Finally, turning to Zola's L 'CEuvre, the Laingian critic would reject as largely
irrelevant the swathes of criticism devoted to the questions of the reliability of the
531
novel as a document of sociological or artistic history. Instead, it gives backing to
the much smaller school of criticism which focuses on Claude Lantier's quest for
authenticity in art, a search which eventually proves to be impossible. Significantly,
however, Laing's work provides an important development of the ideas put forward
• 532
by critics such as David Walker and Thomas Zamparelli as it permits an
examination of the day-to-day psychological process which Claude must undergo in
the attempt to produce 'true' or 'authentic' art.
331 See pp. 111-5.




In the introduction to this thesis, I proposed that my aims would be twofold. First, I
aimed to put forward anti-psychiatry-inspired responses to a series of questions
regarding seemingly irrational and out-of-place events in four novels. This objective
has been met in part III of this thesis where I situated the four protagonists'
behaviour within the unsustainable co-existence between two mutually exclusive sets
of separatist desires and integrationist pressures. The second aim was to examine,
more widely, the extent to which the writings of R. D. Laing, discredited though they
may be in clinical psychiatric circles, may be used as a framework within which to
analyse literary texts. Throughout this thesis, many convergences have emerged
between the four novels and Laing's writings - notably his 1960 work The Divided
Self. These convergences, I believe, suggest that Laing's work does indeed offer the
literary critic a wide range of simple but still extremely fruitful concepts and tools
with which to analyse the actions and motivations of fictional characters. It has also
emerged, however, that the elements of Laing's work which gained him most renown
within 1960's counter-cultural circles and most notoriety among his one-time
colleagues in the psychiatric establishment - that is, his belief in madness as a
healing voyage which could potentially facilitate a metanoic conversion - are the
same elements which provide surely the closest parallel of all between his work and
the four novels. This fact would therefore appear to give some credence to Elaine
Showalter's view which was quoted in the thesis introduction: 'if Laing's work lasts,
it will not be in the realm of psychiatric practice or social style, but in art or
literature, where it may provide instructive images and tropes for other
imaginations'.533 The field of literary analysis thus could arguably offer Laing's
work, particularly his most discredited work, a warmer and more welcoming home
than the sphere of clinical psychiatry does today.
In part I, I demonstrated that some moves have been made recently towards re¬
establishing Laing as a key figure of twentieth-century psychiatry and
psychotherapy. Much critical work remains to be done, however, on the writings of
R. D. Laing and their fruitful conjunction with literary texts. I hope therefore that this
thesis can represent one small contribution to the rapidly growing field of Laingian
533
Showalter, 'Laing and the Sixties', p. 127.
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analyses of literary texts and can contribute towards establishing Laing's work as a
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